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THE  
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1861-1862/

BULL RUN TO MALVERN HILL

By

MAJOR G. W. REDWAY

AUTHOR OF "FREDERICKSBURG: A STUDY IN WAR"

WITH MAPS REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION OF  
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

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1910



## PREFACE

THE difficulty that besets a writer on the American Civil War, the war of the States, is the wealth of material—of firsthand evidence—that has recently become available. Whatever problem of defence may be under discussion, whatever point of detail is being investigated, a number of well-founded opinions embedded in voluminous statements present themselves for consideration: and every phase and aspect of military operations have been illustrated by elaborate reports, accurate maps, plans and sketches. It is evident that the labour of a lifetime were needed to acquire and digest all this information; and the result is to deter the casual inquirer from delivering final judgment on any matter in dispute and make him especially chary of assigning reasons for actions and causes for events. Certain general impressions, however, will remain as the result of a few years' study of the War Records, and such impressions the present writer has endeavoured to set forth in the belief that most of the latter-

day problems of defence were practically solved by the events of 1861-1862; and notably those in connection with an obsolete army system that still endures in all English-speaking countries.

The author has ventured upon a slight innovation in the arrangement of his material which he believes will facilitate study. The opening chapters present some broad views of the War of Secession, exhibiting its purposes and general tendencies, the machinery available under given geographical and political conditions, and indicating certain ideals and principles of action by which the belligerents were guided. The remainder of the volume is devoted to a survey of such phases of the campaigns of the first year of the war as are conceived to possess a living interest, and illustrate the theory of war taught to-day, without hampering the narrative with irrelevant detail, dubious assumptions or merely picturesque biography.

G. W. R.



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## CHAPTER I

### GEOGRAPHY AND POLITICS

ORIGIN OF THE WAR—JOHN BROWN'S RAID—INAUGURATION  
OF PRESIDENT LINCOLN — BOMBARDMENT OF FORT  
SUMTER—RECOGNITION OF BELLIGERENCY—THE THEATRE  
OF WAR—RAILWAY SYSTEMS—INLAND WATERWAYS—THE  
ALLEGHANY MOUNTAINS — THE EASTERN SHORE — THE  
BALTIMORE RIOTS—WASHINGTON IN DANGER—DEFECTION  
OF NAVAL AND MILITARY OFFICERS.



M. 781

# The War of Secession

## CHAPTER I

### GEOGRAPHY AND POLITICS

To the philosophic historian it were a grateful task to expatiate on the points of resemblance and of difference between the American War of Secession and those great popular struggles under Cromwell and Washington in which the standing armies of Charles I. and George III. were worsted by a nation in arms ; or the reconquest of Oude in 1857, or the various oversea expeditions which culminated in the extinction of the South African republics at the beginning of the present century : but for the purposes of this work it must suffice to correct one misapprehension, which is due to the official designation of the four years' contest by the successful belligerent as the "War of the Rebellion."

The hostilities which commenced in 1861 were not caused by a popular insurrection ; there was no Jack Cade nor Duke of Monmouth in the case ;

nor was there a revolt of colonies against the mother country such as tore Virginia, Georgia and the Carolinas from the hold of Great Britain in the previous century. Every State that seceded had proceeded regularly—exercising the right it possessed to legislate for itself—to pass an Ordinance of Secession: and its defence was primarily entrusted to a militia which the State laws had called into being and State funds had supported. There was good ground for the belief that the sovereignty of each State had not been impaired when it voluntarily joined the Union and by the terms of the alliance entrusted its foreign interests to a central government and a President elected by vote; and thus the seizure of forts and arsenals within State territory in 1861 amounted to no more than the recovery of a freehold site on behalf of its legal owner.

It was however natural that President Lincoln should express these things differently, just as George Washington sometime a colonial officer serving George III. afterwards asserted “the equality of man” and the right of British colonies to political independence as sovereign States; but the necessity President Lincoln was under to prevent foreign aid reaching the South fully defined the actual situation in 1861; for his blockade of the coast showed that a state of war existed

and his proclamation to neutrals drew from European powers a Recognition of Belligerency which impartially embraced both sides. The idea of rebellion or of mutiny was further precluded by his acceptance of the resignation of their commissions by Southern officers in the "United States" navy and army, and by demanding from Great Britain ten years later a large indemnity for an alleged violation of neutrality in permitting British subjects to furnish "the enemy" with vessels to be used as cruisers.

An influential party in the North upheld in 1861 this view of the secession movement: even in New York public opinion as reflected in *The Tribune* declared that "whenever any considerable section of our Union shall deliberately resolve to go out we shall resist all coercive measures to keep them in," and it was partly on this understanding that the Southern States determined to establish a Confederacy: but they counted too on the necessities of Northern manufacturers and of Great Britain and Europe, who all needed the produce of the cotton States, proving an ultimate solvent of any serious difficulties that might arise.

The Confederacy, however, in expecting moral support in Western Europe overlooked one important factor in the case, and that was the steady growth for eighty years of a sentiment

antagonistic to slave-holding. Europe was at one with the North in its repugnance to becoming "slave hunters for the South," to use General Grant's expression.

Though Great Britain and France had emancipated the slaves in their colonies during the first half of the nineteenth century the States and peoples of America, which had preached the doctrine that "all men are created equal," had persistently denied to a person of African descent those "unalienable rights" set forth in the Declaration of Independence, namely "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness"; and even so late as 1856 the Supreme Court in America had decided that a man and his family could lawfully be bought or sold, and "treated as an ordinary article of merchandise and traffic," on the sole ground that his ancestor had been imported into America as a slave: moreover, it was held that such persons even if set free by their owners could never claim any of the rights of a "citizen."

This deliberately weighed judgment in the Dred Scott case added fuel to the flame that had been lighted in 1852, when the publication in America of a romance called "Uncle Tom's Cabin" awakened the conscience of the continent where slavery had been hallowed by the practice of George Washington himself; and now the slave-



breeding section was looked at askance and fugitive "servants" from the Southern were offered asylum in the Northern States. The abolitionist party increased in numbers and activity and actually organised a raid within the borders of Virginia, and when this enterprise resulted in the hanging of John Brown by the Virginia State authorities the Boston *Liberator* went so far as to say that "to be hanged in Virginia is like being crucified in Jerusalem: it is the last tribute that sin pays to virtue." Little wonder that the Southern and Border States regarded the raid on Virginia in 1859 in much the same light as the Boers viewed the Jameson raid in 1895.

The plain truth is that the Union itself had been established on the basis of slave-holding—Dixie's Land was on Manhattan Island—but the unforeseen had occurred; the phenomenal development of the Northern States on manufacturing and commercial lines, which demanded white craftsmen, while the Southern States remained an agricultural region had not been provided for: and therefore in the South the exigencies of field labour in a semi-tropical zone excused what the law justified, namely the continuance of negro slavery as a domestic institution, while the Northerners could well afford to indulge altruistic sentiments in favour of personal liberty as it

affected a race with which they had nothing in common.

The friction which occurred between the States on fiscal policy was founded on similar differences in regard to environment : the South having no manufacturing interests to serve wanted her ports thrown open to Europe, since import duties were obnoxious to agriculturists as raising the price of farm implements, clothing and luxuries : on the contrary the North, then as now, fostered domestic industries by artificially creating a home market for the products of her workshops by means of a tariff wall.

It is now evident that the Southern States had excellent reasons for wishing to sever the tie with Washington and so dissolving a partnership which had become irksome : and in fact the South went to war for "State Rights" which were as sacred to America in the middle of the nineteenth century as Self-Government is to Canada to-day.

South Carolina had for long taken the lead among the slave-holding States. "Nowhere was the passion for slavery so strong ; nowhere did the Southern planters view the Northern merchant with so much hatred and contempt" ; and as soon as it was known that Abraham Lincoln the Illinois republican and abolitionist had been elected to the presidency South Carolina seceded.

The new President had already shown his hand, vowing that he would "hold, occupy and possess the property and places belonging to the government and collect the duties on imports"; but four months must elapse before he could be "inaugurated" and during that time SOUTH CAROLINA had silently occupied Fort Pinckney and the arsenal at Charleston; GEORGIA had seceded and taken possession of Fort Pulaski at the mouth of the Savannah river and the arsenal at Augusta; FLORIDA had joined the Confederacy after seizing the navy yard at Pensacola and failing to subdue Fort Pickens; ALABAMA had occupied the arsenal at Mount Vernon and the forts which command the entrance to Mobile Bay; the State of MISSISSIPPI secured a fort then under construction in the Sound: LOUISIANA played her part by seizing Forts Jackson and St Philip, the barracks, the marine hospital, the Mint—with half-a-million dollars—the Custom House at New Orleans, the arsenal at Baton Rouge and the forts on Lake Pontchartrain; TEXAS had brought into the Confederacy all the military posts given up to her by Brigadier-general Twiggs, who handed over also his military stores and the Treasury with a million dollars. In every case however a peaceable evacuation of the posts by the small Federal garrisons was effected.

During all this time Mr Buchanan the outgoing President remained supine at Washington, but his Secretary for War, Mr Floyd, was active in the cause of secession, even sending the United States war-vessels to distant stations and causing the transfer of 115,000 muskets and rifles from the armoury at Springfield in Massachusetts and the arsenal at Watervliet to various points in the South. Of Secretary Floyd we shall hear something hereafter as a Confederate general.

Early in February a Constitution was framed for the Confederate States and Jefferson Davis, a cotton planter of Mississippi, was appointed President for six years, who in March despatched commissioners to Europe to invoke foreign sympathy and procure material aid. They soon discovered however that while the effect of a Recognition of Belligerency to the Confederacy was that in accordance with international law its armies became lawful belligerents, not banditti ; its ships of war lawful cruisers, not pirates ; its seizures of supplies from invaded territory became requisitions, not robbery ; its blockades would be respected by neutrals ; on the other hand its Government could not negotiate treaties, nor accredit diplomatic ministers, nor even have regular and official intercourse with other Powers. In short, a community like the Confederacy would

possess no rights, no immunities, no claims beyond those immediately connected with its war unless and until it succeeded in defeating all attempts to subdue it, in which event existing States would sooner or later accord to it Recognition of Independence, and it would then be on the same footing as themselves.

A South Carolina newspaper was publishing telegrams from the North as "Foreign Intelligence" when Mr Lincoln appeared at Washington and as supreme executive officer grappled with the problem of Fort Sumter.

This fort in mid-channel commanded the entrance to Charleston Harbour and had been held for the Union, but the garrison being in urgent need of supplies an attempt was made to furnish them by a landing on the island, an enterprise which resulted in the supply-ship being shelled on her appearance off the coast. Mr Lincoln now despatched a naval squadron carrying 285 guns and 2400 men with positive orders to relieve Fort Sumter. The seven vessels sailed from New York and Norfolk for the inlet, but the Confederate cabinet had been secretly warned of the expedition and had instructed General Beauregard, the local coast-defence commander, to capture the fort and its garrison before the flotilla arrived. Accordingly the guns of Fort Johnson, Fort

Moultrie, Cummings Point and a floating battery were turned on Fort Sumter, and a bombardment for thirty-six hours compelled Major Anderson its commandant to strike his flag. The Confederates then occupied the fort and proceeded to complete the defences of Charleston Harbour by an arrangement of booms, ropes, piles and other obstructions as well as torpedoes of various kinds.

On the news reaching President Lincoln that his naval expedition had proved abortive he called out 75,000 militia, and so ushered in a contest which was to cost America some millions of her bravest sons.

A Virginian historian, Robert Reid Howison, sums up the political situation in April 1861 as follows :

"Had President Lincoln and the 'war' governors deliberately planned events to rouse the people of the North and West to a fury of emotion in favour of war they could not have done it more effectually. . . . All party distinctions at the North seemed to melt away. All—Republicans, Democrats, Whigs, Americans, Free-soilers—united in clamouring for war on the seceded States and the wiping out in blood of the dishonour said to have been done to the country's flag by firing on SUMTER. All of them united to restore the Union."

This outcry was answered by the immediate secession of VIRGINIA, NORTH CAROLINA, ARKANSAS and TENNESSEE, who all joined the Confederacy and made RICHMOND its capital, establishing a rival government nearer to WASHINGTON than HULL is to LONDON.

The geographical position of MARYLAND and DELAWARE, cut off by the river Potomac from Virginia, and of KENTUCKY and MISSOURI almost embedded among "abolitionist" States, prevented their respective governors throwing in their lot with the remainder of the "slave" States, and thus the Confederate cause lost the services of 200,000 combatants who were drafted subsequently to serve the Union.

Geography gave also to the Federals the Heights of Arlington and the port of Alexandria, on Virginian soil indeed but opposite Washington on the Lower Potomac: connected with that city by three great bridges these places were untenable by the small Confederate force available and on May 23 they were evacuated, Alexandria eventually becoming the "Southampton" of the Federals.

On the other hand the Union troops could not hold the Navy Yard at Portsmouth south of the James river, nor Harper's Ferry with its great arsenal on the Upper Potomac in the Shenandoah Valley, nor the section of railway from Baltimore

to the West which crosses the Potomac at Harper's Ferry within Virginian territory.

Fort Monroe in Virginia on the Yorktown peninsula, guarding Hampton Roads and the mouth of the James river, continued to be held by the Federals when Virginia seceded on April 17; and FLORIDA, the peninsular State, never succeeded in reducing either Fort Pickens, Fort Jefferson or Fort Taylor, which kept the Union flag flying in this region throughout the war.

But NORTH CAROLINA seized Forts Caswell, Johnston and Macon, and the arsenal at Fayetteville; and General Van Dorn detained as hostages in TEXAS the various companies of United States regulars who had garrisoned posts in the interior now untenable.

The State of ARKANSAS seized Fort Smith and the arsenal at Little Rock on the Arkansas river and TENNESSEE took possession of the funds held by the United States collector at Nashville on Cumberland river.

KENTUCKY endeavoured to preserve her neutrality and in consequence became the prey of both belligerents. The Confederates seized Columbus and Hickman, one thousand miles up the Mississippi, while the Federals occupied Paducah on the Ohio,—points which may be regarded as marking approximately the western



flanks of the attack and defence respectively in 1861.

The territory which was to become the theatre of war may be roughly calculated as 1500 miles from east to west and about half that distance from north to south ; the northern and western boundaries of the Confederate States were mainly formed by great rivers, the southern and eastern boundaries were the Atlantic Ocean and the Gulf of Mexico : the Mississippi river separated Louisiana, Arkansas and Texas from the other eight States of the Confederacy.

The great plain that skirts the Atlantic seaboard between Washington and Charleston became the Eastern theatre of operations, which is traversed by the Potomac, the James, the Roanoke and other rivers which take their rise in the Alleghany Mountains and flow eastwards ; the valley of the Mississippi and its affluents, the Tennessee, Cumberland and Ohio rivers, became the Western theatre of operations.

This vast area embraced dense forests and cultivated plains, mountain ranges and valleys, sea-coasts and sounds, lakes and rivers, *bayous* and trackless swamps.

The railway system of the Southern States connected RICHMOND in the east—through Lynchburg over the Alleghanies to Knoxville, thence by

Chattanooga, Stevenson and Corinth—with MEMPHIS on the river Mississippi; and all these inland towns were connected with the southern ports by separate lines of railway as follows: MEMPHIS through Jackson to NEW ORLEANS; CORINTH to MOBILE; CHATTANOOGA to ATLANTA and thence by Montgomery to PENSACOLA, or by Macon to SAVANNAH, or by Augusta to CHARLESTON. LYNCHBURG has no direct line to the south coast; but RICHMOND is connected with CHARLESTON through Danville and with WILMINGTON through Petersburg.

Beyond the Mississippi short branch lines ran westward into Louisiana, to MONROE through Vicksburg from JACKSON and to ATCHAFALAYA BAY from NEW ORLEANS. Texas and Arkansas were destitute of railway communications.

North of the line Richmond-Memphis other railways connected RICHMOND through Fredericksburg with AQUIA CREEK on the Potomac, and joined LYNCHBURG through Charlottesville and Manassas to WASHINGTON (Alexandria); STEVENSON through Murfreesboro and Nashville to the State of INDIANA; and CORINTH through Shiloh and Cairo to the State of ILLINOIS.

Approximately parallel with the Richmond-Memphis line a railroad ran from WASHINGTON and BALTIMORE through the States of MARYLAND,

WEST VIRGINIA (*via* Harper's Ferry), OHIO, INDIANA, ILLINOIS and MISSOURI westward; and projected in its eastern section a branch line southwards from HARPER'S FERRY up the Shenandoah Valley, a branch which was connected laterally with the Lynchburg-Washington line at MANASSAS: the same railroad in its western section ran a branch line southwards from CINCINNATI to LEXINGTON.

The populous states of Indiana, Ohio and Illinois were intersected by a network of railways which specially favoured a concentration of Federal troops against the northern frontier of KENTUCKY, and this group of states furnished over 600,000 men to the Union government in the course of the four years' war. Another system of railways from the north-east united at HARRISBURG and BALTIMORE, and caused this region to become the area of concentration for the Federal army in the East.

The communications of North America embraced also extensive waterways, and a journey from NEW ORLEANS to NEW YORK might be performed by steamboat up the Mississippi and Ohio rivers as far as Pittsburg (2000 miles) and thence 500 miles by railway.

At an early stage of the war it was perceived that Virginia could not preserve her integrity,

that a slice of her territory must go : for in the north-west corner of this State a natural barrier in the Alleghany Mountains had been passed, and territory beyond had been politically connected to the Old Dominion. The people of this region however were in contact with five other States, of whom two were distinctly hostile and the others lukewarm in sentiment ; and although Southern sympathisers existed—who at the outset of hostilities clamoured for local protection, expecting the war would be waged for the defence of their towns and villages—the accessible points west of the Alleghanies belonged geographically to the valley of the Ohio, and the Richmond authorities could not prevent this territory being over-run by Ohio State troops : it was formed into an independent State in the course of the war.

The Great Cacapon river and the Potomac river defined a salient frontier which Virginia projected into Maryland about Martinsburg, and gave to the operations in the East a peculiar strategic character : an army in the Lower Valley of the Shenandoah would protect the inner flanks of forces operating in West Virginia and about Manassas, but its own position within the angle would be precarious in the event of the defeat of either force on the flanks : the question of holding Harper's Ferry was therefore hotly

debated both at Washington and Richmond, and the decisions arrived at and the reasons given for them illustrate the peculiar difficulties attending the conduct of war when politicians, military critics and soldiers of all grades are allowed a voice in every matter and the telegraph affords a fatally easy means of altering arrangements at any moment.

Other geographical features were found to present new difficulties; for instance in Maryland Governor Hicks pointed out to McClellan in August the danger of "foul play" in an unsuspected quarter, namely, the two "Eastern Shore" counties of Virginia called Accomac and Northampton. This outpost of Virginia together with East Maryland and Delaware forms a peninsula between Delaware Bay and Chesapeake Bay, and here the malcontents of the North assembled and armed themselves and got into communication with Richmond by crossing the bay. An Act of Congress was therefore passed to confiscate property used for insurrectionary purposes, and its special application to the Eastern Shore of Virginia was needed in November, when Marylanders who had been fighting with the Confederates were actually returning north to take part in the elections, hoping to control the votes in favour of the "rebel" cause.

Governor Hicks, himself a native of the South,

declined to be a "traitor" but nevertheless warned McClellan that "these Southern men will fight like heroes," and assured him that the peninsular section of Virginia and Maryland would give secret aid to the Confederate army in the east. Hicks concluded his admonition in these words, "my motto is Death or Victory for the Union ; then if *the abolitionists* don't let our negroes alone, I will fight *them*." Governor Hicks like many others who sided with the Union supposed that it would be possible to "run with the hare and hunt with the hounds," that their patriotic efforts on behalf of the Union would at least result in securing a new lease of life for slavery. They failed to perceive that the success of the North spelt Emancipation, and that the continuance of slave-holding depended on Maryland rather than Virginia becoming the cockpit of the East.

When Virginia seceded on April 17 President Lincoln began to prepare for the worst.

The concentration of Northern troops took place amid scenes of confusion and riot on the railway between Baltimore and Harrisburg, and we read in a hundred telegrams dated April 21-24 of infantry without muskets, cavalry without horses, all without food ; of "loyal" families quitting their homes ; of bridges destroyed and trains held up : pessimists even declared that "Washington

will fall from starvation alone within ten days." Transports sailing from New York to Chesapeake Bay feared Confederate privateers off Cape Henry, and the forts in Delaware Bay were believed to be in danger. A state of absolute panic prevailed in many quarters.

Lincoln on April 27 officially notified his General-in-Chief "you are engaged in repressing an insurrection against the laws of the United States ; if necessary suspend the writ of habeas corpus for the public safety." The position was indeed critical since between loyal Pennsylvania and the capital stood MARYLAND, a slave-holding State whose Governor was acting in opposition to the wishes of the populace, and the mob had determined to prevent Federal troops being forwarded *viâ* Baltimore or Annapolis to WASHINGTON, where the Navy Yard, the Arsenal, the Treasury and other government buildings, even White House the President's Mansion, seemed to invite a raid ; moreover 60,000 residents were dependent for daily subsistence on the railways and waterways that traversed Maryland and Delaware. General Winfield Scott hardly exaggerated the danger in saying that "railroad communication with the north was likely to be broken in BALTIMORE and should that channel be broken for ten days WASHINGTON would be

in a state of starvation." The city was in fact cut off for several days.


It was firmly believed at this moment that the secessionists were plotting the capture of Washington, and it was supposed rightly or wrongly that "no more fatal blow at the existence of the Union government could be struck than the permanent and hostile possession of the seat of its power."

President Lincoln had other troubles, too: for example, the governor of Delaware declined to furnish his quota of men, answering Lincoln's summons by a message "No militia law in operation in this State"; and since the gunpowder mills were at Wilmington (Del.) their superintendent begged for muskets wherewith to arm a few hundred volunteers to protect this property; but the muskets were in Philadelphia. Then on April 21 it was reported that the general commanding at St Louis in Missouri had refused to arm the State troops which were needed to protect the arsenal and 70,000 stand of arms, news which had special significance in connection with the resignation of two hundred officers "just in an emergency when extraordinary services are essential to the Government."

President Lincoln was now about to experience what the British government had discovered




in the eighteenth century, that while the existence of an armed insurrection legally justifies the use of force for its suppression, if the necessary force is not available, if the balance of power at the moment is actually on the side of the insurgents, the "constituted authorities" find themselves in the position of a general in occupation of hostile territory without possessing the means to make such occupation "effective": in such a case a population which spontaneously takes up arms to resist the invader must be regarded as a belligerent as long as the laws and customs of war are respected.



## CHAPTER II

### THE ARMY SYSTEM

STANDING ARMIES AND LOCAL MILITIA—"VOLUNTEERS" AND  
REGULARS—CONSCRIPTS AND THEIR SUBSTITUTES—THE  
CASE AGAINST UNIVERSAL SERVICE—COST OF IMPRO-  
VISED FORCES—RECRUITING AREAS OF THE RIVAL ARMIES—  
THE OFFICERS—WEST POINT AND THE VIRGINIA MILITARY  
INSTITUTE.



## CHAPTER II

### THE ARMY SYSTEM

IN America as in England in the sixties such a term as mobilisation was practically unknown ; indeed there was nothing to " render movable " in a military sense : neither cadres nor reserves existed ; both countries maintained a standing army of Lilliputian proportions or rather kept up a number of regiments and batteries out of which it would be possible to organise a *corps d'armée*. In time of peace these units were dispersed over an immense area, furnishing garrisons for forts or guards of honour and generally performing the duties of military police : in time of war, that is when an expedition was to be despatched to Persia or to Mexico as the case might be, a certain number of infantry units would be collected and formed into brigades, to which a few batteries and squadrons might be attached—though more often than not the cavalry and artillery were regarded as an appanage of the Headquarters staff and then were only employed at the discretion of the Commander-in-Chief, who not infrequently regarded

the loss of guns and horses as more serious than the loss of a battle.

Such "warlike preparations" would be undertaken at leisure after much debate in the House of Commons or the Senate House at Washington, and if in the meantime a disagreeable surprise occurred at some outpost of Empire the local commander had to choose between hauling down his flag as at Sumter, destroying the stores and evacuating the post as at Harper's Ferry or enduring a siege as at Lucknow.

For home defence there existed militia corps armed with experimental or obsolete weapons and whose rights as citizens were carefully guarded by legislation. The English militia could not, *qua* militia, be sent over seas, nor could the so-called "army" reserve formed by Sidney Herbert in 1859: the American militias could not be marched beyond the borders of their respective States: and if ever the militia reinforced the standing army in time of war it was when individual members were moved by patriotism or a spirit of enterprise to undertake such works of supererogation.

President Lincoln in January 1861 overhauling his military assets discovered six regiments of cavalry, five of artillery and nineteen of infantry furnishing altogether 14,663 "regulars present," and this number varied but little throughout the

war, rising to 19,871 at the end of 1862 but falling to 13,880 in the spring of 1865; at no time more than three per cent. of the land forces in the pay of the Federal government were "regulars" in the technical sense.

Statistical tables show that the "average mean" strength of the classes of troops that served the Union during the war (allowing the "regulars" a service of forty-eight months, the "volunteers" forty-five months and the "coloured troops" sixty-three months) was 22,929 regulars, 741,507 volunteers and 42,339 coloured troops; but the "effective" strength per thousand after deducting "absent" and "sick in hospital" was 710 regulars, 646 volunteers and 796 coloured troops. We may therefore regard the Federal forces in the field as equivalent to half-a-million of men.

On April 15, 1861 President Lincoln issued his proclamation calling for 75,000 militia for three months' service, and the States responded by raising and equipping 92,000 men, of which 57,000 came from New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio and Missouri. Delaware tardily responded with her quota of 780 men less 5; West Virginia raised only one third of her quota. Tennessee, Arkansas, North Carolina, Kentucky and Maryland refused to comply with the demand for troops: the three States first named at once joined the Confederacy;

Maryland resisted as long as she dared and then in fear of invasion by the Pennsylvania militia she yielded with bad grace to the inevitable, for geography was the bane of Maryland as it was of Kentucky, who was exposed to invasion through any of the six States round her, of which five were antagonistic ; she ultimately chose the lesser of two evils and furnished 71,000 men to fight for the cause she detested. The defection of Maryland of course caused Virginia to become a " border " State herself and the principal theatre of operations in the East.

Tennessee also, as in course of time the effects of the Federal operations became permanent, was compelled to abandon territory to the Union government and so this " secession " State is officially credited with having furnished 26,000 men for three years' service in the Federal armies. Other Southern States, too, as a foothold was gained by the invaders were treated by the Federal government as Frederick of Prussia had treated the Saxons and Napoleon the Bavarians ; and thus it appears that compulsory service ultimately procured for the Union recruits from Texas (1965), Mississippi (545), Louisiana (5224), Florida (1290), Alabama (2576), North Carolina (3156) and Arkansas (8289). The Federal " coloured " troops were of course runaway slaves



—such as the South Carolina contrabands—who fought for their emancipation.

In fine, nearly ten per cent. of the *personnel* of the Northern armies consisted of men whose sympathies lay with the Southern States, and the short-sighted views of the run-and-read school of historians on this and other fundamental matters have caused misconceptions to exist which are apt to vitiate judgment on the strategical and tactical problems of the war.

The expression "volunteer" for instance has been used in connection with the War of Secession officially to denote a class of soldier who was neither a regular nor a negro: it has also been used historically to distinguish from the victim of conscription the soldier who served of his own free will: it also in a popular sense discriminated between the American patriot and the foreign-born mercenary.

We may here clear the ground for discussion by defining the regular soldier as a man who has enlisted in circumstances which ensure his being systematically instructed in at least the rudiments of the military art, and under conditions which secure absolutely to his employer for a definite period his services when trained; the "regular" then is essentially a trained soldier who can instantly be ordered to march anywhere. Any

other class of soldier is necessarily of the irregular type : but there are different species of irregulars. An irregular may be serving by compulsion at home as in the militia or serving abroad as a volunteer, but in either case he does not wholly lose his status as a civilian, and thus he possesses several privileges denied to the regular, privileges which have to be taken into account when making use of him : and in all cases he is untrained, and therefore in the mass—we cannot otherwise view them—irregulars are unreliable.

Among themselves irregular or, as we call them, auxiliary forces exhibit other differences. The value of the volunteer is that we find him at least enthusiastic, and so more willing to forego his civil rights in case of emergency than the man who has been drafted. The drawback of militia conscripts is that they invariably include a strong leaven of an inferior class of men, men who would be rejected by a regular regiment on physical grounds and by a volunteer corps on the ground of social unfitness. Such men are generally serving as the paid substitutes of "respectable" citizens who have been drawn in the ballot ; and as there are shades and degrees even among substitutes we may discover a stratum of men of the criminal type who have fraudulently disposed of what does

not belong to them, their services having previously been contracted for in another place. Since the war hard words have been used of the Northern "bounty-jumpers," but let us remember in this pharisaical age our own experiences during the Boer War which caused, not without good reason, an alteration in that section of the Army Act which deals with fraudulent enlistment.

The question to which these observations are a prelude is, What was the composition of the Northern armies? Is Lord Wolseley right in describing them as "mobs of Irish and German mercenaries hired at fifteen dollars a month to fight in a cause they know little and care less about"? Or is the following complaint by a Northern soldier, a genuine volunteer, justified? "Volunteering the unprincipled dodge of cowardly politicians ground up the choicest seed-corn of the nation . . . it consumed the young, the patriotic, the intelligent, the generous, the brave; it wasted the best moral, social and political elements of the republic, leaving the cowards, shirks, egotists and money-makers to stay at home and procreate their kind."

The conflict of evidence on this question is a serious bar to the right understanding of a matter of primary interest to us to-day; and even before the close of the War of Secession thoughtful

writers in America were discussing the recruiting question as a topic of national importance. "A rigid draft without exemptions save for disability, and without the privilege of substitution or commutation, is of course the fairest way of distributing among the citizens of a country the burdens of an exhausting war. Yet the experience of nations has shown that in this unyielding shape the draft works fatal injury to the industry of a country, without which hostilities cannot be prolonged." That is the case against Universal Service in a nutshell; but does the American writer therefore advocate "volunteering" in war time? Let us see.

"The War Department can readily calculate how many men per annum will be requisite, under the average vicissitudes of war, to keep our forces up to the desired maximum. It can announce the number that must be furnished per month by the country at large, by each State, and by each congressional district or sub-district. Hold each unit—and the smaller the unit the better—hold each sub-district responsible for its monthly quota, to be filled by an inexorable draft in case of non-compliance. Hold out liberal bounties for volunteers, but withhold them from conscripts."

Unless the meaning of words has changed in fifty years we see little "volunteering" about this

proposal, which rather suggests a method of raising the price of unskilled labour in war time. The writer proceeds :

“ Each sub-district in the country would thus be forced to organise itself permanently as a recruiting station. The men of substance and of family who could not without ruin render the military service which each citizen owes, would in self-preservation exert themselves and contribute what might be necessary to secure volunteers.”

Call this system by what name you will it is not “volunteering” : it is a plan for opening local markets for waste material or contracting for the temporary services of untrained men at higher rates than those current for skilled labour ; and yet this was the best system that the Federal government could evolve after four years of domestic war : it caused the Northern States to become the paradise of the alien bounty-jumper who (until he could desert) necessarily served alongside the American militia—those who did not happen to be “men of substance and of family” and who therefore from want of means to buy a substitute had to serve in person. There existed also genuine “volunteers,” ardent spirits who had run away from home or from college to seek military adventures, and likewise many honest

men whose commercial instincts led them to accept four hundred dollars to enlist rather than be subjected to the Conscription Acts.

America certainly had her peculiar difficulties. "The man without family, the labourer, the peasant, the 'loafer' is likely to escape the enrolment; but if the vigilance of the provost marshal secures his name for the wheel, he becomes impalpable the moment that chance designates him for a soldier. . . . Drawn in Philadelphia he moves to New York; drawn in New York he disappears and turns up in Iowa."

Thus the Northern States came to graft upon the militia system in war time a system which in Great Britain we began to imitate to our cost during the Boer War; it was a system of paying famine prices for untrained men, equipping them and transporting them to battlefields where they proved chiefly useful in saddling the enemy with the cost of their maintenance as prisoners of war. The large population of Federal soldiers reported missing from their regiments, who were being guarded and fed—192,000 useless mouths—at the expense of the Confederacy in Southern jails, proved eventually a great embarrassment to the Southern government: and that was a direct result of the Federal army system, a system which we must describe as unadulterated

conscription, that is to say, compulsory service regulated by means of a lottery and tempered by the acceptance of bounty-paid substitutes.

When the Maryland citizens refused to allow their "State" militia to proceed south "they would not see or admit that when sworn into the service of the United States they were no longer 'State' troops but United States troops or militia in the service of the Government." The truth is that the men had been trapped, for when McDowell was A.A.G. at Washington and called out the militia of the District of Columbia under the Act of 1803 the men had refused to take the oath on the ground that it would make "regular" soldiers of them. McDowell had thereupon personally declared that "they were of the militia of the District taken into the United States service for the protection of the District and would not be ordered off." He further promised that not more than one third of each company should be embodied during the day, its duties requiring it only to be assembled from nine o'clock at night till morning.

Ultimately, no doubt, methods were used to procure a "voluntary offer" of service beyond the borders of the State such as the British government used in order to induce our militia to serve overseas in 1900. The morality of such proceedings is open to question. The regular soldier on en-

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listment individually contracts with the Government and must discharge his personal liabilities : under conscription laws military service is a lottery in which all men have an equal chance as long as substitution is not permitted : universal service, the French and Prussian army system, converts chance into a certainty and compels every able-bodied male to undergo training and render service as a soldier. There is nothing unfair about any of these methods. But the practice of enrolling men for home service, knowing that in time of foreign war devices will be used to press them to undertake the duty of regulars, might be described by a very ugly term : and this practice is still countenanced in two great countries where compulsory service is officially banned. The Federal government paid for its perfidy at Bull Run.

In the Southern States a similar condition of things existed save that there was no nucleus of regulars nor apparently did the States encourage "bounty-jumpers" : the blockade prevented an immigration of aliens and money was scarce ; but in the South there was a larger number of genuine volunteers since patriotism was stimulated by the circumstance that slave labour was available to carry on the work of the farms and relieve the troops in the field of fatigue duties.

Nevertheless in April 1862 a Conscription Act

was passed by Congress at Richmond and applied immediately to men between eighteen and thirty-five ; later on it was extended to take men of forty and afterwards men of forty-five ; it finally embraced all males between seventeen and fifty : but in the execution of these laws no doubt there was great difficulty, for the Acts of Congress at Richmond often came into violent collision with State legislation : certain it is that while possessing a white population of 8,000,000 the Confederacy was always short of troops : then for want of an effective police desertion grew apace while marauding bands of " partisans " came into existence whom the inhabitants feared more than the enemy and as a corollary certain Louisiana regiments were kept on active service in the east for three years : but at all times there existed militia troops and " State reserves " who were presumably invalids, boys and old men.

The working of the army system in America in the sixties is of practical importance to all English-speaking peoples to-day, and it is to be regretted that there exists no authoritative treatise on the subject : many of the errors in administration which characterised our conduct of the Boer War might have been avoided by timely study of the factors which protracted the War of Secession a generation ago : moreover the various schemes

put forward to-day for an Imperial Army can only be regarded as idle dreams until the question has been answered, In what way can every man pay the debt that he owes to his country ?

“ We put into the field a huge army and think that the work is done. Our rulers announce that no more men are wanted and close all the recruiting offices. Six months later the nation wakes up to find that its magnificent battalions have melted away. Two or three pitched battles, innumerable skirmishes, some prisoners lost, inevitable desertions and the waste of the hospital have thinned the ranks, until regiments muster but as companies and brigades are but scanty regiments. A second call is made and is responded to less enthusiastically than before. Still the fearful drain continues ; men must be had ; and when volunteers no longer come forward the draft is resorted to. The first draft proves practically a failure and high bounties are offered to induce the re-enlistment of veterans, without whose continued services the army would nearly be disbanded, as well as to entice new recruits into the field ; and as a wholesome stimulus another conscription is held over the head of the nation in terrorem.”

These words were written in 1864 of the United

States army system—will they ever become applicable to the army system of the British Empire?

But of course the difficulty of procuring the rank and file of an army fades into insignificance beside that of obtaining officers to instruct them in peace and lead them in war. The officer is a plant of extremely slow growth, especially in the junior ranks : a nation is more likely to throw up a Washington or a Cromwell in time of need than to find ready made a class of men like the sergeants of a standing army, of whom even Great Britain employs 25,000 on a peace establishment : two centuries of regimental tradition are embodied in the group of fifty senior N.C.O.'s which is the backbone of every one of our infantry battalions : and there is something in the bearing of a man, be he corporal or captain, who is accustomed to look a body of soldiers in the face and give an order and see it instantly obeyed that is not to be immediately acquired by even a superior intelligence : this air of authority is a prime necessity in dealing with irregular troops, and the lack of it in those who come into immediate contact with men under arms as their military superiors is fatal to discipline. The general can afford to display excessive affability, not so the sergeant major : the lieutenant may occasionally unbend, but the lance-corporal must continually preserve the attitude of a man

who means to assert himself : and this fact alone would compel the upkeep of a standing army among a people who may be forced to take up arms and fight for its existence : moreover, it justifies a peace establishment of which a large proportion consists of trained leaders who are held by " life " engagements.

After the war the United States government is found keeping on pay some 8000 N.C.O.'s and officers for an establishment of 17,000 private soldiers. But was that so in 1861 ? There is no direct evidence on the point, but recorded scenes of indiscipline among the irregulars during the war are eloquent enough : there can have been no surplus of trained leaders to " staff " the levies in the junior ranks. It is true that the emergency of 1861 gave the retired " regular " officers their opportunity ; but there were not enough to go round : ex-Captain Ulysses S. Grant who had quitted the United States army in 1854 to engage in commercial pursuits, for example, became available in 1861 as colonel of a regiment of Illinois irregulars ; but within a few months he was required to assume the rank and duties of a brigadier-general ; ex-Captain Halleck also had retired in 1854 to practise law in San Francisco, and the national emergency brought him back to the army, but he was made a general and subsequently

placed in supreme command, a position he relinquished in favour of Grant in 1864.

In any European army Grant and Halleck would probably have been serving with a company in the field, in Great Britain as "reserve officers" they would be relegated to the *depôt* for duty. But in America in 1861 the dearth of leaders was such that practically anybody who could show that he had received a military education had the choice of any post for which he could qualify. Colonel Robert Lee on the outbreak of war was serving in the United States army and was designated for the supreme command of the field force: ten years before he had been as a captain the instructor of cadets at West Point.

The attitude of officers like Lee serving in the United States army whose homes, interests and sympathies were in the Southern States became in 1861 a question of national importance. Could such a contingency ever have been foreseen as that officers of all degrees should tender their resignations to the President at the outbreak of war and go home as civilians to take service with "the enemy"? The thing is inconceivable unless we go back to the history of Great Britain in the seventeenth century, and recall how David Leslie fought at Marston Moor under Cromwell in the first Civil War, but afterwards took command of the royal

army formed to drive Cromwell out of Scotland.

In 1861 President Lincoln let them all go : and in losing many of its best officers through political disaffection the Northern army was further handicapped by having thrust upon it a dozen civilians who joined the service as "generals" with the quotas of their respective States ; all save three, however, were "mustered out" after Bull Run.

The defection among army officers spread to the cadets at West Point, and six out of seven of those who had been nominated by the Southern States returned to their homes, and afterwards joined the Virginia Military Institute, where 250 cadets received special training, to qualify for commissions in the Confederate army.

As time wore on the "West Pointers" made their way to the front on one side or the other, but it is noticeable that the Federal generals were mainly officers who had served in the artillery like Sherman, Thomas, Meade, Hooker, Sedgwick, Humphreys and Slocum, or in the engineers like McClellan, Halleck, McPherson, Rosecrans and Warren ; only two cavalry officers (Gregg and Pleasonton) and only three infantry officers (Hancock, Sheridan and Grant) attained celebrity as generals. On the Confederate side the honours



of war were more evenly distributed between the four arms, for Lee and Beauregard were engineers, Jackson was a gunner, Ewell and Stuart were cavalry men, while Johnston, Longstreet, the two Hills and Early had been infantry soldiers.



## CHAPTER III

### POLICY AND STRATEGY

FUNCTIONS OF MODERN GENERALS IN THE FIELD—MCDOWELL AND MCCLELLAN—FREDERICK AND NAPOLEON—A NEW CONCEPTION OF STRATEGY—ARMIES CONTROLLED BY PRESIDENTS—SELECTION OF OBJECTIVES—THE NEED OF CONCENTRATION—THE TRUE CHARACTER OF DEFENSIVE WAR—INDISCIPLINE OF GENERAL OFFICERS—SCHEMES OF WINFIELD SCOTT AND MCCLELLAN—SECONDARY OPERATIONS—ARMIES MOBILISED ON THE FRONTIERS—OPERATION OF MARTIAL LAW—PRESIDENT DAVIS'S THEORY OF WAR—ANGULAR FRONTIERS AND OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS.



## CHAPTER III

### POLICY AND STRATEGY

THAT Policy is the determining factor in modern war it is idle to deny, and a plan of campaign framed on the abstract principles of strategy, however theoretically perfect, will prove in future to be a counsel of perfection, since Policy regulates the conduct of war and must therefore become the basis of strategy.

Policy will co-ordinate the work of army and navy, select the commanders on land and sea, choose the theatre of operations and the objective for every campaign : it will also determine the force to be employed and control the means of repairing the waste of war. But if all these matters are taken in hand by Policy it is evident that the functions of generals in the field are restricted to a choice of methods of utilising for certain defined purposes the instrument which Policy has placed at their disposal.

In discussing the War of Secession especially it is otiose to call generals to account for errors or neglect clearly traceable to the policy dictated

by the Presidents and their advisers : on the other hand the commanders in the field must be held responsible both for accepting battle in circumstances unfavourable to the troops at their disposal and for failing to utilise unsparingly the means given them for offensive operations.

If the combined resources of a state and its allies are inadequate to the military task before them it is a question whether hostilities should be commenced, for a Declaration of War postulates the possession of ample means to wage war successfully : but that is the affair of Politics. The utilisation of a country's resources so that commanders on land and sea are at all times properly equipped for the operation in hand is the business of Policy : the judicious employment for the object of the campaign of the land forces under his immediate control is the trade of a General.

At Bull Run, for example, we cannot hold Irvin McDowell responsible for the arrangement by which all the "regulars" were excluded from his command save six batteries, a composite regiment of cavalry and two provisional battalions of infantry and marines ; the instrument of strategy was not of his fashioning : but it was his business to determine whether with such a force he should initiate a decisive action on July 21 ; and if it be urged that McDowell was in fact carry-

ing out the positive instructions of his superior we have only to substitute for the name of McDowell the name of that superior as the real commander, and regard McDowell merely as a subordinate leader whose functions are mainly tactical: and in this light McDowell would stand acquitted of all blame, since he did the best he could to win the battle on July 21 with the means then at hand.

In the case of McClellan it was certainly otherwise. McClellan went to the peninsula with a mandate. His mission was to force his way to Richmond and capture that city. His apologists aver that he accepted the task only on condition that a force of 150,000 men was placed at his absolute disposal, but his critics say that McClellan knew that Policy would not grant him all that he asked; moreover that a part of McDowell's force (Franklin's division) was in fact sent to him and McDowell aided him otherwise by detaining Anderson's division on the Rappahannock; that both Banks and Fremont contributed to his means indirectly by occupying Jackson and Ewell in the Valley; and finally that McClellan himself at the end of June promised that he would operate actively without further assistance. He did not keep his word.

We may criticise the Policy that placed half-

a-dozen generals in command of as many independent forces without absolving each and every commander from the duty of gaining success according to his means, or at least exerting himself to the utmost in attempting to carry out the task he had undertaken at his own solicitation: and on these grounds McClellan stands condemned. What if Wellington with an army of 95,000 men had quailed before Marshal Soult's entrenchments on the Nivelle? As a soldier and the servant of his government Wellington performed a soldier's duty even while protesting against the Policy which exposed him to disaster in the winter of 1813.

McClellan's attempt to throw the blame of the Yorktown fiasco upon Policy would hardly be justified if even it were shown that he was a tyro in war and ignorant of modern history; that he was harking back to a system of war that had been dead for a century, when the head of the army was head of the State and conducted the war in person; to a period when a general who had been detached for independent operations was often compelled by the difficulty of intercommunication to act on his own responsibility for many months at a time; when invaded territory was subject to the will of the conqueror.

The old system had certain obvious advantages,



unity of command for instance, which caused indeed a certain form of strategic attack to be applied as a matter of course against divided forces. An army like that of Austria when opposed to Frederick was handicapped from the outset by possessing a Council of War. The rise of Napoleon to supreme power in France revived the old system temporarily, but when in June 1815 Wellington and Blucher combined their operations so finely as to rout Napoleon the inherent weakness of the one-man system was exposed.

Meanwhile democratic governments had overthrown the old ideal of leadership in war and had substituted for it the notion that a general is a servant of the State, and since the State is represented by the Cabinet and a Cabinet is kept in power by the popular vote it follows that war is actually waged by the people : and so it was in America fifty years ago when the President, the Secretary of War and the Commander-in-Chief at Washington formed a Committee for the Conduct of the War.

Among other results of the change is one that must considerably modify the old conception of strategy. The rise of national armies has enlarged the domain of tactics so as to include "all dispositions for the decisive struggle," dispositions which modern inventions such as telegraphy,

steel and high explosives have combined to make excessively elaborate and expansive in character ; and Strategy thus attenuated by Tactics is no longer able to claim as its prerogative the arbitrament of " the broad measures which should enable the troops to enter on the decisive struggle under the most favourable conditions," since its authority in this department has been invaded by Policy with its roots in the army system established in peace by politicians.

The effects of these changes in the method of waging war are shown by the events of 1861-65. Policy dictated that two geographical points chosen by the belligerent cabinets as their respective seats of government, only 140 miles apart and actually in telegraphic communication, should be " covered " by armies operating immediately under the eyes of the rival Presidents: the tactics of the period demanded the lives of 93,000 Federals and perhaps an equal number of Confederates ; and generals were found willing to succeed one another in the position of nominal leadership without much power to choose the means of operating or the scene of operations, but liable in the event of failing to carry out successfully a plan of another's devising with an instrument of another's fashioning to be punished by instant supersession.

Napoleon at twenty-seven at the outset of his career firmly declined to serve the Directory on any such conditions. "Every commander-in-chief who takes upon himself to execute a plan which he considers bad or ruinous is culpable: he ought to remonstrate, to insist upon alterations, and if necessary resign rather than become the means of the defeat of the force entrusted to him." That is precisely the position which Strategy as represented by the Commander-in-Chief must assume in order to wage war successfully under the new system; it is futile for him to ask for absolute power and it is useless to expect that a campaign will be won by his personal conduct of all the battles; but it is still possible for such a general to ensure favourable conditions for the operations by declining command until the just demands of Strategy are satisfied by the government, and then to operate with a single eye to military results.

Such considerations appear to be obvious to-day, but they were not so in 1861. The conceit of ignorance, the fatuity of enthusiasm and the machinations of political partisanship combined to produce a phantasmagoria of war which is almost without a parallel; and it is difficult to say whether in the long run the Federals or Confederates laboured under the greatest dis-

advantage in these respects: the early failures are more conspicuous on the part of the North which had the harder task, but the final result was fatal to the South which had neglected to profit by the mistakes of the enemy during the first three years of the war.

Policy in America being what it was and the leaders in the field being dominated by the Presidents the strategy on both sides at the outset was of a negative character. The disadvantages on both sides balanced. The Northern States which possessed a nucleus of regulars and an established government miscalculated the extent of preparation required for the task of subjugation: the Southern States which ostensibly adopted the stronger form of war, in which the terrain and the people might be expected to constitute a powerful aid to the field armies, were distracted by the novelty of administration; and the head of the Confederacy under arrangements existing as late as June 10, 1861 even contemplated the personal command of an army in the field.

Whether Mr Davis would have proved a Wellington in war we do not know, but he was certainly no Pitt in council. He had graduated at West Point, had served in the regular army and had filled the office of War Secretary at Washington under President Pierce. A man

of great ability and with considerable military experience he yet failed to realise, or teach his colleagues in Congress, the true meaning of defensive war. That policy of drift which becomes the habit of governments whose experience of war is the occasional fitting out of expeditions Mr Davis, as its former Secretary of War, had imbibed along with other traditions of the Union government. Writing to Bishop Polk who was solicitous for the safety of the Mississippi region in 1861 he says on May 22: "An invasion will hardly be attempted at this season of the year; the people of the north-west States have so great a dread of our climate that they could not be prevailed on to march against us." Yet the Shiloh disaster occurred in the month of April and the greater one of Vicksburg in May and June: so the President's reliance on the barrier of climate cost the Confederates 42,000 men in the second year of the war.

On the other hand the value of sea power to the North was for some time discounted by a Confederate fleet, commanded by ex-Union naval officers, which controlled the waters of Chesapeake Bay for twelve months; while mines and torpedoes protected the Confederate harbours and formidable coast defences defied the Federal warships. The great rivers in the West were difficult to

navigate even at seasons when there was enough water for gunboats to pass the "falls." Blockade-running was reduced to a fine art by maritime adventurers as long as British coal held out, and our shipyards on the Clyde furnished cruisers for the South.

The Northern States were thus in 1861 restricted to operations on land, and the question before the cabinet was whether to aim at the destruction of the Confederate army or select as an objective the enemy's capital or other so-called strategic points. "There are in Europe many good generals," said Napoleon, "but they see too many things at once; as for me, I see only one thing namely the enemy's main body. I try to crush it, confident that secondary matters will then settle themselves." But whatever objective Federal policy might choose there could be only one way of operating with success, for "the same rules obtain in the conduct of campaigns as in the siege of fortresses; the fire must be concentrated upon one point," says the Master of War.

What was the plan of campaign in the North which resulted in exposing a force hardly equal to a couple of modern divisions within the enemy's borders at the end of July? The Confederates having so far remained passive not even the con-

ventional excuse, the protection of Washington, could be offered to justify the movement: we must therefore regard " Bull Run " as a political battle, a battle fought without regard to strategic considerations.

Another spasmodic effort on the part of the Federals in August brought 17,000 men into collision at Wilson's Creek (Mo.) of which only one third were Federals, and this force under Nathaniel Lyon enabled the Confederates to score a success for the second time in three weeks.

In September and November at Lexington and Belmont (Mo.), and in October at Ball's Bluff (Va.), encounters took place which added 3164 to the Federal but only 1368 to the Confederate casualties; and thus we may sum up the land operations of 1861 in the course of which by five combats the Confederates had lost 4215 and the Federals 7351, the majority of the latter having surrendered as prisoners of war.

What losses were incurred on either side at other points of contact—about a hundred and fifty engagements were recorded between April 12 and December 28—there is no means of knowing. What is painfully apparent on both sides, however, is the want of a military head, the lack of military organisation and absolute negation of the first principles of strategy.

"The secret of war," said Napoleon in one of his inspired moods, "is to march ten leagues, fight a battle and march ten more leagues in pursuit." That is the model for offensive operations. On another occasion commending Massena's admirable defence of Genoa he declared that the art of war is to gain time when one's forces are inferior, a doctrine which has been elaborated by Clausewitz ; but in either case concentration is indispensable : in attack because it is impossible to be too strong on the field of battle if decisive results are sought ; in defence because the attractive force which a retreating army exerts on the enemy is "like a magnet on iron," as Goltz puts it, and by its means the enemy may be drawn in any desired direction and so the initiative be gained by the defending army. The Russian armies in 1812, which at first withdrew into the interior because they doubted their capacity for effective resistance, soon realised the destructive power which their retrograde movements exerted on the invader, and henceforward they adopted this mode of operating as their system of defensive war.

Thinly populated districts like the Southern States of America, capable no doubt of supporting a defending army of moderate size, would compel the invader to bring his supplies with him : and his dilemma to maintain in an exhausted country



a force large enough to win a decisive battle would prove the Confederates' opportunity; for if the "turning point" for the strategic defensive were fixed where the defender's strength would be at its maximum the invader, on reaching that point, should feel the greatest disadvantage owing to the length of his communications and his numerous detachments; and then the counterstroke could be launched under most favourable conditions.

But if these elementary principles of war were present to the minds of the belligerent generals in 1861—and why should they not have been?—we can only assume that Policy on both sides intervened to prevent the hostilities from assuming a strategic character in either Virginia or Missouri. Consider how tardily Wellington's ever-victorious army moved from Bayonne to Toulouse in 1814, drawn hither and thither across the Gaves and up and down the Adour, by Soult who retreated at leisure on Toulouse, gaining time for Napoleon's operations to which his own were but secondary to take a turn. Nor could Wellington even have followed but for the veiled insurrection in France which, stimulated by British gold, caused the inhabitants to subsist the Allies while denying Soult even transport for his military stores. Was not a lesson for Mr Davis there?

The constitutional head of the Confederate

government waited until the task of a general was hopeless before appointing Robert Lee to the undivided control of the Confederate forces ; and in 1861-62 when the initiative might have been seized there was no military head, no supreme command in the field, since "the control and direction of all offensive military movements was vested exclusively in the President."

Would it have been possible for the Army of the North to pursue the Confederates through Virginia and North Carolina into Tennessee, Alabama or Georgia ? Such an operation does not seem feasible, since the resources of the country were often strained to support even the Army of Northern Virginia ; and similar considerations would prevent the forces of the Confederacy crossing the Potomac to march on New York or Philadelphia : yet the idea of the Confederate armies concentrating to the rear and there fighting out the issue once for all in a great battle with all the advantages procurable from defensive strategy—the stronger form of war—seems never to have been seriously entertained until the Confederacy was tottering.

Richmond and Petersburg might have fallen or been subjected to investment, but the Confederate government could have returned to Alabama where it had been first established ; the States of Virginia and North Carolina might have been im-

poverished, perhaps devastated, if all supplies had been collected and sent westward; but the Confederate cause would have triumphed or failed outright and the protracted misery of a long war been averted.

To seek for reasons why such a plan was not adopted is to probe the recesses of Policy, a process difficult even in a country where a centralised administration simplifies cabinet questions; but when a Confederacy is being forcibly established on the principle of State Rights the ultimate causes of military happenings may be sought in vain. Throughout the war there was an Army of the West and an Army of the East, each operating independently of the other; but the eastern forces being the nearer to, were most under the control of, the War Office at Richmond: and though it is admitted that the Federals in the east were in no better case, being within sight or hail of Washington, the Federals were not, after all, battling within their own borders for their existence as a nation.

The military situation was further complicated by a form of indiscipline among the generals which may charitably be described as *trop de zèle*. At the head of the Federal War Office was General Winfield Scott who fifteen years before had won the campaign in Mexico, and it seems hardly

credible that the veteran commander should have been called upon at the crisis in 1861 to write lengthy replies to a series of letters from an ex-captain, now a commander of "State" troops, who apparently desired to conduct the campaign himself. Yet such was the case, and the correspondence did not end even when G. B. McClellan on May 21 was rebuked officially in these terms: "we are surprised at your repeated admonitions to the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of War and myself to occupy Cumberland."

McClellan was persistent and being backed by a political party he was a few months later called to Washington to supersede McDowell as commander of the Army of the Potomac. Soon afterwards we find Winfield Scott complaining to the Secretary of War that McClellan had hardly entered upon his new duties before he was "encouraged to communicate directly with the President and certain members of the cabinet," and later he "forgot that he had any intermediate commander" and "prided himself in treating me with uniform neglect, running into disobedience of orders," a state of things which led to Winfield Scott's resignation of the command of the Federal forces in November. A year later McClellan followed Scott into retirement, his pretensions as a general having been extinguished by his unfortun-

ate campaigns on the Yorktown peninsula and in Maryland ; but in 1864 he nearly contrived to oust Lincoln from his position as President.

In the spring of 1861 McClellan, who had represented the United States army as commissioner in the Crimea and subsequently wrote a book on "The Organisation of European Armies and the Operations of War," laid more than one plan of campaign before the authorities at Washington. McClellan first proposed to operate through West Virginia by passing the Ohio river about Gallipolis and moving up the valley of the Great Kanawha river, crossing the Alleghanies to reach Lynchburg one hundred and fifty miles west of Richmond, a plan which suggests the Marengo campaign and perhaps was the cause of his being dubbed the Young Napoleon, for McClellan had assigned the rôle of Moncey on the eastern line to the forces then at Washington, and proposed to leave detachments behind him at Cincinnati as Napoleon had done on the Var.

General Scott replied to the effect that the Ohio volunteers whom McClellan then commanded were only enlisted for three months' service, were at that moment without adequate equipment or transport and would be time-expired by the time he was ready to march. General Scott also adverted to the cost of the undertaking and—here

we trace the hand of the President—the political effect of invading West Virginia.

Again we are confronted with the difficulty which Policy puts in the way of Strategy : why were the troops only available for three months and why was not the material of war in their possession ?

If McClellan had been Dictator it is quite possible that he would have organised an army to carry his plan through, and cutting the Carolinas from the Western States would have put an end to the war : certain it is that the first successes of the Federals were gained in West Virginia, and it was in that region Robert Lee nearly lost his budding reputation as a general.

General Scott however was at this time contemplating a plan of campaign in the West by establishing a cordon of posts (he called it “ envelopment ”) on the Mississippi, from its junction with the Ohio to its mouth at New Orleans, using water transport to save both time and money, in aid of a naval blockade on the seaboard.

Policy thwarted Scott as it had thwarted McClellan : for President Lincoln at this time was wholly intent on a scheme for protecting his capital, the geographical position of which certainly left much to be desired. Washington is actually nearer to Richmond than to Philadelphia, and moreover it stood in the centre of a disaffected district

embraced by a State always "rebel" at heart though its Governor had agreed to side with the North. There were riots at Baltimore daily, the Federal troops coming down by rail from Harrisburg on the one side and Philadelphia on the other being held up by Marylanders secretly armed by the Virginia State authorities: and yet it seems to us to-day that Lincoln's fears were really groundless, or that danger would have disappeared with a correct strategical distribution of his forces.

Assuming, as both belligerents did, that the decisive point was east of the Alleghanies an army from Ohio concentrated at Hagerstown would menace the flank of any attack on Washington by land: and after the Federal gunboats had gained control of the lower Potomac and Chesapeake Bay the manhood of a population of 20,000,000 was available for offensive operations against the army which President Davis had rooted, strategic considerations notwithstanding, to the territory between the Shenandoah Valley and Richmond.

But secondary operations in the Mississippi Valley—from first to last over seven hundred combats took place in the states of Missouri, Arkansas, Louisiana and Mississippi—drained the strength of the eastern armies and gave to this long war its peculiar character of costly inconclusiveness.

A study of the War of the States may therefore



proceed on two distinct planes of investigation, the one political the other military in its origin, and their overlapping must be prevented or a confusion of ideas will result. When the soldiers attribute their military impotence to Policy and the statesmen trace the failure of their schemes to blunders in strategy or tactics they create an *impasse* which it is excusable in us to avoid: but we must never forget in attempting to judge the events of 1861-62 that the belligerents consisted of the nation in arms.

From various States in different latitudes the planter, the minister, the lawyer, the railroad president and the civil engineer join the army, but they carry with them their professional instincts, their local prejudices, their political passions and the ties of blood, of home, and of party are not less firmly knit than before; soldiers for the nonce their individualities cannot be suppressed; in every man self-assertion has become a habit, a sense of his political rights remains keen as ever, impelling him to make his wants known at all times and seasons through the congressman whom his vote has elected to office: and if this be the case with citizens serving in the field army how intense must the feeling have been in the case of the stay-at-homes, to whom the Confederacy or other central government hundreds



of miles distant seemed but a pale reflection of their native State and local authorities.

The effective control of these unstable elements would have taxed the resources of a tyrant, and the powers of a constitutional ruler proved wholly unequal to the task. On April 17 for example President Davis received letters from the governors of North Carolina, South Carolina and Virginia respectively: the one writes "Come as soon as you choose; we are ready to join you to a man; strike the blow quickly and Washington will be ours": the other writes "We stand at present on the defensive and try first to make our own Confederate government strong": the third writes "Our object is to secure the Navy Yard at Gosport." Virginia who had hardly yet entered into what she termed the "alliance" was herself sending arms into Maryland—they were never recovered—and throwing a garrison into Harper's Ferry which the Federals had evacuated as untenable, besides lending aid to citizens west of the Alleghanies where a local insurrection was in progress. The idea of concerted action, of concentration, of a central authority, of a comprehensive plan is nowhere traceable: self-preservation seemed each State's only law, and even before the war closed Georgia was on the point of breaking away from the Confederacy.

These considerations give us pause when the acts of Abraham Lincoln and Jefferson Davis seem to call for adverse criticism; and when we condemn their unreadiness for war we must not forget that the lack of preparation proceeded from a positive ignorance of the real nature of War on the part of all classes; from individual inexperience of war's demands upon the moral courage, the patience and the self-sacrifice of those who do not bear arms as well as upon the physical courage and endurance of those in the field.

Such reflections must be ever present to students of the American Civil War in its opening phases, when all action seems haphazard, casual and inconsequent, when floods of talk create on all sides a vision of immediate felicity which the actual struggles of men in battle remove to a greater distance week by week and month by month. A pathetic interest even is awakened as one realises that the killing and wounding of men, the capture or the surrender of colours, guns and stores bring about no tangible result; that they lead only to reprisals in kind; that military reputations are made and lost without advancing either cause one iota; that in fact the armed forces in 1861-62 at an enormous cost in life and suffering are merely practising hostilities and training their leaders for the real struggle to come two years later when

one at least of the belligerents had learnt how to make war.

When General Beauregard was called from the Charleston defences in South Carolina to command the troops on the Manassas-Alexandria line he was told that "the policy of the State at present is strictly defensive. No attack or provocation for attack will therefore be given, but every attack resisted to the extent of your means." These instructions had emanated from the Virginia State authorities when his predecessor General Bonham had assumed command, and Beauregard now as an officer of the Confederacy was ordered to guide his own action by them. He was urged to "organise and instruct" the troops and "prepare them for active service"; but the troops were to be posted "where their services may be needed and where they can be concentrated at the points threatened": in other words Beauregard was expected to be able to accept battle with troops in process of mobilisation in the event of the Federals, whose preparations were assumed to be in a more forward state, advancing to offer battle.

The points indicated as "threatened" were Manassas Junction and Alexandria. Manassas covering the railroad communication between Harper's Ferry and Richmond was obviously a place to be defended for so long as the northern

frontier was to be held, but as regards Alexandria it is not apparent how Beauregard could "resist its occupation . . . without appearing to threaten Washington city": the navigation of the Potomac being closed to the Confederates and the United States gunboats being able to take a position in front of Alexandria it was surely impracticable, in view of the quality and number of Beauregard's troops (6000 effectives on June 3), to expect him to hold even by "strictly defensive" measures an open town which was almost a suburb of Washington: and apparently he was not even permitted to destroy the bridges over the Potomac in his front. Such strategy, like the policy it mirrored, was manufactured at Richmond and Beauregard cannot be held responsible for either.

In the matter of numbers his situation improved daily as new regiments came north, but all the troops needed drill and were unaccustomed to pick and shovel, so that the commander had to solicit working parties of slaves from the planters round about. An even more urgent matter was that of subsistence, and Beauregard accordingly set to work to hire two hundred waggons with teams and collect twenty-five days' rations for 20,000 men. It will hardly be credited that his arrangements for living on the country in his front and stripping it before the Federals advanced met with violent opposition

from the War Office authorities ; and the quarrel was composed only by Beauregard undertaking to procure the waggons, gather the supplies and transmit them by rail one hundred and forty miles to the rear, in order that the Commissariat Department at Richmond might reissue them with due formalities, at a time when the line and the rolling stock were badly needed to bring up men, horses and material : for the Confederate forces at Manassas and Harper's Ferry were now exposed to an attack in force without possessing even the coloured badges necessary in the absence of uniform to distinguish one another from the enemy. Fortunately for the Confederate levies the Federal leaders were beset with similar difficulties, of which perhaps the Richmond authorities were apprised by their secret service agents ; and so the first half of the year 1861 was over before a battle of importance took place.

Looking back over the events of 1861-65 it is easy to see that the greatest obstacle to the defence of a country is the population itself ; that measures for resistance to invasion must include the establishment of a military government from the outset ; that martial law must be proclaimed and all men enrolled for general service ; that in the case of men unfit for active operations and those whose skill is valuable for military purposes,

as producers of food, clothing and material of war, or as distributors and accountants or police, civil duties must be assigned them and regarded as service to the State equally with military duties. But private interests, personal property and individual rights must be temporarily surrendered.

The logical mind of a Frenchman perceives this necessity for drastic measures or Valmy would not have proved one of the decisive battles of the world : the genius who conducted the defence of Saragossa instantly grasped the truth when he caused gibbets to be erected behind the fighting line as a stimulus to what is called patriotism : but President Davis paltered with the principles of defensive war until it was too late to save the Confederacy. Southern inhabitants with Union sentiments discovered tampering with bridges or giving information to the enemy should have been hanged outright. Bodies like the Partisan Rangers, far from being armed at the expense of the Confederacy to prey upon the families of their compatriots at the war, should have been put in the firing line. All the railways of the South should have been placed under military control. The wool and tobacco and the food supplies of the border districts should have been gathered and taken south or destroyed instead of being

policed by detachments of the army. Deserters might have been shot in 1861 when they were few in number, and then this evil would not have grown to dimensions hopeless to grapple with. Long-winded petitions to citizens imploring their aid and fabricating odious stories of the enemy should have been prohibited as childish. The writ of *habeas corpus* might have been suspended and the entire country treated as a city in a state of siege. The moral effect of captures by the enemy would have been discounted by leaving nothing of value within his reach, while his progress could be delayed by destroying all railroads in his front irrespective of ownership. The business of the Government surely was the military administration of the country and the service of the army, not the control of the forces in the field.

But the story of the war as conducted by the Confederacy exhibits an entire negation of every one of the foregoing propositions, or its recognition as a counsel of perfection, or its practical application in a partial sense or too late. President Davis did in fact destroy cotton, suspend the Habeas Corpus Act, recognise desertion as a crime, enact conscription, prohibit the sale of spirits, burn shipping and wharves and destroy guns and railroads, impress negroes and transport, but always as a special case involving explanation

and excuse : he made it the exception instead of making it the rule. The secondary operations in the Shenandoah Valley by preserving the crops were the means of yielding abundant supplies to the Federals : why were such operations which cost many valuable lives undertaken ? Why were forts constructed at Leesburg ? Why was General Heth superseded for proclaiming the fit punishment for desertion ? Why were slave-owners allowed to haggle as to the terms of hire of negro labour or compensation for loss of this " chattel " ? Why was a provost marshal reprimanded for carrying out his duties thoroughly ? Why was North Carolina permitted to detain troops for local defence and Virginia to allot 2000 men to protect certain " cities " in Norfolk county ? And all that has been said with reference to the Eastern theatre could with equal truth at least be said of the Western theatre of operations.

Mr Davis as president of the Confederate States having wedded his Congress to a defensive policy and tied his generals to defensive strategy conducted the war in the East as though the Border State of Virginia alone were concerned in the conflict. He made no use of the Southern States in his system of defence. He kept close to Washington. Until too late he set Richmond in



flames he was obsessed by the idea that the preservation of his capital on the James, which so early as 1862 ceased even to be of value as a seaport, was vital to the cause of Secession. For a while he believed his own pacific attitude would predispose the Federals to regard Southern soil as holy ground. He drew as it were a magic circle round Richmond and hoped to keep the enemy out of Virginia by incantations. His main army and his best generals were afterwards employed to uphold this theory of war.

Virginia as a base of operations for a Confederate army of invasion was valuable ; as a theatre of defensive war it was the worst possible because it offered the Federals an easy foothold at their very doors. Alexandria was practically a suburb of Washington, the passage of the Potomac being secured to the Federals by bridges and gunboats. President Davis would have found an army of 500,000 men hardly sufficient to hold at every point this frontier of two hundred miles ; and with so small an army as the one he possessed in 1861 concentration to the rear was imperative.

But of course it was open to him to adopt offensive measures when means were available, and for such strategy the eastern theatre was peculiarly suited. The northern frontier forms a salient protruding into the enemy's country beyond Winchester, where

the fords of the Upper Potomac lead into Maryland and Pennsylvania, and this angular frontier gave the Confederates the same opportunities as the Palatinate afforded the Germans in 1870 for the strategical deployment of their army. By a concentration behind Blue Ridge the enemy's capital could have been seriously menaced and the Federal troops detained north of the Potomac: the occupation of Chambersburg by the Confederates, severing the main line of communication between Washington and Cincinnati, would have drawn the Federals westward: and the Armageddon might then have been fought out on Union territory.

It is true that Robert Lee in the autumn of 1862 advanced as far as Frederick and in 1863 even reached Gettysburg; but his forces were by that time nearly spent; and Napoleon's maxim that "the transition from the defensive to the offensive is one of the most delicate operations in war" no doubt then applied to Lee: for his base was still at Richmond and the attempt to operate offensively from his left while his supplies were two hundred miles in rear of his right, and behind an unfordable river, was foredoomed to failure. Could then the Maryland campaign or the Gettysburg campaign have been entered upon under more favourable conditions? It is certainly arguable that they could, that better arrangements were possible

in the autumn of 1861 or the spring of 1862, while the Confederate army was still intact, than later when that army had been decimated.


Assuming Lynchburg as a base of supplies, to which the resources of the West and the South could be drawn through Knoxville and Weldon, railway communication from this base to Staunton *viâ* Charlottesville was available, and from Staunton down the Shenandoah Valley was the best road in the State; the Valley itself was a granary before being wasted by repeated Federal invasions. Some traffic might have been diverted from the main route by continuing to use the southern railroads from Charleston and Wilmington to Richmond and thence to the Valley *viâ* Gordonsville; and moreover the Manassas-Strasburg railroad was a reasonably safe line of supply as long as the Federal main army was occupied by operations north of the Potomac. The communications could be protected by local forces defending the passes of the Alleghanies on the side of Ohio, while the coast defences on the Atlantic seaboard covered the Richmond-Manassas railroad against raids; and the passes of Blue Ridge were easily defensible.

Under some such conditions a field army under Lee proportioned to the supplies and equipment then available with Johnston, Beauregard and

Jackson as corps commanders might have been expected to do more than merely "demonstrate" in Maryland, a State ostensibly neutral but actually sympathetic: at least such a plan would appear to be not inconsistent with the accepted principles of strategy. We do not however forget that what Clausewitz calls "the centre of gravity" and others the "decisive point" may possibly have justified the Confederates in adopting measures which may be described as "the waiting till more favourable times," but in such a case their models for action would be found in the strategy of Frederick the Great or the Emperor Alexander. The former by the use of entrenched camps and positions in the Silesian Mountains attained his object and got round difficulties without a collision in which his forces would have been shattered: the latter by wise sacrifices and a retreat into the interior of Russia purchased the greatest military success of the century.

A colossal undertaking no doubt was the defence of the Southern and Border States in 1861, but that is a point to be considered before, not after, commencing hostilities: and if the people were not prepared to surrender their civil rights for a twelvemonth, and in every way aid their armies in the struggle for independence, it was a political blunder to quarrel with the Union


government. Such matters are understood to have been carefully weighed before any question can arise as to the conduct of war on the part of a Confederacy whose leaders in the event of failure are liable to impeachment for treason.



## CHAPTER IV

### THE COMMAND OF THE SEAS

THE VALUE OF SEA POWER—NAVAL BLOCKADES—IRONCLADS  
AND COAST DEFENCES—THE USE OF NAVIGABLE RIVERS—  
LANDING EXPEDITIONS—THE YORKTOWN CAMPAIGN AND  
THE LOSS OF THE *Merrimac*.





## CHAPTER IV

### THE COMMAND OF THE SEAS

HE was neither sailor nor soldier but a philosopher who wrote "Surely at this day with us of Europe the vantage of strength at sea (which is one of the principal dowries of this kingdom of Great Britain) is great; both because most of the kingdoms of Europe are not merely inland, but girt with the sea most part of their compass; and because the wealth of both Indies seems in great part but an accessory to the command of the seas." Francis Bacon, Lord Verulam might even have gone so far as to declare that islanders and peninsular Powers depend for their very existence on possessing the means to thwart the designs of invaders by water. The harbours which enable islanders to receive the produce of oversea regions are the doors by which an enemy may enter who is sufficiently provided with the floating batteries and mobile fortresses which we call battleships. Even without forcing an entrance he may so control the waterways leading to the harbours as to prevent ingress or egress on the part of ships of

commerce and thus starve the islanders into submission, and of course the seizure of an isthmus converts a peninsula into an island in a military sense.

The ability to blockade an enemy's coasts and at the same time prevent any hostile interference with our sea-borne commerce is what is understood by "the command of the seas" and Captain Mahan, writing three centuries after Bacon, has cited as classical examples of sea power the blockade of the French military ports by British fleets during the Seven Years' War and the Napoleonic era—a period of half-a-century—and that of the Confederate seaboard by the United States navy during the War of Secession. There was a difference of course. The British navy had hostile fleets to fear and therefore was compelled to take tactical precautions: in the case of the Federal navy the cordon system was sufficient. The blockade of the Confederate ports was a purely strategic operation, "a steady and strangling pressure upon the enemy's lines of communication with the result of producing exhaustion through the failure of necessary resources."

But even "Dreadnoughts" are not amphibious, and one of the limitations of sea power was felt when the newly-invented ironclads in 1861 measured their strength against the coast defences,

for the Federals had soon to give up fighting mounds of earth and sand with "Monitors": Admiral Dupont's attack upon Charleston resulted in the disablement of his squadron after an hour's engagement with Fort Sumter. The Confederates moreover possessed a "fleet in being" as long as the *Merrimac* was afloat and other vessels of this type could be prepared for sea.

The *Atlanta* for instance, purchased by the Confederate commissioners in England, sailed from the Clyde and eluding the blockade reached Savannah in November 1861, and when this vessel could no longer put to sea as a commerce destroyer she was converted into a floating battery, carrying 7 inch and 100 pr. rifled guns. Ultimately the enterprise of British shipbuilders caused an international difficulty in respect of the depredations of a dozen Confederate cruisers whose origin had been traced to Great Britain, and gave rise to what were known as the *Alabama* claims which cost us three millions to settle.

In the meantime blockade-runners flourished, three or four vessels a night entering Charleston harbour in cloudy weather, and moreover contraband of war could be landed at Matamoras in Mexico for transport overland to the Confederate authorities as long as the Mississippi was controlled by them, and they did not lose control of this

waterway until Vicksburg was surrendered as the result of Grant's land operations, which opened the Mississippi again to the Federals so that their vessels could pass down from St Louis to New Orleans, and then Louisiana being cleft in two all communication between Texas and Virginia was severed.

The Federal fleet however failed to subdue the forts that guarded the mouth of the Sabine river separating the western section of Louisiana from Texas, and two of the gunboats were compelled to haul down their flags before the enemy. A naval expedition against Shreveport (the principal depôt of the Confederates west of the Mississippi) was arrested by obstructions of piles and sunken vessels in the Red river, and the Federal flotilla retreating under a heavy fire from both banks found itself at Alexandria Falls imprisoned in the heart of the enemy's country, two hundred miles from blue water. On this occasion it was the soldiers who extricated the fleet, for a Maine brigade composed of lumbermen set to work felling and hauling in order to construct an immense "tree dam" formed of large trunks, of stone brought down the river in flat boats, of bricks obtained by demolishing houses and of coal barges loaded and sunk. Within eight days the task was completed, the upper stream filled and the Federal

squadron, save one vessel sunk by a torpedo, passed safely over the rocks ; but the Red river region was not again invaded by water.

Even so late as February 1864 the Confederates built a vessel at Mobile and brought her overland to Charleston : she was a submarine called the *David*, and her *modus operandi* was to pass under the keel of a blockading vessel, dragging after her a floating torpedo to explode on striking the side or bottom of her helpless antagonist. The *David* thus effected the destruction of a Federal corvette mounting thirteen guns, the gallant crew of the submarine perishing with their vessel.

When the Confederates evacuated Charleston on the approach of Sherman's army a small fleet of rams and torpedo boats were discovered in various stages of completion : but the Federal blockade had then been effective for two years and gradually destroying the contraband commerce of Charleston had diminished its military value to the Confederates ; and in the same way no fewer than forty harbours, inlets and channelways had been closed to the outer world in 1865.

Moreover the exposed seaboard of the Southern States had tempted the Federals to carry out expeditions which detained on the coast numerous bodies of Confederate troops who were badly needed for the operations in the interior. The

ubiquitous gunboats convoyed Federal transports from one place of landing to another while the larger vessels continued the blockade.

In February 1862 General J. G. Foster had landed eleven regiments and a battery on Roanoke Island in North Carolina and, attacking the Confederate works there, compelled the garrison of the island to capitulate in spite of its defences of piles and sunken vessels. Burnside in March took New Berne and in May he reduced Fort Macon. Fort Pulaski on Cockspur Island at the mouth of the Savannah was captured in April by General Gillmore, who had established eleven batteries on an adjacent island and thence poured in thousands of rounds of shot and shell from 13 inch mortars, 30 pr. Parrott guns and other heavy ordnance, including two 84 pounders. General H. W. Benham in June with fifteen regiments and two large batteries landed on James Island and attacked Secessionville, which covered the terminus of the Charleston and Savannah railway.

Thus by degrees the Confederates were made to exemplify Bacon's maxim, "He that commands the sea is at great liberty and may take as much and as little of war as he will ; whereas those that be strongest by land are many times nevertheless in great straits."

The Yorktown campaign was itself in effect an

oversea expedition on a large scale, and as such was wholly dependent for its success on "the command of the seas": and while the *Merrimac* controlled the navigation of the James even the result of the famous sea-fight in Hampton Roads by no means freed the Lincoln cabinet from anxiety in regard to McClellan's proposal to move by water to the peninsula. A naval authority reported at the time that "the *Monitor* is more than a match for the *Merrimac*, but she might be disabled in the next encounter. I cannot advise so great dependence upon her. The *Monitor* may, and I think will, destroy the *Merrimac* in the next fight, but this is hope not certainty"; and so it appears that a single vessel of a new type in the hands of an enemy may dominate for a while the naval and military situation; and since in March 1862 the "only hope" of the Federals was the *Monitor* it was a marvellous stroke of good fortune for them that the rival ironclad soon afterwards ran aground.

The loss of the *Merrimac* involved the loss of the control of the James river by the Confederates and compelled them to withdraw from the peninsula: and when McClellan's offensive operations failed in June it was to the Federal navy, which kept open the waterways, provided a movable base and even co-operated tactically during the retreat, that


McClellan owed his escape from Robert Lee : and if ultimately the Army of the Potomac gained at Harrison's Landing the advantages which Wellington had derived from Torres Vedras it was only because the Federal navy controlled the James river for, as Goltz says, " of two belligerent powers the one stronger by sea retains under all circumstances his rear free and his communications with the outer world open."



## CHAPTER V

### ORGANISATION

GENERAL MCCLELLAN AS ORGANISER—THE FIGHTING TROOPS—  
FORMATIONS — CAVALRY RESERVE AND ARTILLERY  
RESERVE—ARMS AND EQUIPMENT—THE WESTERN  
ARMIES — THE INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT — TOPO-  
GRAPHICAL ENGINEERS—A SIGNAL CORPS—INTER-COM-  
MUNICATION—FIELD TELEGRAPHY—FIELD ENGINEERS—  
BRIDGING OPERATIONS—TRANSPORT AND SUPPLIES—  
THE ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT—MEDICAL SERVICE AND  
SANITARY DISCIPLINE.



## CHAPTER V

### ORGANISATION

THE fall of Fort Sumter in April 1861 had induced the Union government to call out the State militias, the repulse at Bull Run in July compelled it to set about organising an army. General McClellan who was now summoned to Washington possessed many qualifications for a task of this kind ; an ex-engineer officer still under five and thirty he had served in the Mexican War, had constructed forts, had surveyed rivers and harbours and had only quitted the army to become a railroad engineer and president of a vast business concern. McClellan had introduced the bayonet exercise into the United States army in 1851 and had written the authorised drill-book. A prominent member of the Commission sent by the U.S. government to the seat of war in the Crimea, he had been selected to draw up a critical report on the organisation of European armies. He was popular and respected and moreover represented Ohio—a State which, after New York and Pennsylvania, contributed the largest number of recruits to the Union forces.

McClellan organised the fighting troops into divisions and his war establishments provided for 3 brigades (each of 4 battalions), 4 batteries of field artillery and 1 regiment of cavalry—that is about 12,000 infantry, 24 guns and 1000 cavalry per division. But when he proceeded in the teeth of opposition at the War Office to establish *corps d'armée* he suddenly found that his means were deficient. He became still further embarrassed when he endeavoured to provide himself with what are called “army troops,” that is an artillery reserve and a cavalry reserve after the Napoleonic pattern; but at last he collected 100 guns, field and horse artillery and heavy guns—in addition to a siege train of 50 guns which included 100 prs. (five), 200 prs. (two) and 13 inch mortars (ten)—without depriving the divisions of their batteries. He could not however furnish “corps” artillery.

His greatest difficulty was in regard to cavalry. He had proposed to allot a brigade to each *corps d'armée* and a regiment to each division while retaining a few brigades as his cavalry reserve; but he was constrained—we know not why—to leave 25 regiments at Washington and take the field with only 8 regiments and 7 companies; so that after complying with the demands of his Provost Marshal and attaching 3 companies to

General Headquarters for camp guards and orderlies there remained for all other purposes only 7 regiments and 4 companies, or about 4000 mounted men.

In the result a "cavalry reserve" under General Cooke was formed of 6 regiments in 2 brigades: then Averell's regiment was attached to Heintzelman's III. corps and Farnsworth's regiment to Sumner's II. corps: a few companies were afterwards distributed among the divisions as provost guards; but "divisional" cavalry like "corps" artillery was *non est*.

Even in organising the infantry unexpected obstacles were encountered owing to the territorial system of recruiting, so that many brigades consisted of five while others were perforce reduced to three regiments; and the whole of the "regular" infantry (4600 men in 71 companies) were formed into one brigade of 9 regiments under General George Sykes as a *corps d'élite*.

The artillery reserve under Colonel Hunt absorbed 23 batteries in addition to the siege train under Colonel Tyler. The single battalion of "regular" engineers retained its independence under Captain Duane while two regiments of "volunteer" engineers were commanded by General Woodbury as a brigade.

Such, in rough outline, was the organisation of

the formations of the new Army of the Potomac before the friction of active service produced inevitable modifications: its ten divisions or five corps on May 18 were estimated to include 120,000 infantry or 100,000 effectives (though McClellan averred he could deploy only 80,000 bayonets in front of Johnston's Confederates) supported by 92 batteries or 520 guns, of which one-third were manned by regulars.

Some further details may be useful in regard to tactical and administrative units. A cavalry regiment was composed of 4 squadrons, a squadron of 2 companies, a company of 2 platoons each of some 20 troopers. This cavalry was armed with sabre and revolver, and at least 2 squadrons per regiment with the carbine; but eccentricities occurred sometimes, as when one regiment was equipped—for want of cutting weapons—with the lance!

An infantry regiment of 10 companies was organised in 5 "divisions" or double companies: a company consisted of 2 platoons and a platoon of 2 sections. Infantry were equipped with the sabre-bayonet and muzzle-loading rifle, generally the "Enfield" which could be loaded and fired with good aim at the rate of two rounds a minute. Good practice with this rifle was made at 600

yards: the bullet was .55 inch and the weight of 60 rounds with percussion caps was  $5\frac{1}{2}$  lbs.

The field artillery battery of the period was "mixed," that is it comprised both guns and howitzers; but the favourite piece was a rifled 12 pr. called the "Napoleon" after its inventor, the then emperor of the French, whose "New System of Field Artillery" advocated a 12 pr. shell gun (*canon obusier*) which could fire both shot and shell, in order that a battery might consist of one description of ordnance firing two projectiles in lieu of four kinds of ordnance firing nine projectiles: the value of the new system had been recently proved in the Italian campaign.

The Federals however had not yet attained this ideal of simplicity (only a third of their guns were "Napoleons") and in consequence a battery in action was composed of 4 guns and 2 howitzers, and did one of two things: it either made use alternately of the guns and the howitzers, so reducing its volume of fire; or by firing all six pieces, guns and howitzers together it sacrificed the characteristics of one type of ordnance to those of the other. The Federal government in the course of the war no doubt became the prey of inventors, for in 1866 an industrious compiler made out a descriptive list of 47 types of ordnance then in use in America. There is also reason to

believe that an experimental mitrailleuse was being tested on the peninsula, for Trimble the Confederate general declared that he had been under the fire of "a sort of repeating gun called a telescopic cannon discharging sixty balls a minute." It is however remarkable that the Americans, who had supplied the British army with a B.L. carbine in 1855 and with B.L. guns (32 prs.) in 1857, never succeeded in equipping their armies with other than muzzle-loading weapons, if we except the issue of repeating carbines to Sheridan's cavalry a few months before the close of the war.

All that has been stated in regard to the armament of the Army of the Potomac may be applied to the Confederate forces, since the latter at first equipped themselves from the U.S. arsenals which they had seized, and afterwards imported weapons from Europe until the blockade became effective: besides they gathered up thousands of weapons which had been "shamefully cast away" by routed Federals or taken from prisoners of war. The Confederates also had a *penchant* for the Napoleon gun which with shrapnel and canister proved most destructive at short ranges—they seldom saw the enemy at long range in large bodies—and their arsenal at Augusta turned out one of these guns every other day, as well as 7000 lbs. of gunpowder daily (saltpetre ran the



blockade from England) and at Atlanta percussion caps were made until all the copper stills in the Southern States had been melted down.

Lack of military organisation was however woefully apparent in the Western theatre of war and on the Confederate side in the south of Kentucky especially. Until Sidney Johnston arrived in September 1861 all was chaos throughout an immense extent of country too distant for any effective supervision from Richmond. The local commanders fought or ran as seemed good to them without giving or demanding co-operation from neighbouring forces. One of their leaders was an ecclesiastic called Bishop Polk, whose solicitude for the Valley of the Mississippi was pooh-poohed by President Davis in May, and who was told that the President proposed to take the field in person "when the movement is to be made."

The bishop's "Memoirs" show that at first provisions were abundant and clothing, tents (made at Memphis) and cooking utensils were available ; but the absence of wheeled transport prevented any supply column being organised, and so the troops were tied to the railway sidings, the river-bank or the towns for subsistence. There was no system of collecting or distributing supplies, and even the small quantities of medicines which had run the blockade from the North were wasted,

and in consequence "the mortality was dreadful."

Until September there were hardly 1000 rifles (Springfield or Enfield) in the whole of the Kentucky army : half the men were armed with shot guns and squirrel rifles, and of the remainder fifty per cent. used flint-lock muskets in addition to bowie-knives and revolvers which most men possessed. In the advance on Bowling Green 600 Kentucky Confederates were left behind for lack of weapons. In November one or two regiments were able to discard the flint-lock musket for Belgian rifles and a month later the flint-locks were altered to percussion locks ; but cartridge boxes, knapsacks and canteens were deficient, and there was a scarcity of bullets, powder and percussion caps until a Nashville citizen took to manufacturing some.

The same haphazard arrangements prevailed in organising the troops. The enlisting officer who was popular in his district would raise a local regiment of 2000 men in 17 companies, and a brigade might consist of any number of men from 3000 to 7000 ; and since every volunteer could choose his company and his captain and refuse to be transferred there were companies of artillery as well as companies of cavalry and infantry. The officers were unknown quantities, for even

many ex-regulars knew little or nothing of war : they were elected by the men as experimental commanders and too often the sole test of merit was a disposition to regard with an indulgent eye every form of indiscipline. It was said that " the temper of the Southern people . . . revolted against complete loss of individuality," and in truth a revolutionary army can hardly be expected to exhibit the traits which it detests in the government it would overthrow. Racial pride, self-respect and loyalty to successful leaders might always be appealed to, but " unreasoning obedience from fear of punishment " was naturally abhorrent to such organisations as " Hell-roarers," " Dead Shots," etc.

Yet certain officers fashioned out of this unpromising material a " Stonewall " brigade, or a contingent like that of Morgan whose motto was " our Laws the Commands of our Captain " ; and which broke away from the State Guard organisation to which it belonged in September in order to follow Morgan to the Confederate lines on Green river, passing through Lexington and the Federal lines with its guns packed in waggons. It was Morgan who averred that " the use of cavalry was not to do work that infantry could perform, but to go out to the flanks and the front and remain close to the enemy " — a doctrine

which we strive to inculcate in *Cavalry Training* to-day.

Morgan's command mounted on condemned artillery horses marched 68 miles in 20 hours; and when afterwards it was properly equipped with good horses, saddlery and guns, and increased to three companies Morgan's first exploit was to bring across a river in the face of the Kentucky Home Guards a large drove of cattle, after raising the sunken boats, baling out the water and filling up the holes in them. An enterprise of this sort partly reconciles us to individualism in an army and to national levies, and recalls the saying of Clausewitz: "If it is an object to destroy roads or to block up a defile, the means which detachments from a [regular] army can apply to that purpose bear about the same relation to those furnished by a body of insurgent peasants as the action of an automaton does to that of a human being."

In the Eastern theatre McClellan, having done all that in him lay to perfect the machinery of command and establish a chain of responsibility and proper channels of correspondence in regard to the fighting troops, now sought to create and organise the Services and Departments, as we call them: and the measure of success which he attained will be evident if we consider

the work performed by these administrative troops during the months of May and June 1862; but first of all we should glance rapidly at his Intelligence Department.

At the headquarters of the "Provost Marshal General" at Washington a certain Mr E. J. Allen (Allen Pinkerton) officiated as Chief of the Secret-Service Division and reported to General McClellan the results of his investigations. His prognostications were not very happy though deserters, spies, contrabands (negroes), refugees and prisoners of war were all laboriously catechised. In May he estimated the Confederates holding Yorktown as 100,000 to 120,000 of all ranks; on June 26 he believed that Lee had over 180,000 men in the field while Richmond was said to be defended by fifty-two earthworks of which thirty-six alone mounted 205 guns. Such reports may account to some extent for McClellan's reluctance to carry out the plans of attack which he had formed, though it is difficult to understand why a general in the field with a numerous staff and a body of cavalry should so late as June 26 be ignorant of the strength of his opponent. Even a month later when at Harrison's Landing Pinkerton gravely informed his employers that the Confederates in the Seven Days' battles had numbered 220,000 to 260,000: whereas in fact General Lee

had taken the field with only 80,762 effectives, according to W. H. Taylor his adjutant-general.

A body of topographical engineers attached to army headquarters explored the country and furnished information as to the geography of the region in which operations were to be carried out, and their reports enabled the Federal staff to direct the march of columns, fix points for depôts and select lines of supply ; they also reconnoitred the enemy's positions, secretly when possible and at other times by causing their escort to attack the outposts while sketches were being made ; these sketches were afterwards copied by photography and distributed to commanders and staff officers.

A professional aeronaut was engaged to manage the balloon ascents when required for tactical reconnaissance. For the lines of communication a corps of telegraph operators was organised and equipped with 1200 miles of wire : for use on the battlefield a "portable insulated" wire was invented, but was not fully utilised until the end of the year when at Fredericksburg we find it in the hands of the signal corps.

This "communication company" on reaching the peninsula in May connected army headquarters with the flotilla of gunboats on the Pamunkey river ; and after the battle of Fair Oaks, when the

Confederates held the low ground between the two wings of the Federal army, a signal station at Hogan's House north of the Chickahominy established communication with the left wing across three miles of impassable swamp; and so kept Franklin, Porter and Smith in direct correspondence with army headquarters.

The Confederate advance on June 25 was signalled from an observatory on a tree top: the flagmen also pointed out targets to the field batteries and observed the effects of fire; and when as at Mechanicsville the smoke of black powder obscured visual signals the officers of the corps undertook the work of infantry scouts. At the battle of Gaines Mill both flanks of the Federal army were connected with a central signal station at which General Porter remained. On Sunday, June 29 while the flank movement was in progress the Federal signallers observed and reported the enemy's approach to General W. F. Smith at Savage Station, and when the army had concentrated at Malvern Hill the signal corps established communication with the naval squadron in James river, and by indicating suitable targets to the gunboats enabled them to co-operate in the land battle on July 1.

On June 30 the observatory party at Haxall's Landing had signalled the movement of the Con-

federates when five miles distant and caused the gunboats to open fire on a column which hoped to surprise the Federal left. The retreat from Malvern Hill to Harrison's Landing took place during the night of July 1 and the signal corps (with torches in lieu of lamps) conveyed messages to General McClellan, then on board the gunboat *Galena*, and so reported all through the night the names of divisions as each one passed the signal station on the banks of the James.

In the morning at 9 A.M. (July 2) the last waggons of the Federal trains were entering the clearing at Haxall's; the rearguard of the army (Keyes' corps) was crossing Turkey Creek swollen by torrents of rain; and the timbers of the bridge had been prepared for demolition (trees by the roadside having been partly cut through ready for felling to obstruct the route to the enemy) before permission was granted to the last detachment of signallers—kept back to enable the rear to be covered by the naval guns if necessary—to retire and rejoin army headquarters at Harrison's six miles below Haxall's Landing: from the roof of the Harrison mansion communication with the gunboats was maintained as long as the army remained in the peninsula.



The Federal engineers were not distributed among the corps and divisions, but preserved an independent organisation like the reserve artillery and the reserve cavalry. They carried their technical tools in thirty waggons apart from their entrenching tools which were in "tool waggons." Their "bridge train" consisted of 34 French pontoons and 8 Birago trestles besides Russian canvas boats and the necessary baulks, chesses, anchors, cordage, etc., for a road-way 250 yards in length. There were six such "trains" in the army. The labours of the engineers on the peninsula were as the labours of Sisyphus. They built bridges for the army to advance only to receive orders within a few days to destroy these structures on the army's retreat; they constructed redoubts only to see them abandoned; and siege works only to find that the enemy had evacuated his defences just when the heavy ordnance was ready to begin a bombardment.

At Wormley's Creek, at Cheeseman's Landing and at West Point the engineers assisted at the disembarkations; and on arrival in the middle of May at the Chickahominy, after a march of 40 miles from Williamsburg at the rate of three miles a day, the engineers between New Bridge and Bottom's Bridge, a distance of eight miles, put up or repaired within a month a dozen bridges in order

to improve the communications between the two wings of the army and bring up its supplies from White House on the Pamunkey.

One of these bridges across the Chickahominy was needed at a point where stream and swamp and low bottom lands demanded a structure of bridge and approaches 1400 yards in length : framed trestles (6) supported a roadway 11 feet wide over the water and crib piers (40) carried it over the swamp : the approaches over the low bottom lands were formed partly of raised corduroy and partly of earth embankment three feet high with a layer of brushwood one foot below the surface. The bridge was ready for the passage of teams on June 14 and three days later it was covered with earth and the approaches finished by details from infantry regiments. Yet the floods in May rendered all the military bridges impassable, and for a few days the only means of communication between the two wings of the army was the railway bridge ; which was crossed—though at some risk to horses—by means of planks laid between the rails.

Then the engineers constructed various field works : for example No 1, a lunette with open gorge for 8 guns ; No. 2, a redan with open gorge for 6 guns ; No. 3, a redoubt (irregular pentagon in plan) for 5 guns ; No. 4, a redoubt for 9 guns ;

No. 5 and No. 6 redoubts for 6 guns were in plan squares of thirty yards side : and all these works were connected by rifle pits (fire trenches) or barricades and together formed the defensive lines three miles long which protected McClellan's left wing. Similar works were constructed north of the Chickahominy to strengthen the right wing.

As early as June 26 the destruction of the bridges began as the preliminary to retreat ; the pontoons were scuttled and the flooring was burnt. At the same time engineers were sent forward to bridge the stream at White Oak Swamp and corduroy the approaches on both sides, and open up routes eastward from Savage Station for the army and its trains.

On the retreat from Malvern Hill the engineers repaired the roads and bridged Kimage's Creek—which swollen by the rain needed two bridges—and left all the material together with the waggons to be destroyed by the rearguard.

Then at Harrison's Landing a new defensive line four miles long was prepared, both extremities of which rested on the James and were flanked by the fire of gunboats. On the northern front, commanding the two practicable approaches, a work consisting of two redans connected by a curtain was laid out, rifle pits and barricades were constructed and redoubts built for guns at the salient

angles ; and everywhere except through the open fields of Westover the front of these works was covered by extensive abattis.

Here the Army of the Potomac remained until August when the Chickahominy was again bridged, at a point near its mouth where pontoons and rafts spanned 2000 feet of water, and McClellan's unhappy divisions followed their trains eastward. The site was reconnoitred August 10, the material was brought up from Fort Monroe the next day and unloaded on the third day. The bridge was commenced August 13 and finished in a day : the advanced guard crossed August 15 and three days later the rearguard passed over and the bridge was dismantled before nightfall.

The Chief Quartermaster controlled the whole of the transport of the Army of the Potomac which in the spring of 1862 consisted of 3600 waggons and 700 ambulances for use on the roads and 405 vessels—86,000 tons of shipping—on the waterways.

By throwing the barges and canal boats ashore at high tide and bridging over them extensive wharves were constructed at Cheesman's Creek (depôt for forage, quartermaster's stores and camp equipage) ; at Ship Point (depôt for subsistence) ;

at Old Point (depôt for clothing) ; at Back Creek (a small dépôt of supply for Porter's division) ; and at Wormley's Creek where the heavy ordnance was landed for the siege of Yorktown which the Confederates did not wait to endure.

As McClellan's army advanced westward its dépôts were pushed up the York river and the Pamunkey until at White House (within 23 miles of Richmond) the railway was reached. The Confederates had of course removed the rolling stock and destroyed the bridges ; the track was out of repair and parts of it even washed away by storms of unprecedented severity. But northern enterprise was equal to the occasion, for locomotives and carriages were procured and landed, and large working parties employed on the permanent way ; so that by the end of May the trains were running and railhead was established within five miles of the troops. Even then the haulage presented a difficulty, for the roads were so bad that teams could only draw a half-load, viz. 1000 lbs. : yet the gain was great for it had been necessary before the railroad was put in running order to haul the supplies 16 miles, from the dépôt at White House to the troops on the Chickahominy, and the waste in horses was such that mules were afterwards employed for the draught work involved in delivering 600 tons daily to the troops.

The ration strength of the army was at this time 100,000 and each man being allowed 3 lbs. of food and every horse a ration of 26 lbs. McClellan's forces ate up 150 waggonloads a day.

On June 23 the Chief Quartermaster was instructed to fill up the advanced depôts and prepare to evacuate White House two days later ; for the word went round " Jackson will be coming down very soon " : and on June 27 the battle of Gaines Mill put the Federal trains in movement after dark in order to avoid capture. On the afternoon of June 29 the waggons had crossed White Oak Swamp and next day, though shelled by the enemy at distant ranges, were safely parked behind Malvern Hill before nightfall, the transports in the James arriving at the same time at Haxall's Landing. " It seems almost a miracle our successful escape from White House," said an officer of the Quartermaster's department.

The Director of Supplies (as we should call him) was a colonel on the staff of General McClellan who was appointed Chief Commissary of Subsistence and who on May 5 got his supplies up to Yorktown. Three days later he was required to send forward 90,000 rations of bread and meat to the army at Williamsburg. Supplies were trans-

ported by water on May 10 to Eltham Landing on the Pamunkey, on May 13 to Cumberland Landing and on May 19 to White House. On May 20 a herd of beef cattle reached White House which had set out from Fort Monroe on May 11 with orders to follow the army, so that a commissary officer could detach daily the number of beasts required for rations. Other cattle now arriving by vessel from Washington an immense corral was formed at White House, beef on the hoof being driven forward daily to the army.

On May 25 a supply depôt was opened for the right wing at Dispatch Station one mile north of the Chickahominy, and two days later another depôt was established for the supply of the left wing of the army three miles south of the river at Savage Station. On June 3 railhead was advanced to Orchard Station (Fair Oaks) seven miles from Richmond.

On June 18 supply-ships with 800,000 rations arrived at City Point on James river "in anticipation of a speedy advance on Richmond" but on June 26 preparations for retreat had begun at White House on York river. All day liberal issues of hard bread to the troops were made and all night the reshipping of supplies went on. The depôt at Dispatch Station north of the Chickahominy was evacuated after rationing the hospitals in

view of their seizure by the enemy. The cattle (2500) had been driven forward to Savage Station and on June 27 were marched to the rear *viâ* Baltimore Cross Roads ; and three days later the convoy crossed White Oak Swamp whence after grazing the herd was pushed on towards the James by roads already crowded with waggons.

On June 28 an immense conflagration at White House put out of reach of the enemy all the supplies which could not, for want of time, be re-shipped under cover of Stoneman's detachment including Casey's disgraced division. On June 29 the depôts south of the Chickahominy are broken up, the hospitals are victualled for the use of the patients now to be abandoned to the enemy, the haversacks of troops and the regimental waggons are replenished, and the remainder of the supplies after equipping a small supply column for the march to the James are destroyed. On July 1 the supplies which had been reshipped at White House are landed near Haxall's on the James river for issue, but afterwards in consequence of the battle of Malvern Hill they are again reshipped and taken down the James to Harrison's Landing, where the next day a portion is landed and the remainder carried down to Westover, near Herring Creek, which was to become the depôt of the army as long as it remained on the Peninsula. It will



be observed that these details throw some light on the nature of General McClellan's operations in June and correct first impressions derived from vainglorious reports of Federal victories.

The Chief of the Ordnance Department established his depôts at Yorktown, White House and Harrison's Landing as the army moved up and across the Peninsula ; but when the White House depôt was in danger of capture he transferred millions of rounds of musket and artillery ammunition to the vicinity of Savage Station and a point called Forage Station, and thus enabled the troops to replenish their waggons and pouches from these temporary depôts after the communications had fallen into the hands of the enemy.

The supply of field artillery—smoothbore and rifled guns—was abundant and of good quality : the " light twelves " or Napoleons grew in favour and 6 prs. were gradually discarded : but the ammunition for rifled ordnance was often defective, and ten varieties of S.A.A. were needed for different patterns in use of British, French, Belgian, Prussian and Austrian rifles, as well as those of American make, besides the old muskets altered from flint to percussion action, and for the cavalry carbines which were reissued after being

withdrawn as an encumbrance to mounted troops : and extraordinary exertions were required to supply the troops during the movement from the Chickahominy to the James, owing to the ordnance waggons being packed in haste and labelled wrongly or not at all.

The medical administration of the army was entrusted to Surgeon Tripler as " Director " who however found it difficult to improvise an efficient medical staff, especially as his civilian colleagues derided all systematic arrangements as " red tape." He regarded the health of the troops as good upon the whole, the sick report never exceeding 8 per cent. of the force " including trivial cases." No epidemic disease appeared during the Yorktown campaign. " Those scourges of modern armies—dysentery, typhus and cholera were almost unknown." Some cases occurred of typhoid fever and more of malarial fever.

His professional troubles had begun at Williamsburg where rain fell on the night of May 5 and continued the next day : " many of the regiments left their camps with nothing in their haversacks ; the roads were shocking and it seemed impossible to get medical supplies to the troops whose privations were extreme : and as a

natural result when the columns were again put in motion a large number of men, some of them sick, most of them tired and exhausted, straggled in from the rear of the army without reports, nurses or subsistence."

A general hospital (100 tents) was established at White House : at Yorktown houses as well as tents were occupied. A medical storeship and hospital transports lay in the Pamunkey, and it was decided to relieve the field hospitals by sending 260 of the worst cases to Boston ; but before any selection could be made " stragglers had rushed on board without authority and taken possession." There were malingerers of course and a remedy was applied in an order establishing regimental hospitals and requiring commanders to treat their own sick. The Medical Director reasoned thus : " If men can be sure of being sent home by being thrown upon the medical director of this army, the contagion of homesickness will spread till there is not a sound man left here to carry a musket." It was found that mortality was greater in buildings than in tents, and that tents were healthier without plank floors.

The establishment authorised one surgeon and one assistant per regiment, but no provision was made for a staff from which medical men could be allotted to hospitals or detachments and casualties


made good. Lack of discipline led to slackness in rendering reports and to the loss of transport and stores. Professional duties and administrative duties were so combined that a surgeon was responsible for subsisting his patients, taking charge of the hospital train on a march and distributing the waggons to brigades and regiments upon their arrival in camp : he had also to muster, pay and subsist the teamsters and to forage the horses.

Straggling and malingering were rife and Dr Tripler on May 29 reported that " Casey's division has lost some 3500 men within the last two months from sickness and straggling combined " and " I feel confident that more than 1000 men perfectly fit to join their regiments are now idle in the general hospitals." He also observed that " much mischief is done by the sale of improper articles of food," while on the other hand the troops could not be induced to use the desiccated vegetables prescribed as a preventive of scurvy : moreover sanitary rules could not be enforced by medical officers whose status was that of civilians.

The physical condition of the Federal army on reaching Harrison's Landing caused Dr Tripler some alarm. Malaria had been bred in the swamps of the Chickahominy, and continual rain, mud, labour and excitement coupled with lack of food and rest had produced scurvy. Six thousand sick

were sent away on transports while thirteen thousand remained in field hospitals : twenty per cent. of the army was ineffective at the beginning of July, despite the employment of 66 surgeons, 12 medical cadets, 12 hospital stewards, 537 nurses and 126 cooks.


Probably no such instructive reports in connection with the health of an army had ever before been made as those of Dr Tripler and Dr Letterman in 1862, and they bore immediate fruit in a thorough reorganisation of the medical services of the Army of the Potomac : even to-day they afford to the combatant officer an education in sanitary discipline.



## CHAPTER VI

### TACTICS

THE MOST IMPORTANT THING IN WAR—FACTORS OF SUCCESS  
—INFLUENCE OF NUMBERS—ATTACK *versus* DEFENCE—  
GRAND TACTICS AND MINOR TACTICS—FIGHTING METHODS  
OF THE PERIOD—BULL RUN AND COLD HARBOUR—CAVALRY,  
ARTILLERY AND INFANTRY—LACK OF GOOD LEADERS—  
THE REMEDY APPLIED BY AMERICAN SOLDIERS.





## CHAPTER VI

### TACTICS

"THE thing of the highest importance in war," says Clausewitz, "will always be the art of conquering the enemy in battle"; and we may add that in proportion to the lack of success attending a general's strategic combinations the prowess of his troops on the battlefield becomes essential. He himself must now assume the *rôle* of tactician, since a battle like Rossbach, Marengo or Salamanca will retrieve even a situation which is strategically hopeless.

The shortcomings of strategy in 1861-62 caused the results of the combats to become of the greatest consequence; indeed a decisive victory at Bull Run in 1861, or at Cold Harbour in 1862, might have ended the war by convincing the beaten side of the futility of further struggle: but as in policy and strategy so in tactics a certain equilibrium was preserved which proved fatal to the cause of peace: on neither side was there ever sufficient remaining energy in the victors to effect the

destruction of the enemy on the field of battle : there was always a want of what old-time pugilists called "finishing" power ; and the phenomenon was witnessed again and again of mental and physical collapse on the part of an army at the moment when the fruits of victory were ready to be gathered.

Ought we to blame the general or his troops for achieving a half measure of success ? There is much to be said on both sides ; but a leader evidently cannot rid himself of responsibility for bringing on an engagement, for deliberately accepting the ordeal of battle, when his force is suspected to be inadequate to profit by the favours of Bellona ; since he thereby dissipates the strength that should be carefully stored up for a decisive blow : moreover he emboldens the enemy to try conclusions on a future occasion.

The judgment to discern at once the conditions which justify a pitched battle is perhaps the rarest attribute of a general : what are these conditions ? Our Field Service Regulations say : "superior numbers on the battlefield are an undoubted advantage ; but skill, better organisation and training, and above all a firmer determination in all ranks to conquer at any cost, are the chief factors of success,"—surely a most comfortable doctrine for the leader of a small force who is

willing to close his eyes to the circumstance that in 1815 Napoleon matched his skill and trained army against the heterogeneous forces of the Allies with dire results. Why did he do it? At the zenith of his power Napoleon had said: "I never think I have enough troops to fight a battle with an enemy whom I am accustomed to beat: I call up all the troops I can collect." Napoleon however is not the only preceptor who "recks not his own rede."

It seems not unwise therefore to assign to numbers their evident value in battle, and in doing so we explain to some extent the influence of tactics on the campaigns of 1861-62. There never existed on one side or the other that preponderance of physical force (represented by numbers when opponents are equal in moral and training) which is necessary for decisive results.

The true value of numerical superiority had, no doubt, been somewhat obscured by recent events in Europe, where the French had beaten the Austrians with equal or inferior numbers by utilising their remarkable manœuvring powers; but the significant fact was overlooked by contemporary critics that at Magenta and Solferino the total loss in killed and wounded was equally shared by victors and vanquished (French, 18,295; Austrians, 18,733); and that therefore so far as

tactics were concerned the war might have been prolonged for an indefinite period.

The battles of 1859 were however instinct with a change in the spirit of the combat even as compared with the battle of the Alma, where 63,000 Allies with rifles had barely sufficed to defeat 35,000 Russians with smoothbores; and the War of Secession was to show why a decisive victory would become more and more difficult to bring about: the Federals and Confederates being equally matched as combatants the question of Attack *versus* Defence became vital.

It was a maxim of Napoleon's that "even in offensive warfare in the open field the great secret consists in defensive combats and in obliging the enemy to attack," a rule which however the temper of their troops compelled Napoleon and his marshals often to ignore to Wellington's great profit, who operated confidently in the belief that the French never possessed the "patience" to fight a defensive battle. But in America it was quickly perceived that defensive tactics sustained by a powerful rifle and field fortification would enable either army at will to impose on its antagonist a task to which he must prove unequal owing to paucity of numbers. Yet at the outset each army in turn—perhaps for the psychological reason which often swayed French armies—chose

the rôle of attacker and found itself confronted by the problem whether to break the centre or turn the flank, whether to adopt a frontal or enveloping form of attack.

They did both equally badly : at Bull Run the Federals and at Cold Harbour the Confederates attempted envelopment, at Williamsburg the Federals and at Fair Oaks the Confederates endeavoured to break the centre. But the attack in whatever form it was planned invariably failed. Defensive tactics were inexpugnable. The attackers could neither surprise nor overwhelm. And it is evident that if a deliberately planned attack could not succeed the improvised offensive movement which we call the counter-attack would fare no better, and so passive defence tended to become stereotyped. It is therefore to be feared that modern tactical theories which prescribe a vigorous offensive will receive but negative illustration from the encounters between Bull Run and Malvern Hill : rather must we turn to the Western theatre where Brigadier-general Grant was making history in Tennessee—wiping out 5000 of the enemy in a two days' battle at Fort Donelson at a cost of some 2000 casualties and by a magnificent counterstroke at Shiloh taking heavy toll of the Confederates for their initial success—if we would see how battles have been

fought and won when skill, resolution and numerical superiority are happily combined.

So much being said of that aspect of tactics which is the affair of commanding generals and forms the subject of Operation Orders it may be well to glance at the "minor tactics" of the period, at battle formations and the fighting methods of units of all arms while the Waterloo traditions yet survived.

At the time when the American armies were preparing for the battle of Bull Run the adjutants of our Rifle Volunteers were teaching that "if a soldier is not properly placed, if his shoulders and body are not square to his front, how can a company, how can a regiment form that exact line of which we are so justly proud?" They taught also that the success of "the charge" depended on "the line being kept unbroken," and even when marching with sloped arms the touch was kept by the elbow; for "correct marching in line is the most important and at the same time the most difficult of military movements—it is the movement by which soldiers are brought into immediate contact with the enemy." Then the front rank always knelt to fire and after firing a volley rose up to load again, though in "file firing" it continued to fire and load in the kneeling position. Evolutions in direct echelon

enabled the line to advance or refuse a flank and oblique echelon enabled it to take ground to a flank or to change front. But whenever column was to be formed from line the soldier was expected to repeat to himself "right in front, left is the pivot" or "left in front, right is the pivot"; though in wheeling into line from column another "front," namely the supposed direction of the enemy, was assumed.

In a word, the British army was still wedded to the sort of drill which Frederick the Great had decried after Mollwitz and had modified during the Seven Years' War, and which the French had abolished at Montenotte. That "thin red line" two miles long, which at the Alma had been formed (after several hours spent in deployment) only to be broken into fragments by the mere passage of an obstacle, remained the ideal formation for attack in our service; and there is little doubt that McClellan who had studied British methods in the Crimea, and Jefferson Davis who as Secretary for War in 1855 had received his Report, would have made it the basis of their minor tactics if their levies had been allowed time for "spring drill" and "platoon exercises."

Fortunately as it happened American soldiers were permitted to evolve for themselves a battle formation suited to their environment, and soon this formation partook less of the character of the

“line” than of the “skirmishing order” associated with rifle corps and “light infantry,” who in England were supposed to “conceal and cover the movements of the line” and afterwards “run to the rear of the battalion by the shortest way.”

This “irregular” method of fighting had been introduced into Europe by the survivors of such battles as Bunker’s Hill and Saratoga a century before, and now was to be revived and improved by the Federals and Confederates who fought in Virginia with the Enfield rifle and sword bayonet. Behind a row of skirmishers or sharpshooters the shallow column “doubled on the centre” moved into position, deploying only when a field of fire was opened and a target presented itself. The result was manifest at Sharpsburg on the Antietam where out of 47,000 Federals engaged over 12,000 were killed or wounded, whereas at the Alma out of 112,000 engaged only 8000 were placed *hors de combat*; and if the object of fighting be the speedy destruction of the enemy it would seem that the American levies in 1862 had little to learn from European standing armies.

It is also remarkable that these staunch fighters were the means of reviving a branch of defensive tactics which had long lain disused, namely the art of shooting from behind improvised earthworks. Even in Grant’s army after Shiloh the axe and



the spade began to play a great part, for the Confederates whose battles were usually defensive in character soon imposed their system on the Northern armies; and then parapets of earth or log breastworks, abattis or "slashings" were constructed at each halt within striking distance of the enemy. Every engineer in the States seems to have found his way to the armies, and mechanics and craftsmen of all degrees contributed something new to the art of fortification. The one thing lacking was a breechloading rifle, which still was regarded as a too expensive toy for general service and, despite the introduction of a platoon exercise for Westley Richards' B.L. weapon in the British army as early as 1861, the breechloader as an infantry firearm did not appear in war until the Prussian needle-gun crushed the Austrians (equipped with M.L. rifles) five years later.

The American armies we shall see began a series of tactical experiments on the basis of the British drill-book and picked up "wrinkles" as they went along. During the first twelve months of the war we find the "new wine" being poured into "old bottles" with sometimes curious results, as at Bull Run where a Minnesota regiment in Franklin's brigade, having deployed within speaking distance of the Confederates, "poured into the faces" of the enemy a fire which was so

heartily reciprocated that the Minnesota regiment lost 185 men—20 per cent. of its strength. The commander declares that he was also enfiladed by a Confederate battery at 350 yards' range. He says that the enemy was "entrenched in the woods and behind ditches and pits." His men were "volunteers not three months in the service" and when moved at the double they threw away haversacks, blankets and canteens as the pace increased. Yet they bore their company and regimental colours into action. Certain regiments we are told "declined to charge."

The Confederate leaders were of course involved in similar difficulties. A North Carolina regiment in Longstreet's brigade was ordered to charge a battery but the commanding officer left his corps "to go for orders"; four captains thereupon marched their companies to the rear; the adjutant was "absent" and the chaplain acted as field officer. Yet at another part of the field an infantry escort to Pendleton's batteries, just in from Winchester, defended the guns from a Federal attack in most valiant fashion "rushing forward with charged bayonets," and during "the *mêlée* of butt and bayonet" the batteries were withdrawn. The Confederate cavalry attempted to "charge" but were stopped by musketry fire. Federal batteries would dash through the "line"

in order to get to the front, where the G.O.C. division would be found riding alone.

At Bull Run the troops were raw, the regimental commanders untried and every description of blunder was committed in consequence; but a year later the tactical training which a hundred skirmishes had afforded the troops on both sides was beginning to bear fruit.

The first engagement of real importance in the Eastern theatre was the battle of Gaines' Mill on the Chickahominy, or as some call it the battle of Cold Harbour, fought on Friday, June 27; and here we may see the three arms again in action and observe the improved methods of fighting in country very different from the scene of "Bull Run."

To begin with the mounted troops, on the Federal right, north of the Chickahominy, the 5th U.S. cavalry had detached 5 companies to act with General Stoneman to the right and rear; and the remainder, commanded by a captain, was kept out of fire until 6 P.M. and then moved up in "line of battle" to support a couple of batteries; and when a body of Confederates dashed on the batteries the cavalry was ordered to charge: the horsemen advanced under heavy fire and the casualties were heavy; six out of seven officers fell and then "the column being left without officers wheeled to the right and came off

in as good order as could be expected." Neither army had yet learnt that Balaklava tactics were dead, for at this time 2 regiments of Confederate cavalry were placed in position to charge the enemy's infantry if it should attempt to "flank our infantry or should break through it."

A battery of the 5th U.S. artillery after taking up two or three preparatory positions was posted at noon to command the road leading from Cold Harbour. On each flank was a regiment of regular infantry and it was claimed that this section of defence prevented the enemy turning the Federal right until 7 P.M. The battery dispersed a body of Confederate cavalry at 1000 yards' range: then "a line of infantry was seen crossing the road at double-quick to gain the wood on their right; at the same time their artillery opened fire to divert our attention from them": but the Federal battery ignored the enemy's guns and shelled the infantry; and afterwards, when a body of Federal infantry was driven out of the wood, two field batteries covered their retreat by concentrating the fire of 12 guns on the wood, and crushed the Confederate musketry fire with canister. But at 6.30 P.M. the Confederate infantry got within close range of the Federal batteries and compelled them to limber up to avoid capture. The 5th U.S. battery fired 1000 rounds during the day: its commander comments sarcastically on another

Federal battery manned by volunteers, which rapidly fired canister at a range of 1500 yards and "if terrible at all it was only so to its friends."

A Confederate artillery "battalion," which seems to have corresponded to our artillery "brigade" though commanded by a major, reported for the day to General Magruder whose chief of artillery gave instructions as to posting its three companies (batteries) after reconnoitring the position in their front, where the Federals were still entrenching. A couple of howitzers were emplaced just below the crest of a hill in order to co-operate with other guns on their left. "Very soon the signal on our left was heard, when the captain gave the order and the firing commenced and the working parties [Federals] were soon driven from their position."

Then a rifled gun with its detachment of a dozen men opened fire on a Federal battery, but drew the fire of four batteries upon it as well as that of "a line of sharpshooters protected by rifle pits immediately in our front and about 400 yards distant." In another part of the field we read of a Parrott gun engaging a Federal battery "thus drawing a raking fire away from our infantry while charging the enemy's position," but here the howitzers were "inefficient against the battery because of their short range, and they could no

longer shell the enemy's infantry without endangering our own troops." Another Confederate battery commander reports that "we were brought into position in an open field about 600 yards from the enemy's works, when we opened upon him with shell and spherical case from our howitzers (two 12 prs.) and with shell and shot from our rifled pieces (two 3-inch guns): we fired very rapidly, receiving in reply an incessant fire from the enemy's battery composed (as we afterwards learned from prisoners) of 13 breechloading guns, sustaining at the same time an enfilading fire from their sharpshooters." Yet this engagement of thirty minutes cost only 1 man killed and 3 wounded in the Confederate battery, so perhaps the prisoners' report as to the type of gun in use was incorrect.

With regard to the artillery generally "no site was found from which the large guns could play upon the enemy without endangering our own troops, and no occasion was presented for bringing up the Reserve Artillery; indeed it seemed that not one half of the divisional batteries were brought into action on either Monday or Tuesday [June 30-July 1]": such was General Pendleton's complaint just four years before it became the complaint of Prince Kraft after the battle of Sadowa.

Let us now look at the tactics of the infantry. The 3rd U.S. infantry formed part of Sykes'

brigade of regulars to which was confided the protection of the Federal right : from noon till 4 P.M. the regiment acting as escort to three batteries was under fire but was not engaged ; then it was advanced in support of the 12th and 14th U.S. infantry, and especially to guard the right flank of these regiments who were to charge : but somehow all these plans fell to pieces ; for the 3rd found " its whole left wing exposed to a murderous fire from the front, flank and rear and almost surrounded " ; and when its commander, a major, was mortally wounded the senior captain withdrew the regiment to its original position, having the 12th on his left ; but " the enemy suddenly appeared in front of the 12th in the woods and almost decimated the regiment at a volley," when four companies of the 3rd reinforced the 12th and " drove them back to the woods." Until 8 P.M. the 3rd regiment remained in this position, and then retired to a line of batteries 600 yards in rear and covered their right flank during the movements incident to retirement. The major commanding the 12th U.S. infantry tells us that he saw Warren's brigade advancing to the attack in line of battle ; " there was danger of Warren's right being overlapped by the enemy and I was moving the 12th to his support when I received the order to charge : as I was still 600 yards from the enemy, and not

wishing to exhaust my men before getting into close action, I ordered them to shift their arms to the right shoulder and then marched them in line and in quick time . . . when within easy distance of the enemy Warren's three battalions taking the double quick step with a cheer dashed at the enemy who, not waiting for us to close, gave way and fled in disorder across the marsh and into the woods beyond. The rebels now sheltered by the woods opened on us an enfilading fire of grape, canister and musketry." So the 12th regiment fell back with the 14th on its right and remained facing the woods till 7 P.M., by which hour the extreme left of the Federal defences near Gaines' Mill had given way and was being forced back behind the centre and right, while the Federal right was being hard pressed on its front. The 12th and 14th infantry held on while a second line was being formed in rear; then the 14th retired and the 12th now quite isolated was in danger of capture: the men lying down behind a low ridge waited till the enemy came within fifty yards and then "I gave the order to rise and fire. My men poured in one close, withering volley. I then gave the order to face about and fall back at the double-quick and to rally on the road behind the second line."

The Confederate infantry on June 27 at Gaines'



Mill conducted its battle somewhat in this fashion :  
“at about 5 P.M. the order was passed down our line to accelerate our pace, which my regiment (31st Georgia) promptly obeyed, casting away all articles which encumbered them ; thus alternately marching and double-quicking we entered the battlefield ; here we formed line with the rest of the brigade, our right flank toward the enemy ; we then marched in column in the direction our right previously occupied and, by the execution of the movement ‘forward into line’ found ourselves face to face with the enemy. Thus we marched under a most terrific fire to within about 180 yards of a body of 4000 or 5000 regulars. It was here that our colonel and major were wounded and the command devolved upon me [Captain Battey]. In obedience to orders received from Captain Lawton (A.A.G. to Lawton’s brigade) I commanded my men to ‘fire and load lying,’ which order they promptly executed until nearly all the cartridges were expended. At this critical moment of the engagement we were directed by Captain Lawton to charge, he leading in gallant style. My regiment . . . passed completely through that portion of the enemy opposed to it and carried a battery of five pieces beyond.” This Georgia regiment lost in killed and wounded 172 including 6 officers.

Testimony to the same effect with regard to every combat might be adduced *ad infinitum*, but it would serve no useful purpose to multiply witnesses. The fact is apparent that the armies of McClellan and Lee had not yet "found themselves" in a tactical sense ; but were still in the trammels of tradition, striving after European ideals founded on obsolete methods of fighting. The disciplined individualism, that sharpened sense of the fitness of things which we call "common-sense," all that afterwards stamped the tactics of the War of Secession with a character of its own, was non-existent in the spring of 1862 ; but we can detect the "great first cause" of the change that was so soon to come. That change was unquestionably due to the lack of skilled leaders, which a keen-witted people like the Americans instantly perceived and determined to remedy. Of "shoulder-strapped office-holders," as an indignant Federal soldier called his military superiors, there were sufficient, perhaps too many. A chain of responsibility even existed in theory, but a chain is no stronger than its weakest link ; and not even at the head of affairs was there on either side a dominating will, a personality in whose hands the formations could be welded together or shaken out in consonance with a well-knit plan or a flash of genius evoked by the spirit of battle.

"The fate of the battle," says Napoleon who won at Arcola by sheer persistency and a final stroke delivered with fifty horsemen, "is a question of a single moment, a single thought. . . . The decisive moment arrives, the moral spark is kindled and the smallest reserve force settles the matter."

It would of course be unfair to expect of McClellan or Lee in June 1862 that power of command which Wellington had gained by twenty years of almost continuous strife—though Napoleon's first was perhaps his most brilliant campaign—and equally of course neither of the generals then in front of Richmond could count on the aid of such detachment-leaders as Sir Thomas Graham and Sir Rowland Hill, nor upon a battle-leader like Sir Thomas Picton, all of them generals who were hand-in-glove with their commander-in-chief. The American generals in the east at this period could not pick and choose their lieutenants, nor would they make good the deficiencies of their subordinates by a personal conduct of the battles; yet Wellington even could not dispense with his own services as tactician, and at Vittoria, where Graham took charge of the turning movement and Hill of the envelopment of the French left, the supreme commander guided the battle in the centre with his reserve divisions. Did

Lee perceive the parallelism on June 27 ? Again before Bayonne when Wellington had separated his forces by a river, just as McClellan had done in placing the Army of the Potomac astride the Chickahominy, the vigorous attacks by Soult on our left and right in succession were checked by the "iron" Duke, who at steeplechase speed moved from flank to flank and from front to rear, pervading a battlefield of sixteen square miles.

General Lee's time was indeed to come ; but in June 1862 he had not yet "arrived" ; he was a stranger to his troops, and perhaps the shadow of his failure in West Virginia still hung over him. In regard to the Federals the case is not so simple : for whatever tactical errors, deficiencies or defects were discoverable at any time or place on the Confederate side seem to have been reproduced by the leaders of the Army of the Potomac in an exaggerated form and displayed on all occasions : whatever military talent resided in the officers of this army was by some occult means persistently suppressed. The South had no monopoly of West Point graduates, and yet the fact remains that, until the coming of Grant and Sheridan from the West in 1864, this army never had a fighting general of even respectable ability : one might almost imagine that a conspiracy had been formed in 1862 to check the

growth of any military spirit among the Federals in the East, whose leaders seem to have been goaded into activity by the force of public opinion rather than by professional zeal.

The ascendancy of their opponents, Ewell and Hill, Stuart and Longstreet, Jackson and Lee appears to have been assumed or accepted as a condition of the contest; and the avoidance of disaster rather than victory in battle seems to have been sought by the Federal generals—a phenomenon which will perhaps never be accounted for, though a Union gunner who won his commission from the ranks has shrewdly recorded one of its manifestations. He says “our losses of general officers if they had fearlessly performed their duty should have been at least four times as heavy as those of the Confederates; instead of one Union general being killed to over 44,000 enlisted men stricken in battle, there should have been at least twenty of them killed and eighty of them wounded; and there probably would have been if they had done their duty as recklessly as the Confederate generals did theirs.”

And it was we believe the instinctive recognition of the truth in regard to these essential matters that prompted the American soldier to take the problems of minor tactics into his own capable hands, and in a very literal sense fight his own battles

according to circumstances. The outcome of such decision, after a couple of years devoted to practical experiments, was that American soldiers in general and the Federal rank and file in particular had got all the tactical knowledge they had any use for ; so that according to an eye-witness " after the column halted I did not hear an officer give a command : the enlisted men knew what to do and did it instantly and without orders."

They knew that one good man behind an earth-work was equal to three good men outside it ; they knew that 3-inch percussion shells could not be relied upon to perform the work of a steam shovel. They knew quite well that it was the business of general officers to ascertain the strength of the enemy's works before launching a decisive attack ; but all they asked was to have the battle-torn portions of the line fed with fresh troops. They would say : " Put us into it, Hancock, my boy ; we will end this damned rebellion to-night ! " And then—when a night " made to fight on " was spent in cooking—their rage was " devilish." Yet they fought on, year after year, and (as a Federal private writes) " lived in hopes of the coming of a great commander whose military talent would command our unqualified respect. *He never came.*"

## CHAPTER VII

### OPERATIONS IN 1861

RÉSUMÉ OF ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTY COMBATS IN SOUTH  
CAROLINA, VIRGINIA, MARYLAND, MISSOURI, WEST VIRGINIA,  
NORTH CAROLINA, NEW MEXICO, KENTUCKY, FLORIDA,  
TEXAS, ARKANSAS AND TENNESSEE.





## CHAPTER VII

### OPERATIONS IN 1861

HOSTILITIES began in April with the Confederate bombardment of Fort Sumter off the coast of SOUTH CAROLINA; the evacuation of Harper's Ferry arsenal in VIRGINIA by the Federal garrison after destroying the stores; and the riots in MARYLAND, where citizens antagonistic to the Union attacked the Northern troops coming by rail from Massachusetts and Pennsylvania to Washington.

For a month all was quiet in the east; but a thousand miles away in MISSOURI the Union levies provoked street-fighting and skirmishing in that State between political opponents at Camp Jackson and St Louis, in which the local "Home Guards" took the side of the Federals.

In June further trouble broke out in MISSOURI at Booneville, Independence and Camp Cole; while in VIRGINIA the New York, Massachusetts and Pennsylvania volunteers, supported by some regular cavalry and guns, encountered Con-

federate detachments at Great Bethel, Vienna, Edward's Ferry and Patterson's Creek (Kelly Island); a company of regular cavalry even reached Fairfax Court House. The event of the month however was the beginning of the struggle for WEST VIRGINIA; when Ohio and Indiana volunteers crossed the frontier and, aided by malcontents on the western slopes of the Alleghanies, drove the Confederates from Philippi and New Creek, and even pushed as far east as Romney; reinforced by some Kentucky levies in July they fought the Confederates successfully at Red House (Barboursville), Middle Creek Fork, Laurel Hill (Bealington) and Beverly: at Scarytown the Confederates held their own; but the fights at Rich Mountain and Carrick's Ford, where an able Confederate general was killed, were brilliant little affairs on which McClellan built up his reputation. In July, too, the Missouri, Illinois and Iowa volunteers skirmished with the local Confederate forces in MISSOURI at Carthage (Dry Forks), Fulton, Martinsburg, Harrisonville and Parkersville, at Monroe Station and at Millsville (Wentzville) on the North Missouri railroad.

The preliminaries to the battle of Bull Run (Manassas) in VIRGINIA consisted of a skirmish at Blackburn's Ford, and Patterson's affair at

Bunker's Hill ; but earlier in the month minor engagements had taken place at Great Falls and Newport News on James river ; and at Falling Waters (Haynesville or Martinsburg) in MARYLAND under General G. H. Thomas.

These combats and chance encounters were often the result of *trop de zèle* on the part of local commanders, or excess of patriotism on the part of the inhabitants ; but they indicate and define the three distinct theatres of operation with which the historian of the war has to deal, namely, Virginia east of the Alleghanies, Virginia west of the Alleghanies and the Mississippi Valley. To some this is proof that domestic politics had more to do with the land operations than what Napier calls the military art ; to others it seems to testify to a genius for war on the part of the American people. The battle of Bull Run, however, fought by General McDowell's troops after they had laboured for two months on the defences of Washington, and when consequently all danger of the capital being seized by a *coup de main* had disappeared, needs special pleading to show that its occurrence was other than a strategic blunder.

A fortnight after the battle of Bull Run a war of posts commenced : in MARYLAND at Point of Rocks and Darnestown (Pritchard's Mills) ; in

VIRGINIA at Hampton, Lovettsville, Ball's Cross-roads and Bailey's Cross-roads in Fairfax county, and at Munson's Hill (Camp Advance), Beher's Mills and Lewinsville: the New York, Vermont, Pennsylvania and Massachusetts troops were again employed, and a few Indiana levies, but the services of Marylanders (who were doubtful adherents to the Union cause) were not utilised. A naval expedition to Cape Hatteras Inlet in NORTH CAROLINA secured some forts for the Federals at the end of August; but WEST VIRGINIA again became the principal scene of operations in the east, and here the Ohio, Indiana and West Virginia levies, and some from Kentucky, were engaged at Grafton and Hawk's Nest, at Wayne and Boone Court-houses, at Summerville (Cross Lanes), Worthington and Petersburg; at Chapmansville and Hanging Rock (Romney), at Barboursville and Elk Water. Practically the entire region between the Ohio and the Shenandoah rivers was up in arms.

In the West the irregular warfare continued in MISSOURI. The Home Guards were engaged in July at Lane's Prairie near Rolla; in August at Potosi, Jonesboro and Lexington; in September at Booneville and Bennett's Mills. The Missouri volunteers and reserves at Ætna, Blue Mills, Brunswick and Dallas; the Iowa volunteers at

Shelbina, Blue Mills and Elliott's Mills (Camp Crittenden); the Illinois volunteers at Charlestown (Bird's Point). The Kansas cavalry and artillery engaged at Morristown and Osceola (Papinsville); the Indiana cavalry at Black river near Ironton. At Forsyth and Harrisonville, Dug Springs and Athens, Lookout Station, Shanghai and Dry Wood (Fort Scott) the newly raised troops from Iowa, Kansas and Missouri, both infantry and artillery, attacked or defended in turn, with more or less success, and gained some tactical experience at a corresponding cost in killed and wounded.

Between July 27 and August 3 at Fort Fillmore and Mesilla in NEW MEXICO a battalion of regulars (infantry and mounted rifles) gained some success; and an important affair occurred at Wilson's Creek (Springfield or Oak Hills) in MISSOURI on August 10, when Nathaniel Lyons, co-operating with Sigel, engaged his small division (5400) including a few detachments of regulars with McBride's Confederates (11,600) and got beaten, losing twenty-five per cent. of his force. At the end of the year however, Congress voted its Thanks to "the late" General Lyon and his troops for their exertions at Springfield.

A local colonel (Mulligan) with a mixed force of western volunteers engaged his command at

Lexington during the week ending September 20, when the Confederates at a cost of 100 casualties inflicted on Mulligan a loss of 1774 of whom all but 150 were taken prisoners. The principal affairs, however, took place in WEST VIRGINIA where at Carnifex Ferry on Gauley river General Rosecrans with six Ohio regiments attacked Floyd's Confederates on September 10, and where a few days later another Federal force cleverly avoided General Lee's combinations to intercept it at Valley Mountain. The Confederates claim the victory at Carnifex Ferry, but the result of the West Virginia campaign as a whole was especially mortifying to the Confederates as involving abandonment of territory afterwards erected by the Federals into a separate State. General Stuart at Lewinsville in VIRGINIA on September 11, with a small mixed force on outpost duty, drove back a Federal reconnaissance party which had provided itself with an escort of a brigade of infantry and eight guns. Such alarums and excursions continued without intermission during the whole of the war, but in 1861 they constituted the war itself.

In October KENTUCKY is made the scene of operations and at Buffalo Hill and Upton Hill, at Wild Cat (Rock Castle), West Liberty, Hodgenville and Saratoga the Indiana, Illinois and Ohio

infantry, artillery and cavalry were engaged ; at Woodbury and Morgantown some Kentucky infantry and cavalry first fought for the Union ; at Hillsboro the Flemingsburg " Home Guards " and at Lucas Bend some local cavalry were engaged. FLORIDA was the scene of conflict at Santa Rosa where detachments of regular infantry and artillery supported the New York volunteers : and on September 14 a rebel privateer was destroyed by the U.S. flagship at Pensacola. In NORTH CAROLINA the Indiana volunteers engaged at Chicamicomico.

In WEST VIRGINIA some Maryland troops were now employed at Romney (Mill Creek Mills), in conjunction with an organisation called the Potomac " Home Brigade " and some Pennsylvania cavalry : but here, as at Greenbrier, the principal force consisted of Ohio, Indiana and West Virginia levies supported by regular and Michigan artillery. In VIRGINIA engagements took place at Bolivar Heights, Ball's Bluff (Edwards' Ferry, Harrison's Island and Leesburg) and Bayle's Cross-roads between the northern State troops and the Confederates. At Ball's Bluff on October 21 the Federals under General Stone in covering a foraging expedition lost 900 men (fifty per cent. " missing " as usual) and the Confederates under Evans, of " Bull Run " fame,

won a handsome victory with a loss of only 300 men.

In MISSOURI during October local cavalry engaged at Spring Hill, at Cameron in Ray county, at a farm twelve miles from Bird's Point and at Shanghai, otherwise West Glaze, Henrytown or Monday's Hollow. At Springfield or Zagony's Charge two organisations called Fremont's Bodyguard and White's Prairie Scouts fought for the Federals. Other affairs occurred at Plattsburg in Clinton county, Buffalo Mills, Fredericktown, Ironton and Warsaw; at Linn Creek and Big Hurricane Creek; and at Big River bridge near Potosi the Missouri, Wisconsin, Illinois and Indiana volunteers (including artillery and cavalry) were engaged. The regulars with some local cavalry were engaged at Alimosa near Fort Craig in NEW MEXICO.

On November 7 at Belmont, MISSOURI, on the right bank of the Mississippi, ex-captain Ulysses S. Grant now a brigadier-general began the career which was to place him in a few years at the head of the Union armies and ultimately in the President's chair. He was aided at Belmont by six Union gunboats. His force of all arms was furnished by Illinois, Missouri and Iowa troops. He lost 500 men of whom fifty per cent. were reported "missing," but he inflicted on the enemy



a loss of 1000 men according to Federal estimates ; the Confederates however claim to have beaten Grant at Belmont. At this time the Federals under General C. F. Smith held Paducah, a railway terminus in KENTUCKY at the junction of the Ohio and Tennessee rivers, and communicated with ILLINOIS by a pontoon bridge over the Ohio protected by a floating battery in the river and a fort with a good water supply.

In November a Federal frigate burnt a Confederate ship in Galveston harbour, TEXAS, and during the last two months of 1861 in MISSOURI the volunteer cavalry of Kansas, Missouri and Illinois fought at Little Blue (Independence), Little Santa Fe, Palmyra, Black Walnut Creek near Sedalia, Salem in Dent county, Bertrand and Hudson ; the Home Guards and "citizens" also at Wadesburg, Dunksburg near Sedalia, and Johnstown. A force of all arms (Ohio, Indiana, Kansas, Iowa and Missouri troops including a detachment of regular cavalry) fought on December 18 at Milford and Shawnee or Blackwater Mound. At Lancaster some Missouri infantry, at Mount Zion and Hallsville some Missouri cavalry and "Birge's Sharpshooters" engaged, and a skirmish took place at Renick in Randolph county : at Bushy Creek in ARKANSAS some Red Indians fought for the Union on December 9.

In TENNESSEE a conflict had taken place in November between "loyal citizens" and Confederates at Taylor's Ford on the Wautauga river, one hundred miles east of Knoxville, and a skirmish occurred at Morristown. In KENTUCKY the State cavalry in December were engaged at Sacramento and the infantry at Bagdad in Shelby county, south of Cincinnati; at Cypress Bridge a Federal force lost 25 killed and wounded, and at Piketown (Ivy Mountain) four Ohio regiments and one Kentucky regiment engaged during November. At Rowlett's Station (Mumfordsville and Woodsonville) an Indiana regiment fought on December 17.

In SOUTH CAROLINA on the coast at Port Royal Commodore Dupont took some forts in November, and in FLORIDA six batteries of regular artillery and four companies of infantry (part volunteers, part regulars) resisted a Confederate attack on Fort Pickens, Pensacola, which was held by the Federals throughout the war.

WEST VIRGINIA continued to recruit for the Union forces: local cavalry engaged some Confederates at Wirt Court House and some infantry recruits fought at Guyandotte on the Ohio in November. On December 13 General Millroy's command (Indiana, Ohio and West Virginia volunteers) was engaged at Camp Alleghany

(Buffalo Mountain) : at Gauley Bridge infantry and cavalry had fought on November 10. In VIRGINIA the New York and Pennsylvania cavalry got in contact with the enemy at Occoquan Creek, Dranesville, Hunter's Mills and Vienna between November 12 and December 3 : at Annandale a party of New Jersey volunteers and at New Market Bridge, near Newport News on James river, a New York regiment was engaged in December.

An Indiana regiment defended a dam on the Potomac river, and on December 20 General Ord at Dranesville with a force of all arms (Pennsylvanians) drove back a Confederate detachment to Centreville. It was a chance encounter, both forces being engaged on foraging expeditions : the Confederates under General Stuart consisted of four battalions (1600), one battery and 150 cavalry, which formed an escort for the supply waggons of the army in the Shenandoah Valley : the waggons were to be filled from the country between Dranesville and Leesburg ; but they had to return empty by the way they came. At Washington this " victory " was regarded as a set-off to the repulse at Ball's Bluff in October.

In many cases these skirmishes and " scouts " were unauthorised and uncalled for. McClellan had in General Orders forbidden the firing upon the enemy's pickets except to resist an advance

or return a fire commenced by the enemy ; and the Confederate cavalry leader severely reprimanded an adventurous captain of Georgia hussars, who took out a party of twenty men "without authority and for no object of importance" at midnight and got ambushed by a party of New York infantry, which had gone out "to intercept the enemy's cavalry patrols." Stuart concluded his reproof by saying : "I cannot approve their tempting Providence in such a manner."

On December 28, Forrest, a superb leader of mounted troops, with the Tennessee Mounted Rifles smashed the Kentucky cavalry at Sacramento by a method of fighting which we are reviving for the use of our regular cavalry to-day. He marched twenty miles, attacked the enemy's rearguard by a charge with his advanced guard, and then retreating he drew the enemy upon his main body, which had dismounted to open fire from a flank position. The Federals thrown into disorder by a hail of bullets were routed by a charge led by this backwoodsman, farmer and slave dealer, who began his military career as a private at forty and became a general officer—one however whose orders and despatches had to be written for him by the educated men who were proud to serve on his staff.

The military operations of 1861 epitomised in

these few pages were practically abortive; for they left the rival Powers at the end of the year just where they had stood at the beginning: the real armies were in fact still in the process of mobilising, and they mobilised to the accompaniment of one hundred and fifty-six skirmishes and combats, of which the five principal actions, Bull Run and Ball's Bluff in VIRGINIA, Wilson's Creek or Springfield, Lexington and Belmont in MISSOURI, cost the Federals about 7000 and the Confederates about 4000 casualties. Except the gain to the Federals of WEST VIRGINIA, which time alone would have yielded, there was positively nothing to show for the losses incurred. Howison, a careful historian, estimates the "battles" of 1861 as sixteen in number, of which the Federals gained five and the Confederates eleven. He claims as Confederate successes—

Big Bethel (Va.) June 10.  
Booneville (Mo.) June 17.  
Carthage (Mo.) July 5.  
Scary Creek (West Va.) July 17.  
Bull Run (Va.) July 18.  
Manassas (Va.) July 21.  
Springfield (Wilson's Creek, Mo.) August 10.  
Carnifex Ferry (West Va.) September 10.  
Lexington (Mo.) September 20.  
Ball's Bluff (Va.) October 21.  
Belmont (Mo.) November 7.

Howison observes that "Missouri did not secede, though her military movements under Governor Jackson and General Sterling Price were all in the interests of the Confederate cause," and he allows the following to be undisputed Federal victories :—

Philippi (West Va.) June 3.  
Rich Mountain (West Va.) July 11.  
Carrick's Ford (West Va.) July 13.  
Hatteras Inlet (N. C.) August 29.  
Port Royal (S. C.) November 7.

Never perhaps before or since has so little been accomplished with so much fuss. The official documents relating to this period of the war are preserved in the archives at Washington and the printed copies of them fill many huge volumes ; to the record of operations in MARYLAND, PENNSYLVANIA, VIRGINIA and WEST VIRGINIA between April 16 and July 31 a thousand printed pages are allotted ; to the operations in MISSOURI, ARKANSAS and INDIAN TERRITORY between May 10 and November 19 seven hundred and fifty pages are devoted ; and he who would get at the root of the matter, who would completely master the particulars in regard to seven months of war or tumult in eight separate States, must needs begin by perusing over a million words written by the actors on the spot. Everybody who was "anybody" had a voice in every matter. The rival

Presidents—both newly appointed—were pulled or driven by the parties who voted them into office ; and were at the beck and call of officers, naval and military, who put forward claims on the ground of fidelity to the one cause or of treachery to the other. The State governors moreover at this period took themselves seriously, as allies whose susceptibilities must not be wounded by occupation of their territory nor the use of their railroads, who doled out quotas of men enlisted for ninety days and demanded in return fortifications and heavy guns for the protection of their boundaries.

These frays and forays grouped themselves eventually into what were called " Campaigns " and even in 1861 foreshadowed the rude sort of strategy that was to be employed throughout the war, consisting on the one side of repeated independent attacks upon the territory held by the Confederates, assaults delivered from every point of the compass by water as well as by land ; while on the other side we see a resistance frugally measured at each point by the pressure then and there brought to bear by the assailant. The war was waged by committees ; the policy was parochial in character ; and the partial successes of a few able generals blinded the world then to the true military situation as they have done ever since.





## CHAPTER VIII

### THE CAMPAIGN IN WEST VIRGINIA

THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER OF VIRGINIA—A FEDERAL BASE  
ON THE OHIO RIVER—GEOGRAPHY AND POLITICS—  
CHARACTERISTICS OF MOUNTAIN WARFARE—LINES OF  
OPERATION—MCCLELLAN AND GARNETT—ROSECRANS AND  
LEE—THE PARKERSBURG TURNPIKE AND GAULEY RIVER—  
DIFFICULTIES WITH SUBORDINATES—ABORTIVE COUNTER-  
STROKES—DISSOLUTION OF THE ARMIES.



## CHAPTER VIII

### THE CAMPAIGN IN WEST VIRGINIA

THE Appalachian Mountains or Atlantic highlands of North America are drained in latitude  $39^{\circ}$  N., on the one side by the Kanawha and Cheat rivers, tributaries of the Ohio, and on the other side by the Roanoke, the Potomac and the James rivers which flow into the Atlantic Ocean: and the western slopes of the great watershed, which hereabouts includes several parallel ranges such as the Blue Ridge in the east and the Alleghany and Shenandoah Mountains in the west, form the boundary line between Virginia and West Virginia. In 1861 the two regions, so dissimilar in climate, in soil, and therefore in their industrial and social aspects, formed politically a single State under Governor Letcher who had joined the Confederacy. West Virginia is half the size of England, but its population even to-day hardly exceeds that of Liverpool.

Screened by this great natural barrier the Federals in May concentrated their levies from the States of Ohio and Indiana after crossing the Ohio river between Wheeling and Point Pleasant. The

population on the whole was opposed to secession, though a section of the inhabitants cried aloud to the Governor of Virginia for aid in expelling the intruders and in suppressing local malcontents : such militia forces as the Rockbridge Guards, the Upshire Grays, the Churchville cavalry and the Buckingham Institute Guards had already been organised, not only to withstand the Federal invasion but also to fight against their neighbours who had espoused the cause of the Union, and who in the course of the war were to furnish 28,000 recruits for the Union army. The Virginia State authorities thus found themselves on the horns of a dilemma : to abandon this region, more than a third of Virginia, as untenable would be regarded as a political blunder ; while an attempt to maintain a large force there by a line of communication over the mountain passes might result in a military disaster.

Face to face with a North-West Frontier problem such as the British have experienced in India a policy of "Thorough" never appealed to President Davis, and so half-measures were resorted to which led to the dispersion of bodies of Confederate troops between Clarksburg and Lewisburg, under various commanders who unwittingly afforded an excellent schooling to McClellan, Rosecrans, Milroy and Cox at the head

of a dozen regiments easily spared from the excess numbers at the disposal of the Federal government.

The tide of battle in West Virginia ebbed and flowed ; occasionally the Confederates drove back the invaders towards the Ohio, and often the Federals advanced as far east as the Shenandoah Mountains. Throughout the war this region was a bone of contention and no fewer than eighty engagements were fought in West Virginia, of which a third at least took place in 1861.

The fighting was governed by the conditions of all mountain warfare : it is easier to attack and capture a post in the hills than to hold it when won ; there are few positions for large forces even if a large force could be subsisted, and supply is always the difficulty : to guard a pass, to hold a defile is an elementary tactical operation provided the enemy can be restrained from a turning movement ; but there are no means of preventing such manœuvres short of establishing a chain of forts with adequate garrisons, supplemented by a mobile reserve to deal promptly with any local success the enemy may gain : a field army may be absorbed in such operations, and in 1861 neither belligerent had a field army to spare for the purpose. " The character of this mode of warfare," says Napoleon, " consists in occupying camps on the flanks or in the rear of the enemy, leaving him

only the alternative of abandoning his position without fighting to take up another in the rear, or to descend from it in order to attack you."

McClellan and Rosecrans found little difficulty in marching across the valley from Parkersburg to Clarksburg, resting their left upon the Baltimore and Ohio railway, nor in following the Kanawha river up as far as Charlestown, but at these points their progress was stayed by the mountains of which the passes were held by the Confederates. On the other hand if Garnett or Wise, Floyd or Loring ventured into the valley west of Beverly or Gauley Bridge their expulsion was a mere question of days after their presence had become known to the Federals. Mutual observation of a frontier line formed by the western range—the Alleghany mountains—was the final outcome of a score of combats in 1861.

In the hilly region north of Monterey many streams take their rise; the Cheat and Tygart's Valley rivers flowing north; the Greenbriers flowing south; and the Little Kanawha, the Elk and the Gauley flowing west; and hereabouts are the passes which connect by devious routes the great valleys of the Ohio and the Shenandoah. These passes are numerous, but the principal one is known as the Parkersburg turnpike over Cheat Mountain, the only good road between

Staunton and the terminus of the Baltimore and Ohio railroad on the Ohio. On the Parkersburg pike are the towns of Philippi, Beverly and Huttonsville west of Cheat Mountain; and at Huttonsville the turnpike is joined by a southern road which by a detour through Warm Springs affords an alternative route from Huttonsville over Valley Mountain to Staunton.

West Virginia is mainly interesting to soldiers from the fact that McClellan and Lee there made their debut as commanders in the field, though not simultaneously and by no means with the same military results: before Lee appeared McClellan had been called to Washington to supersede McDowell in the command of the Army of the Potomac, his operations in West Virginia having convinced President Lincoln that he possessed all the qualities of a successful general, of whom the Federals stood greatly in need after "Bull Run."

When Lee quitted this region in October "he came back," says Davis, "carrying the heavy weight of defeat and unappreciated by the people whom he served . . . the clamour which then arose followed him when he went to South Carolina, so that it became necessary on his departure to write a letter to the Governor of that State telling him what manner of man he was."

McClellan's detachments had reached Grafton in May and had surprised and defeated the Confederates under Porterfield at Philippi on June 3, which led to the supersession of that leader by General Garnett, late A.G. at Richmond, who was expected to retrieve the disaster with a force consisting of some 4000 of all arms, which he distributed about Laurel Hill, Rich Mountain and Beverly near Cheat river.

McClellan himself had reached Parkersburg on June 22 and Grafton on June 23; his intention was to move *via* Clarksburg and Buckhannon on Beverly covering the Baltimore and Ohio railroad; and after expelling the Confederates from their positions about Laurel Hill and Rich Mountain he proposed to advance from Beverly on Huttonsville and drive the enemy over the forks of the Potomac eastward into the Alleghany mountains, and then blocking the passes return to "clean out the Valley of the Kanawha."

But McClellan on July 7 is still at Buckhannon, deluging Washington with telegrams and imploring Winfield Scott to allow him to advance on Staunton or Wytheville and "break the backbone of secession." Like Napoleon at Marengo he desired apparently to pursue the enemy before having defeated him. He advanced to Buckhannon Bridge on July 10, to Rich Mountain



on July 12 and to Beverly on July 13, where he received from Washington a telegram in the following terms :—" the General in Chief, and what is more the Cabinet including the President, are charmed with your activity, valour and consequent successes of Rich Mountain the 11th and of Beverly this morning. We do not doubt that you will in due time sweep the rebels from Western Virginia, but we do not mean to precipitate you, as you are fast enough." McClellan next day is able to report from Huttonsville : " Garnett and forces routed, his baggage and one gun taken, his army demoralised. Garnett killed. . . . Our success is complete and secession is killed in this country."

McClellan, despite those bombastic addresses to his troops which tempt us to belittle his achievements, had done extremely well in difficult circumstances. His claim to have destroyed or captured 5 guns, 12 colours, 1500 muskets and 1000 men at a cost of 80 killed and wounded seems to be well-founded ; and the Confederate general Garnett, a leader of some repute, had signally failed not only in his mission to destroy the Baltimore and Ohio railroad at Cheat river, which Lee had declared to be " worth to us an army," but even to maintain his entrenched positions west of Beverly : for the inhabitants had assisted McClellan, and of

course it is difficult to defend a country which welcomes its invaders.

Garnett at Laurel Hill had written on July 1 to say that "these people are thoroughly imbued with an ignorant and bigoted Union settlement": he estimated McClellan's force at 17,000 men and desired the co-operation of General Wise, then at Charlestown in the Kanawha Valley with about 2000 infantry and cavalry: other forces under H. R. Jackson and Pegram, Scott and Harman were also available; moreover the Confederate general J. B. Floyd was at Wytheville, west of Lynchburg: but there was no attempt made to combine their operations.

No returns are available to show McClellan's strength on July 8-17, but apparently only four regiments were engaged at Rich Mountain and two at Beverly, two at Laurel Hill (Bealington) and three at Carrick's Ford, and all were Ohio or Indiana troops.

At Rich Mountain on July 11 the Confederates under Pegram held a position on the crest facing west, and astride the Parkersburg-Staunton turnpike seven miles west of Beverly. McClellan left his camp on Buckhannon river on July 10, rebuilt the bridge over Roaring Run at the foot of Rich Mountain for his artillery and baggage, and next day pushed two regiments and four

guns forward as an advanced guard, which under cover of a wood got within two hundred yards of the Confederate works on Rich Mountain.

The approaches were reconnoitred by Lieut. Poe of the Topographical Engineers and the troops were then withdrawn. A force under Rosecrans was now detached to turn the position while the main body, which was to attack in front, employed 400 axe-men to blaze a road through the wood so that a battery of 6 prs. might be emplaced to enfilade the Confederate works: but the effect of Rosecrans' attack in rear was to cause the enemy to evacuate the position during the night. The Confederates had been holding six hundred yards of frontage with 1100 men, but had neglected to occupy the point on their left from which their position could be enfiladed by artillery: their attempts to clear a field of fire by cutting down trees in their front actually weakened their defences, since they had not removed the timber and its dense foliage would have given cover to an attacking party. Pegram surrendered the next day to the Federals who had intercepted his force and occupied Beverly, whence McClellan dated his address to the Soldiers of the Army of the West on July 16 in which he assures them that they have "annihilated two armies" at a cost of twenty killed and sixty wounded.

The Confederate commander Garnett meanwhile had been attacked and routed at Laurel Hill sixteen miles away on Pegram's right, and retreating next day towards Williamsport and Petersburg in Hardy county he was pursued to Carrick's Ford, where in personally conducting a rearguard skirmish he was killed. Garnett's plan of holding the two turnpike roads over the Rich and Laurel Mountains, the gates to the north-west country, had resulted in his main body being defeated by a frontal attack while his detachment had been turned, intercepted and captured.

The policy of dispersing the Confederate forces in West Virginia over a hundred miles of front, under leaders who each was led to believe that his own operations were vital to the cause of Secession, had given McClellan his opportunity; and, since his ten days' campaign had synchronised with McDowell's failure at Bull Run, comparisons were made at Washington which resulted in McClellan being summoned from Huttonsville to Army Headquarters; and then the West Virginia command fell to Rosecrans.

The Richmond authorities, relieved by the battle of Bull Run from pressure in their front, and recognising at last the need of a military head in West Virginia, where the task was to fight the Union with one hand while putting down "traitors"

with the other, assigned General Loring to what was now called the North Western Army. He was to keep the enemy on the far side of the Alleghany Mountains by occupying the passes, particularly guarding the road from Huttonsville to Huntersville which led through Warm Springs to the terminus of the Virginia Central railroad at Millboro, forty miles west of Staunton. Loring was to operate with the remnants of Garnett's command, H. R. Jackson's force, the troops at Staunton, Floyd's brigade, Wise's brigade and other detachments; and "a union of all the forces in the West can thus be effected for a decisive blow," said Lee who gave the instructions. Loring was to get certain supplies locally but regard Staunton as his advanced *depôt* connected by rail with Richmond.

Loring left Richmond on July 22, reached Monterey fifty miles east of the Federal camp on July 25, and began the task of concentrating his forces, but soon found himself in difficulties. At Huntersville on Greenbrier river on July 30 he hears that Wise on his left is retreating from Gauley Bridge to Lewisburg. Wise writes on August 1 that "the Kanawha Valley is wholly disaffected and traitorous . . . you cannot persuade these people that Virginia can or will ever reconquer the North West and they are sub-

mitting, subdued and debased." Loring then has to report that "the country is very scarce of supplies and it will be necessary for us to rely mostly upon Staunton and Richmond." He discovered no disposition on the part of Wise or Floyd to unite with him, for each had a "campaign" of his own in full swing, and as though the number of generals were not even now excessive, General Lee appears on the scene.

The only record of his mission is contained in the President's letter to Joseph Johnston dated August 1: "General Lee has gone to Western Virginia and I hope may be able to strike a decisive blow at the enemy in that quarter, or failing in that will be able to organise and post our troops so as to check the enemy, after which he will return to Richmond." Lee at Huntersville on August 3 gives directions to Wise then at Lewisburg, but a few days later Wise is quarrelling with Floyd (who had come north from Wytheville proposing to attack the enemy at Gauley river) and he begs Lee to "assign to each one respective fields of operations"; but Floyd was in direct correspondence with the President, whom he addresses as "your friend."

It is now easy to explain the disasters that overtook the Confederates in West Virginia. In no single letter, report or despatch is there any

indication of a single mind controlling the various forces there under leaders who were often positively hostile to one another. Floyd on August 14, styling himself "commanding Army of the Kanawha," writes to Wise, "you are peremptorily ordered to march at once," and we may presume that political influences caused Lee to silently acquiesce in this assumption of authority on the part of the ex-Union Secretary for War, for he merely exhorts Wise to try and operate harmoniously with Floyd.

On August 26 a Federal detachment under Tyler had been surprised when at breakfast at Cross Lanes on Gauley river by Floyd who had crossed near Summersville, and McClellan rebuked Rosecrans for remaining at Clarksburg instead of taking an active part in the operations in his front, bidding him "concentrate everything against Floyd."

Lee's own movements at this time are unknown since his reports to the President were not preserved, but Wise on September 3 again complains to Lee that he is "harassed" by orders from Floyd which he finds it "impracticable to comply with," and again Lee replies "we must endure everything in the Cause." Certainly at this period General Lee gave no proof whatever of the ascendancy he was afterwards to gain over the

forces of the Confederacy; and if his career had been closed in the autumn of 1861 Lee would have gone down to posterity as a weak commander who had failed to profit by his opportunities.

The main road from Staunton to Parkersburg passes by Monterey over the Alleghanies, descends into the valley of Greenbrier river, and then ascends Cheat Mountain "whose natural strength had been greatly increased by the art of engineers since its occupation by the Federals"; the road is then carried through a narrow gap and forms a winding defile nearly a mile in length before commencing its descent westward into the Tygart's River Valley, where Huttonsville lies ten miles south of Beverly. But Cheat Mountain is flanked by Valley Mountain which is traversed by a road to Huttonsville from the south through Huntersville and Warm Springs.

Now General Loring had reached Monterey on July 24 and soon learnt that the Federals could not be dislodged by a frontal attack from their position on Cheat Mountain covering Huttonsville, whereupon he determined to push a detachment over the Alleghanies as far as the Greenbrier river in his front; and this detachment was to observe the enemy while he with his main body moved south on Huntersville and approached the right flank of the Federal position by the road over



Valley Mountain ; to secure which he sent forward at once another detachment under Gilham. Such was the situation on August 1 when Lee arrived at Monterey, and so it remained for five weeks while commissariat arrangements were made and daily reconnaissances were directed by General Lee himself ; but unfortunately one result of the persistent scouting was to warn the Federals of their danger, who then secured another pass ten miles in front of Valley Mountain and thus protected their right flank from the threatened turning movement : they also brought up reinforcements.

Another difficulty arose on the Confederate side, which was delicately alluded to in after years by Davis when he said, eulogising General Lee, that "if his plans and orders had been carried out the result would have been victory rather than retreat." The truth is that Loring had "ranked" Lee in the United States army and, being credited with much skill in mountain warfare from having commanded the United States forces in New Mexico, the sudden arrival of General Lee at Huntersville "took Loring by surprise," and according to his staff officer "he could not suppress a feeling of jealousy."

Lee recommenced scouting to find another route leading to the rear of Cheat Mountain, but the wet season now set in and it rained for weeks ;

the mountain roads were rendered impassable for waggons and measles attacked the Confederate troops; nevertheless two routes for infantry were at length discovered, and the plan of attack was issued on September 8. The opposing forces were by this time about equal in numbers, for the Federals had 2000 on Cheat Mountain, 5000 on the Huntersville road to cover their right flank and 4000 in reserve on Tygart's Valley river about Huttonsville.

Loring's dispositions for attack, which were approved by Lee, divided his force into four detachments under Rust, Anderson, Jackson and Donelson, besides the main body. A double envelopment was to be combined with a frontal attack. An enterprising officer, Colonel Rust, had undertaken to gain the rear of the Federal position at dawn; and his attack was to be the signal for the advance of the other columns; but on the eventful day Rust lost touch; each leader waited for the other, neither would act independently, and so nothing was done.

Lee himself was on Valley Mountain where he had fixed his headquarters on August 9 and whence on September 17 he wrote to Governor Letcher: "The troops intended for the surprise had reached their destination, having traversed twenty miles of steep, rugged, mountain paths;

and the last day through a terrible storm, which lasted all night, and in which they had to stand drenched to the skin. Still their spirits were good. When morning broke I could see the enemy's tents on Tygart's Valley river at the point on the Huttonsville road just below me. It was a tempting sight. We waited for the attack on Cheat Mountain which was to be the signal. Till 10 A.M. the men were cleaning their unserviceable arms. But the signal did not come. All chance for surprise was gone. The provisions of the men had been destroyed the preceding day by the storm. They had nothing to eat that morning, could not hold out another day and were obliged to be withdrawn. The party sent to Cheat Mountain to take that in rear had also to be withdrawn. The attack to come off from the east side failed from the difficulties in the way: the opportunity was lost and our plan discovered."

Such was the "lame and impotent conclusion" to an operation which had been maturing for six weeks and is known as the Valley Mountain Campaign, but which in spite of the elaborate plans set forth in the Orders of September 8 (printed in our Appendix) was afterwards alluded to by Lee as "a forced reconnaissance of the enemy's position."

On September 10 the citizens of Hardy county

addressed President Davis somewhat stiffly to the effect that they had placed themselves under the protection of the Confederate States relying upon the promise of the Southerners to defend the Border regions; that they had expected General Lee's army to drive Rosecrans from Western Virginia; but the Federals having seized their cattle and horses were now engaged in thrashing out their crops of wheat. The hostility between Wise and Floyd was made the subject of a protest from the inhabitants of Lewisburg, who declared that "each of them would be highly gratified to see the other annihilated." The acrimonious correspondence of these commanders would fill a volume, and yet Lee continues to preach patience when he reaches Lewisburg on September 21. A few days later Wise received direct orders from the President to relinquish his command.

Meanwhile Floyd's engagement at Carnifex Ferry on Gauley river had resulted in the tactical repulse of the Federals under Rosecrans on September 10, but the Confederates nevertheless retreated before superior numbers; for Rosecrans had been reinforced and now commanded three brigades under Benham, McCook and Scammon respectively, besides a force of cavalry under Stewart, and on September 24 he pushed forward a detachment under Cox as far as Sewell Mountain.

General Lee, leaving in front of Cheat Mountain a detachment to observe the Federals under Reynolds and guard the Parkersburg road, came to the assistance of Floyd and established his headquarters on Sewell Mountain where he remained for a month. On September 26 he writes "the men are all exposed on the Mountain with the enemy opposite us. We are without tents and for two nights I have lain buttoned up in my overcoat." A fortnight later General Rosecrans in his front made a show of attacking and then withdrew, upon which Lee remarks "I wish he had attacked us, as I believe he would have been repulsed with great loss." Then why did not Lee pursue? The answer is that "the reduced condition of our horses for want of provender, exposure to cold rains in these mountains and want of provisions for the men, prevented the vigorous pursuit and following up that was proper; we can only get up provisions from day to day, which paralyzes our operations."

In no better case apparently Rosecrans reports on October 8 that he had withdrawn his forces to Camp Lookout, 14 miles from Camp Sewell, not only because he had "failed to draw the rebels out" but for "want of transportation, want of force, roads almost impassable: we can reoccupy this ground whenever we require:

our troops will fall back nearer to the Gauley and get their pay and clothing." Reynolds was a week's march distant on Cheat Mountain, but his position defended by 10,000 men and 26 guns was quite secure; in fact, on October 3 he attacked the Confederates in his front.

The Washington authorities were however somewhat premature in assigning to the Department of Western Virginia under Brigadier-general Rosecrans "so much of Virginia as lies west of the Blue Ridge Mountains." From the Alleghanies to the Shenandoah Valley is a far cry, and it was evident at this time that the tide of Federal invasion had been stayed for the winter.

The Confederates had yielded the Ohio valley but clung to the mountains; and although it is easy to be wise after the event it remains to be said that the energy expended in defending the passes might have yielded important results if employed against the enemy's communications after he had crossed the mountains. The offensive on the part of the Federals had spent itself on General Garnett and when Lee arrived there was nothing to be done, since the Federals would not advance and the Confederates lacked the power to compel them to retire, a situation which of course was not amiss to the invaders—*beati possidentes*.

Lee was now sent to South Carolina on what he

describes as "another forlorn hope expedition worse than West Virginia," and he soon discovers that in the Cotton States "the people do not seem to realise that there is a war": even six months later Lee, writing from Savannah, says "our people have not been earnest enough, have thought too much of themselves and their ease, and instead of turning out to a man have been content to nurse themselves and their dimes and leave the protection of themselves and families to others"—an observation which would probably still apply to all English-speaking peoples in time of war.

The rival armies in West Virginia were now about to be dissolved, Rosecrans retiring to Wheeling as Lee proceeded south. Rosecrans detached a force to aid Buell in Kentucky, whither as a counterpoise the Confederate authorities despatched Floyd's brigade.

East of the Alleghanies the centre of gravity was shifting from the Kanawha Valley to the Shenandoah Valley. The duel between McClellan and Garnett and the manœuvres of Rosecrans against Lee were to be followed by a struggle between Jackson and Lander; and as "coming events cast their shadows before" General Kelley was now taken from the control of Rosecrans and assigned to the Upper Potomac with headquarters


at Romney, where he believed himself to be in a position either to strike at Winchester or take in rear the Confederate detachment in front of Reynolds; but Jackson's command was about to be reinforced by Loring's brigade with results to be shown in our chapter on The Valley Campaign.



## CHAPTER IX

### THE BULL RUN CAMPAIGN

THE MILITARY SITUATION—HARPER'S FERRY—PATTERSON AND JOSEPH JOHNSTON IN THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY—BEAUREGARD AND MCDOWELL AT MANASSAS—THE BULL RUN DEFENCES—BEAUREGARD'S FIRST PLAN—JOHNSTON'S FLANK MOVEMENT—MCDOWELL'S MARCH—RECONNAISSANCE AND ATTACK—BEAUREGARD'S SECOND PLAN—HIS THIRD PLAN—THE USE OF RESERVES—PATTERSON AND BEAUREGARD BOTH FAIL TO PURSUE—END OF THE SEVEN DAYS' CAMPAIGN—THE AFFAIR OF BALL'S BLUFF—IN WINTER QUARTERS.



## CHAPTER IX

### THE BULL RUN CAMPAIGN

THE timorous policy that directed the embryo armies of the rival Presidents had in July 1861 produced a military situation in Northern Virginia somewhat as follows :

A Confederate force under Beauregard was holding the line of the Potomac from Leesburg down to a point opposite Alexandria, supported on its right by a detachment at Aquia Creek near Fredericksburg, and on its left by a detachment in the Shenandoah Valley. Beauregard's command was called the Army of the Potomac, the detachment on his right was under General Holmes and that on his left, commanded by Joseph Johnston, was called the Army of the Shenandoah. Farther west General Garnett in the Alleghanies was striving with McClellan for the possession of West Virginia.

The Federals were now concentrating in front of Washington on Beauregard's right, but a detachment under Patterson about Williamsport was held in readiness to march up the Shenandoah

Valley, hold Johnston fast, and menace Beauregard's left and rear. On the night of May 23-24 the Federals had crossed the Potomac by the Long Bridge, by the Aqueduct Bridge and by steamer, and had seized Alexandria and the Heights of Arlington on the right bank; Forts Runyon and Corcoran were soon constructed as *têtes-de-pont*; Fort Ellsworth protected Alexandria; Fort Albany commanded the Columbia turnpike; and these works though incomplete were all quite defensible at the date of General McDowell's advance on July 16.

The north-eastern States began to clamour for an advance on Richmond just as the Parisians a decade later cried "*à Berlin*," and accordingly all routes to their newly-established capital were guarded by the Confederates on outpost principles. The routes to Richmond from the north were three in number: (1) by Aquia Creek on the Lower Potomac to the Fredericksburg and Richmond railway; (2) by Fairfax to Manassas Junction and the Orange and Alexandria railway; (3) by Harper's Ferry up the Shenandoah Valley *viâ* Winchester and Staunton to the Virginia Central railway.

From President Lincoln's point of view the Manassas route was preferable as covering Washington, which it was supposed the Confederates were

strong enough to seize ; but in fact the Richmond authorities while desirous of preventing further encroachments by the Federals had expressly instructed Beauregard to avoid even " threatening " Washington, though he was encouraged to regain possession of Alexandria which was connected with Manassas by about 27 miles of railroad.

At Harper's Ferry, the site of an arsenal on the Virginian shore of the Potomac, the Ohio and Baltimore railway crosses the river where the Shenandoah flows into the Potomac: the Shenandoah Valley turnpike from Staunton here merges into Boteler's Ford and leads to Maryland. As early as April 18 the arsenal had attracted a force of Virginian militia and, since the Federal authorities had then made no provision for its defence, the commandant set fire to the buildings and evacuated the place after dark. Then Thomas J. Jackson took possession and held it for the Confederates. He believed that the place should be " defended with the spirit which actuated the defenders of Thermopylæ," a view apparently shared by both Davis and Lee. Yet this concurrence of expert opinion was insufficient to secure Harper's Ferry as a Confederate stronghold, as a base for offensive operations in Maryland, though Joseph Johnston was sent to reinforce Jackson and assume command at this point on May 15 ; for meanwhile the Washington

authorities who had allowed Harper's Ferry to fall and its stores and machinery to be taken to Richmond—the fire did little damage—became suddenly solicitous to recover this post, and on May 24 sent Patterson to threaten the place and “support the Union sentiment in West Virginia.”

Patterson determined “to place such a force on the Virginia shore as can hold every inch of the ground gained, and however slowly to advance securely after Harper's Ferry falls upon Winchester.” Brave words, especially as he believed a desperate resistance would be offered. But what happened? Johnston did what the Federals had done before him; he evacuated the place on June 14 as “untenable without a much larger force than he had”; and thus the intentions of the Richmond authorities were frustrated: Joseph Johnston's withdrawal from Harper's Ferry became known to the Federals on June 16, and Patterson now proposed to make this place his base of operations in Virginia.

Fresh orders from Washington however arrive—the telegraph was in continual use at this period—and ten days are consumed in a question-and-answer correspondence before General Winfield Scott authorises Patterson to cross the Potomac and offer battle to Johnston. On June 28 Patterson discovers that he has no harness for his

battery and that he is inferior in strength to the enemy (his force was 14,344 "present" while Johnston had only 10,654), but on being promised reinforcements he undertakes to cross the river on July 1, a month after his original plan "to hold every inch of ground gained, etc." had been approved by Winfield Scott.

Patterson actually crossed the Potomac at Williamsport on July 2, encountered a detachment under Jackson at Falling Waters, drove him back and passed through Martinsburg July 3. Patterson now waited four days for supplies and reinforcements, and during this halt he receives elaborate instructions, suggestions and warnings from Washington, where at this moment the Lincoln cabinet was actually discussing the propriety of superseding him! On July 8 Patterson issued orders for an advance on Winchester, but now he encounters opposition from his own subordinates, who compel him to call a Council of War and listen to their advice. The next day Patterson writes to Scott, submitting a fresh plan based on an endless chain of possibilities, and on July 13 places on record his conception of his duty (on hearing of McClellan's victory at Rich Mountain) in the following words: "my column must be preserved to insure to the country the fruits of this and other victories which we hope will follow."

This extraordinary appreciation of the military situation is a pendant to his letter of June 10 to the Secretary for War in which he said, "the importance of victory at Harper's Ferry cannot be estimated. I cannot sleep for thinking about it: remember, my dear general, that my reputation and the reputation of our dear old State is at stake in this issue. I beseech you . . . give me the means of success . . . and shoot me if I do not use them to advantage."

These details may seem trivial, but they are significant of the temper of a considerable number of the generals employed at this period on both sides, men who had political influence, who could write to members of the Cabinet or get their friends to do so, who preferred offering advice to headquarters to attending to their own business, and who had a positive genius for inventing excuses for doing nothing. The politicians talked strategy, the soldiers talked politics: and two years were cut to waste in learning the uses of "decentralisation" and in compelling a full recognition of their responsibilities on the part of subordinates in the field. The case of General Patterson is typical: it is one to which the reader may confidently refer when other reasons are wanting for promises being unfulfilled and expected results being unattained.



Patterson retained 18,000 men idle at Martinsburg till July 15 and then advanced to Bunker Hill, but two days later he moved eastward to Smithfield and thence to Charlestown, avoiding Winchester and his enemy, who screened by Stuart's cavalry was now on his way to Manassas. When at Charlestown Patterson receives Scott's telegram, "9.30 P.M. McDowell's first day's work has driven the enemy beyond Fairfax Court House; the Junction will probably be carried to-morrow . . . do not let the enemy amuse and delay you with a small force in front whilst he reinforces the Junction with his main body."

Turning now to the Confederates at Manassas we find that on July 11 Beauregard reported that with his force of light artillery (27 pieces), cavalry (1425), and infantry (16,150) he held Leesburg as an advanced post, and after having assigned 1500 men for camp guards, pickets and the garrison of his entrenched camp at Manassas Junction, he could count on 16,500 of all arms for his field army to oppose the advance of the enemy who was then at Falls Church between Leesburg and Alexandria with a force of 35,000 of all ranks.

Beauregard was at this time preparing for defence the line of Bull Run, where he determined to accept battle whatever the odds against him. He hoped the enemy would attack by Mitchell's Ford

where the ground favoured defensive tactics, but he apprehended a turning movement on his left by Gum Springs to Haymarket on the railway, which as he remarked would isolate Johnston's detachment in the Valley and interrupt his own railway communication with Richmond. Beauregard determined in such an event to retire on Fredericksburg and there unite with Holmes for operations against the flank of the invaders.

On July 13 Beauregard proposes that Johnston should join him in taking the offensive, keeping Patterson in the Valley during the operation by blocking the passes of Blue Ridge; together they could attack McDowell and drive him back to Washington, then return to crush Patterson and subsequently reinforce Garnett in West Virginia and force McClellan over the Ohio river. This programme was certainly ambitious and it therefore found no favour at Richmond, whereupon Beauregard writes to Johnston: "Oh, that we had but one good head to conduct all our operations; we are labouring unfortunately under the disadvantage of having about seven armies in the field under as many independent commanders, which is contrary to the first principles of the art of war." The remark was perfectly just, but it applied in an equal measure to the Federals.

Beauregard had prepared for emergencies by

entrenching a "rallying" position behind the Rappahannock and on July 8 had issued a General Order to his three brigades, then in Fairfax county watching the Potomac, which directed them to retire if attacked by a superior force.

One of these brigades was commanded by a very able officer, Colonel Cocke, and as his dispositions proved to be of great importance on July 21, and illustrate very clearly the sort of defensive arrangements approved in our own Regulations to-day, we will describe them in some detail.

Cocke commanded a mixed brigade consisting of 5 battalions of infantry from Virginia, South Carolina and Louisiana; 2 four-gun batteries of brass 6 prs. and 4 prs.; 6 troops of cavalry; and two infantry detachments each of 3 companies: and in accordance with instructions from Beauregard to cross Bull Run, an affluent of the Potomac, and hold Stone Bridge and the adjacent fords, Colonel Cocke issued Brigade Orders on July 12 calling in his detachments, and marched to Stone Bridge on the day (July 17) that the Federals under McDowell advanced towards Fairfax Court-house. The Confederate brigadier occupied the extreme left of the position: his section of defence extended for three miles along Bull Run east of Stone Bridge.

Stone Bridge carries the new turnpike road from Alexandria to Warrenton over Bull Run, and the old road, disused but still practicable, crosses the stream at Ball's Ford lower down. Between Stone Bridge and Ball's Ford is Lewis' Ford—less than a mile between the fords—by which a track from Lewis' Farm crossing Bull Run leads diagonally through a pine thicket to the turnpike about half-a-mile north of Stone Bridge. Below Ball's Ford is Island Ford which defined the extreme right of Cocke's defences.

On the left (west) of Stone Bridge and about 400 yards from the river bank on the defender's side is a hill some forty feet high, and between this hill and the bridge is an oak wood. Colonel Cocke caused this wood to be cleared so that fire from the hill could be brought to bear upon the bridge, and here he posted a couple of guns, using the felled trees as obstacles. Aware of the value of concealment he sent off his tents and baggage a few miles to the rear towards Manassas and instructed his force to bivouac. He ordered two battalions to cross the stream and occupy some high ground and a wood which dominated his position, and these battalions deploying astride the old Warrenton road were so disposed as to cover the two lower fords.

The upper ford, Lewis', was commanded by a

hill on his own side on which Lewis' farm stood, half-a-mile from the bank, and here Cocke posted a battalion and two guns. The battalion entrenched very carefully under the direction of an engineer officer, who also emplaced the guns separately in positions where copse and undergrowth screened them from view. This was the centre of Colonel Cocke's section of defence: from Lewis' farm on the hill he could survey the country round; on the right and rear of the farm was a wood which was to be held *à outrance* in the event of the enemy forcing a passage in his front; to the left of the farm was a ravine formed by a stream flowing into Bull Run, a tactical point likely to invite the enemy, and at the head of this re-entrant he posted two guns and three companies whose sharpshooters were to cross Bull Run and use the far bank as a breastwork. Behind the crest of the hill, concealed and sheltered in a hollow near the farm, he posted his local reserve, viz. 1 battalion, 3 companies, 2 guns and 3 troops.

On the left of his position Cocke placed a battalion for the defence of Stone Bridge and this battalion together with the two guns on the hill and a troop of cavalry formed the command of Major Evans, who despatched mounted scouts westward up Bull Run towards Sudley Mill and lined the edges of the wood with sharpshooters.

So far as we can judge from Cocke's minute description of the ground there was little else to do in order to discharge the duty imposed on him of protecting a flank of the Confederate line of defence ; but it does not appear that Colonel Cocke was visited by any superior between July 17 and July 21, and though he was reinforced by 2 squadrons, 4 companies and 4 guns he received neither criticism nor advice. As events proved it was a happy chance that confided so important a post to so competent an officer.

Another glance at the Confederate dispositions at this period is afforded by Longstreet, the South Carolinian, who was destined to aid Lee in his struggle to the end of the war.

Longstreet had been serving the Union as an army paymaster in New Mexico (where mails from the East came but once a month in the winter season) when news arrived of the attack on Fort Sumter and he recognised that a three years' war was ahead. Like other Southern officers, naval and military, he had no doubt that his plain duty was to retire from the United States army and support the State to which he owed allegiance. His resignation being accepted at Washington he reported at the Richmond War Office on June 29. Longstreet was assigned to the command of a brigade under Beauregard and reached Manassas

Junction on July 2, where he proceeded to organise his three regiments of Virginians. A few days later he began to drill them as a brigade, but their attempts at entrenching showed him that his men were "more familiar with the amenities of city life than with the axe, pick, spade or shovel."

When on July 10 it became known through spies that the Federals were ready to march Longstreet and other professional soldiers were strangely apprehensive of the result of meeting a Federal army organised by the veteran Winfield Scott, an army which was said to include a "splendid equipment of field batteries" and regular infantry. But McDowell did not march until July 16, and then he found himself possessed of only 8 companies of infantry, 7 companies of cavalry, 1 battalion of marines and 9 batteries out of all the regulars on the establishment: the remainder of his command consisted of either State militias or volunteers in the recruit stage, of whom many were on the point of becoming time-expired.

Beauregard's little "volunteer" army was now behind Bull Run: Longstreet's brigade was at Blackburn's Ford, on his left Bonham's brigade (retiring from Fairfax Court-house as McDowell advanced) was to hold Mitchell's Ford, while Cocke's brigade prolonged to the left as far as Stone Bridge: on Longstreet's right was Jones'

brigade at McLean's Ford, while Ewell's brigade prolonged to the right as far as Union Mills Ford. Thus from left to right the brigadiers were Cocke, Bonham, Longstreet, Jones, Ewell; and in support of the right was Early's brigade.

The Bull Run campaign opened on July 16. "McDowell has been ordered to advance to-night" was the message delivered to Beauregard through Holmes' pickets from a Mrs G—— in Washington, who was a secret emissary of the Confederates and got this important news through a signal line which had been established across the Potomac some fifteen miles below Alexandria. The information proved to be correct and so next day Beauregard had occasion to telegraph to Richmond: "The enemy has assailed my outposts in heavy force. I have fallen back [from Fairfax Court-house] on the line of Bull Run and will make a stand at Mitchell's Ford. If his force is overwhelming I shall retire to the Rappahannock railroad bridge, saving my command for defence there and future operations. Please inform Johnston of this, *vid* Staunton; and also Holmes."

This message stirred up the Richmond authorities, who at once began to send reinforcements to Beauregard and who instructed Johnston at Winchester to evacuate the Valley, sending his sick and baggage to Culpeper Court-house *vid*



Warrenton, and join Beauregard with all his effectives.

Johnston's flank movement was assisted by Beauregard sending all his rolling stock on to Piedmont station, so that the infantry could be transported thirty-four miles by the Manassas Gap railway to the Junction.

On July 18 the Federals resume their advance and demonstrate on the left bank of Bull Run, but are checked at Blackburn's Ford by Longstreet's brigade and at Mitchell's Ford by Bonham's brigade. Johnston on this date begins his march over Blue Ridge *via* Ashby's Gap to the railway at Piedmont: his mounted troops marched sixty miles on the waggon-roads.

On July 19-20 the Federals suspended operations or restricted them to secret reconnaissances whilst Beauregard received reinforcements from various quarters. By one of those curious strokes of fate that decide battles more often than is commonly supposed McDowell turned a deaf ear to General Tyler's warning (Tyler was a professional railroad manager) that the "exhaust" of many engines bringing heavy loads into Manassas from the west portended the approach of the Valley detachment; and so in operating by his right McDowell actually shortened by many miles the journey of the Confederate reinforcements on July 21.

Meanwhile Holmes arrived from Fredericksburg with 1265 infantry, 6 light guns and a squadron of cavalry. Johnston came in from the Valley with Jackson's brigade (2611), portions of Bee's and Barton's brigades (2732) Stuart's cavalry (300) and Imboden's and Pendleton's batteries. From Lynchburg a Mississippi regiment under Barksdale and from Richmond a battalion called Hampton's Legion also joined Beauregard on Bull Run. All these fresh troops were placed in reserve. There was yet one half of the Valley detachment to come in; part of it (Kirby Smith's brigade) arrived towards the close of the battle on July 21 but the remainder was detained on the railway until the day after the battle.

Beauregard, it should be mentioned, was until recently a brevet major of U.S. Engineers (McDowell had graduated with him at West Point in 1838) with a brilliant record of service in the Mexican War; but on joining the Confederacy with the rank of brigadier-general he had risen to the occasion, organising his command with great skill and improvising a staff consisting of an A.A.G., a chief engineer, a commissary of subsistence, a chief quartermaster, a chief of artillery and ordnance, a medical director and half-a-dozen aides-de-camp. A system of field signals lately invented enabled him to direct his dispersed

brigades in much the same fashion as a twentieth-century commander expected to do before the advent of the telephone. Nevertheless in accordance with the rule of seniority Beauregard should have handed over the Bull Run defences on July 20 to Joseph Johnston, late brigadier-general in the United States army; but Johnston magnanimously declined to take the command out of the hands of his junior and so we may continue to speak of Beauregard as the commanding general at Bull Run; though telegraphic communication with the War Office at Richmond was maintained and progress thus continually reported to the Supreme Command.

On Sunday morning at half-past five Cocke was attacked by Tyler's division and soon the left flank of the defence was in jeopardy. Beauregard on the alert showed himself equal to the emergency; and his fresh plan would have commended itself to the victor of Salamanca; it smacks even of Napoleon's counterstroke at Austerlitz: "the most effective method of relieving that flank was by a rapid determined attack with right wing and centre on the enemy's flank and rear at Centreville, with due precautions against the advance of his reserves from the direction of Washington." In other words McDowell was to pay the penalty of undertaking a flank march in presence of the enemy.

Johnston approved of the Orders issued to carry out Beauregard's plan.

Ewell was to begin the movement and be followed by Jones, Longstreet and Bonham in support, each of whom was authorised to call upon the reserves in his immediate rear; the cavalry under Stuart and Radford were to form a General Reserve for this attack, which it was assumed three hours would be required to develop.

But at half-past ten Beauregard learnt to his dismay that his orders to Ewell had miscarried, and so a third plan of action had to be improvised on the spot.

Meanwhile the Federal attack had increased in vigour on the left, where Cocke held his ground under the fire of a 30 pr. Parrott gun and other rifled guns (13 pr.) to which his little 6 pr. brass pieces could make no reply; but perhaps Cocke was on the whole a gainer thereby inasmuch as his exact dispositions were not disclosed to his opponent, Tyler. The intention of McDowell to completely turn the flank of the defence became more and more apparent—the enveloping movement with Hunter's and Heintzelman's divisions continued—and accordingly the various brigades of the Shenandoah Valley force which had been held in reserve were at last moved towards the left.

Bernard Bee's brigade was soon up, and when

Barton's and Hampton's also arrived Cocke's left was protected by a new line of defence opposite the Federal flank attack. The struggle for mastery now began and it proved to be severe. The Confederates were outclassed in respect of both guns and rifles—in fact 90 per cent. of their infantry firearms were smooth-bore muskets, calibre 69; and the remainder were the regulation U.S. rifled musket, calibre 58. But the men who in those days went through the tiresome process of loading their muskets at the muzzle were averse from wasting their cartridges; they shot to kill; and in the end some 1500 Federals were laid low (one-third killed outright) and as many more surrendered to avoid a worse fate.

McDowell's onset had been too slow: he had allowed time for a new front to be formed, and then he proceeded to attack it by a succession of half-hearted blows instead of "hunting for a Confederate flank" as Alexander puts it. There had been a sad want of control on the part of the Federals and now Howard's brigade was miles in the rear, Burnside's brigade was lying down at rest under pretence of replenishing ammunition, Keyes' brigade lost itself in the valley of Bull Run, and Schenck's brigade was engaged in removing trees which had been felled across the Warrenton turnpike; so that McDowell in the end was attempting

a frontal attack against equal numbers, and though well served by his artillery he experienced the common lot of commanders who undertake such enterprises against a resolute foe. Beauregard used his reserves wisely. Jackson's brigade was brought up in time to sustain the conflict by a deployment which seemed like a "stone wall" to the ragged lines of the brigades which had hitherto borne the brunt of the attack; and then Jackson fought his command with such determination that his five regiments were reduced by 561 casualties before he was able to cry "we have whipped them!" The killed and wounded in the commands of Bee, Barton and Jackson numbered 1257 out of a total loss of 1958; and Patterson who had failed to keep Johnston in the Valley on July 17 thus caused McDowell's defeat four days later at Bull Run.

Patterson it seems had not even watched his enemy, for as late as July 19 he telegraphs to Washington that "the enemy from last information are still at Winchester," implying of course that Johnston's force was there intact; but on July 20 Patterson is able to report that "with a portion of his force Johnston left Winchester by the road to Millwood on the afternoon of the 18th." Apparently well satisfied with himself Patterson retires to Harper's Ferry on July 21 and reports

that "Johnston left for Millwood to operate on McDowell's right and to turn through Loudon upon me. I could not follow." The Washington authorities stood aghast at this news: instead of Patterson detaining Johnston in the Valley while Beauregard was being crushed, it was Johnston who had beguiled Patterson and kept him forty miles from the battlefield while McDowell was being beaten at Bull Run. Waterloo history was repeating itself. Patterson of course published a "Narrative" years afterwards with the object of showing that he was quite unjustly blamed: but his letters and telegrams in 1861 speak for themselves.

At Bull Run commenced those involuntary contributions by the Federal army to the Confederate army which for two or three years were counted on as part of the resources of the South. On July 21 McDowell left behind him 28 excellent guns with 100 rounds per gun, 64 horses and 37 caissons, 6 forges and 4 battery waggons with all their equipment; also half-a-million rounds of S.A.A. with 500 muskets and the accoutrements of 4500 men; besides piles of entrenching tools and hospital stores. Here, too, the South began the systematic collection of prisoners (1600 at Bull Run) which in the end was to prove such a potent cause of embarrassment to a Power whose food resources were limited.

But why was there no pursuit? Beauregard's official reason was that "an army which had fought as ours that day against uncommon odds under a July sun most of the time without water, and without food except a hastily snatched meal at dawn, was not in condition for the toil . . . and on the following day . . . a fall of rain intervened to obstruct our advance: added to this, the want of a cavalry force . . . made an efficient pursuit a military impossibility." Against this assertion we may set the facts that Beauregard had 5 brigades practically intact (Bonham, Ewell, Jones, Longstreet and Kirby Smith), though every Federal brigade save two had been severely handled, and Longstreet avers that "the supplies of subsistence, ammunition and forage passed as we marched through the enemy's camp towards Centreville seemed ample to carry the Confederate army on to Washington." Moreover many of the Union regiments, called up for three months only, were time-expired on July 21, and Stuart with a handful of cavalry following for 12 miles gathered up stragglers until the whole of his command was dissolved into escorts for his prisoners.

The truth is that ill service on the part of an inexperienced staff, which had caused in the morning the abandonment of the counter-attack from



the right and compelled Longstreet's brigade to cross and recross Bull Run six times within twenty-four hours, again in the evening prevented the movement of Longstreet and Bonham against the Federal fugitives becoming effective : rival staff officers even suspended an attack after the infantry had deployed and the batteries had made ready to open fire on the enemy's position at Centreville, which Longstreet had caused to be reconnoitred closely by mounted officers in the course of the battle. Although two generals were on the field to control 20,000 Confederates the brigades were out of hand when McDowell's 37,000 Federals gave way ; and as if to afford excuse for doing nothing Mr Jefferson Davis now made his appearance and, according to Alexander who was the signalling officer at Bull Run, " the President himself and both generals spent these precious hours in riding over the field." We hear afterwards of a Council of War and of the President actually dictating an order for pursuit ; but at midnight more talk is indulged in, as to whether this pursuit should be " immediate " or " at dawn," with the result that the original intention is entirely lost sight of, and the Order as issued prescribed merely a reconnaissance by a couple of brigades. Thus General McDowell and his routed divisions escaped to their camp

at Arlington and the Seven Days' Campaign came to an end.

After the retreat of McDowell to his entrenched camp the Confederates pushed forward Longstreet's brigade, to which Stuart's cavalry and a battery was attached, as an outpost force as far as Fall's Church on the Alexandria-Leesburg road, the point from which McDowell had advanced. Stuart had his pickets out in touch with the Federal outposts at Mason's, Munson's and Upton's hills, whence the spires of Washington were clearly visible. The infantry and artillery units were relieved every few days. Johnston had now assumed command of the army at Manassas and Beauregard was gone West, where he will be *en évidence* again at Shiloh.

In October Johnston withdrew his outposts to the line Centreville—Union Mills, flanking the best approach to Richmond from Alexandria; and here Longstreet went into winter quarters, leaving a brigade under Evans on his left flank fifteen miles away at Leesburg, where the road to Winchester passes over the Catoclin Range. These dispositions led to the affair of Ball's Bluff, for on the north bank of the Potomac a Federal

force under Stone remained about Poolesville, crossing the river occasionally to collect supplies from Virginia between Leesburg and Dranesville: and Evans caught one of these raiding parties *en flagrant délit*, drove it into the river, killed or wounded 207, including the general in command, and captured the remainder. The Federal loss was 921, that of Evans only 155.

In December with far less success "Jeb" Stuart encountered General Ord. The Confederate cavalry leader with a mixed force (1600 infantry, 150 sabres and a battery) was escorting the waggons of the army, which were to collect supplies from the country west of Dranesville. A Federal division under McCall was engaged on a similar expedition and Stuart fell in with Ord's detachment 4000 strong. Stuart was obliged to attack the superior force in order to gain time for the retreat of the waggons, and in the result he was driven back five miles with a loss of 194 men: this was Stuart's first serious check and oddly enough it synchronised with his appointment to the command of a brigade of cavalry, the result of Johnston's recommendation of him in glowing terms as "a rare man."

No general movement was made on either side, though the autumn and early winter had been unusually fine and the roads and fields kept firm

and in good condition for marching and manœuvring. When the winter rains set in early in January (1862), and snow fell with alternate frost and thaw, the roads and fields were reduced to a quagmire of red mud and military operations then became impossible.

In March the Confederate outpost force fell back from Centreville to the line Culpeper Courthouse — Fredericksburg, behind the Rappahannock; but Stuart's cavalry remained 25 miles north about Warrenton Junction, and at the end of the month it reported a Federal reconnaissance along the railroad as far as Bealton within ten miles of Culpeper.

In April, news arriving of McClellan's landing with three corps on the Yorktown peninsula, the Confederate army along the Rappahannock was concentrated at Fredericksburg and then brought south, in order to reinforce Magruder's force at Yorktown; while another force under Huger occupied Norfolk on the south bank of the James river which was patrolled by four Confederate war vessels.

General "Stonewall" Jackson in the meantime had been assigned to the command of a division in the Shenandoah Valley.

## CHAPTER X

### THE VALLEY CAMPAIGN

THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY—WINTER OPERATIONS ON THE UPPER  
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## CHAPTER X

### THE VALLEY CAMPAIGN

THE military importance of the Shenandoah Valley—the Valley of Virginia—depended to some extent on its value as a source of supply, a value which was never fully ascertained until 1864 when it was wasted by Sheridan in order to make it untenable for the Confederates. Between Blue Ridge and North Mountain the main valley, the Little Fort Valley and the Luray Valley, even after the devastation of three years' warfare and Hunter's depredations, contained two thousand barns full of corn and hay, seventy mills stored with flour and wheat, thousands of sheep and other cattle, all of which Sheridan appropriated or destroyed together with the farm implements and other means of raising fresh crops.

To cover the valley directly and secure the whole of this fertile region a Confederate force must hold Harper's Ferry, Shepherdstown and Martinsburg or a Federal force occupy Staunton ; and in either case the control of the country eastward over Blue

Ridge and westward over North Mountain is assumed, or in the alternative the passes into the Valley on both flanks must be held, in order to secure communication with Washington or Richmond and check incursions from Kentucky and Ohio. Failing these conditions a military occupation of the Valley must be always precarious. Railroad connection at Staunton with Lynchburg and Richmond, and at Strasburg with Northern Virginia and Maryland, facilitated the movement of troops and supplies from the base of either army; the Valley turnpike took the Confederates north to the fords of the Potomac and so to Washington, and the same road led the Federals south-west to Lynchburg *viâ* Staunton or south-east to Richmond *viâ* Charlottesville and Gordonsville.

The influence of the Valley on the war however was mainly a moral influence which took its rise in the fears, real or assumed, of President Lincoln for the safety of his capital. Washington after December 1861 was girdled with about fifty works mounting three hundred guns to defend a perimeter of 35 miles, and it is hard to believe that the Federal cabinet really shared in the perturbation of Northern citizens whenever the presence of a Confederate force was reported about Harper's Ferry; it is a fair presumption that this panic was skilfully utilised by Lincoln to draw from reluctant States



fresh supplies of men and money for the supposed protection of a locality identified with the memory of the greatest of all Americans. Certainly General Lee never deceived himself as to his ability to wage offensive war by a line of operations northwards covering Richmond and as far as Lee was concerned Washington was never in danger: his own expeditions beyond the Potomac were planned for political effect; and when Early appeared before Washington with 18,000 men in 1864 at the time when only 5000 regulars formed its garrison, it was with the object of drawing Grant's 6th corps from Petersburg, which end being accomplished he quickly retreated.

In July 1861 however the Federals believed it necessary to detach a force under Patterson to command the exit from the Valley into Maryland, and in 1862 even the presence of Frémont's force east of the Alleghanies and so on the flank of this route to Washington did not allay the fears of the War Committee, if we may judge from the fact that after detaining 73,000 men as a permanent garrison for the city the President reduced McClellan's army by nearly 50,000 men (McDowell's corps and Blenker's division) in consequence of "political pressure" following Jackson's demonstrations. These Federal detachments were of course as good as a heavy reinforcement to

Johnston on the Yorktown Peninsula, and rarely has a general had the good fortune to see his secondary operations produce such important results on the enemy's main army as the Confederate leader experienced in the spring of 1862 ; and the Richmond authorities wisely took care to keep Jackson in a position where his presence neutralised a large body of the enemy, who otherwise would have been added to McClellan's forces before Richmond.

To find any parallel to this military situation we must go back fifty years, when Sir Rowland Hill in the Iberian peninsula apparently served the purpose of keeping Soult from uniting with Massena or Marmont against Wellington ; though we should do Soult injustice if we supposed that he tolerated Hill in Estremadura as a military necessity, that he did not in fact suffer Hill's presence gladly as affording him a legitimate excuse to remain and rule alone in Andalusia.

In the case of Thomas J. Jackson this *rôle* of "bogey" was filled to perfection. A man of character, fine soldier and in certain situations a skilful general, Jackson could only with difficulty be induced to play his part loyally as a corps leader, as one of a team ; nor had he apparently the higher gift of leadership, that of persuading abler men to do his bidding. He was ungracious if not

repellent to his equals and except in the tactful hands of Lee none too obedient. His treatment of the genial Longstreet when after Bull Run the latter proposed to combine operations was neither soldierly nor patriotic, and compares unfavourably with the good feeling that prompted Johnston to waive his right to command on July 21. But Jackson's undoubted ability as compared with the Federal detachment-commanders of 1861-2 ensured him always a *succès d'estime*, and gradually inspired in his own men such feelings of personal devotion as Skobelev's division entertained for the brilliant Russian leader whose untimely end—if we look to remote causes—perhaps gave Manchuria to the Japanese.

Jackson was a remarkable instance of a man of warlike instincts for whom soldiering in peace time offers few attractions, and who finds in the philosophic study of history rather than in the dull routine of regimental duty the means of cultivating the true military spirit. He had graduated at West Point after four years' training at that famous academy, and joined the United States army at the outbreak of the Mexican War for service with a field battery, and so passed in a twelvemonth from cadet to brevet-major; but a few years of duty after the close of the war sufficed to quench all desire for further experience of garrison life,

and he gladly accepted a civilian appointment at the Virginia Military Institute, where at Lexington in the Shenandoah Valley he passed the next ten years within hail of Clarksburg, his birthplace. As a professor of philosophy Jackson marched his cadets to Richmond in April in 1861 to assist in drilling the new levies at the Camp of Instruction : within a week he was commissioned as a colonel and assigned to duty at Harper's Ferry under General Joseph Johnston, whose instant appreciation of his military qualities caused Jackson to be appointed brigadier-general in July, in which capacity he took a prominent part in the battle of Bull Run and won further promotion to the rank of major-general.

Three months later Jackson returned to his post in the Valley and there exhibited considerable powers as an organiser, a disciplinarian and a leader of troops. His rebuke to the regimental commanders who sent him a round-robin of protest against a General Order, which they conceived "disparaged the dignity" of their office and "detracted from that respect . . . which is necessary to maintain their authority," is quite characteristic. Jackson replied (November 17) through his A.A.G. to the effect that their conduct was mutinous and ended with this observation : "if officers desire to have control over their com-

mands they must remain habitually with them and industriously attend to their instruction and comfort, and in battle lead them well and in such a manner as to command their admiration." Finally the peccant colonels were forbidden to pass the pickets without a pass from headquarters.

Jackson's attitude towards the War Office at Richmond is shown by his action when instructed (January 31) to withdraw Loring's force from Romney. He obeyed the order and then tendered his resignation. Luckily General Johnston intervened or the Confederacy would have lost one of its ablest soldiers ; but even Johnston was moved to resentment and writes " I receive my information of the Order of which you have such cause to complain from your letter : is not that as great an official wrong to me as the Order itself to you ? " Indeed it was, but Johnston nevertheless counselled patience : " Let us dispassionately reason with the Government on this subject of command, and if we fail to influence its practice then ask to be relieved from positions the authority of which is exercised by the War Department while the responsibilities are left to us." There were " rifts within the lute " even among the Confederates.

In the circumstances we have detailed under " Policy and Strategy " a force in the Valley could only operate as a detachment, and though as a

detachment leader Jackson's renown stands high it is perhaps an abuse of terms to describe his marches and combats in 1862 as a Campaign, since he had no positive object in view and his success or failure could be decisive of nothing. Whether he would have been able with a larger force at his disposal to crush McClellan and save West Virginia in 1861, or by making a dash for Washington cause the recall of McClellan from Yorktown in 1862, is now only a matter of speculative interest: the situation did not in fact arise and, as we shall see later on, Jackson missed one great opportunity which the spring of 1862 afforded him by assuming on the peninsula an attitude which may have been that of a rabid Sabbatarian, or that for which Achilles was blamed at Troy.

His reputation however will rest chiefly on his exploits as the commander of the Valley detachment, and he was singularly fortunate in being able to operate for nearly two years over familiar ground against generals to whom the population was hostile; and for an ally he might almost have claimed President Lincoln himself, for Lincoln it was who supplanted Rosecrans and appointed Frémont to command in West Virginia, who selected Banks to be his factotum in the Valley and caused Shields to oscillate between McDowell and Banks under the eyes of Confederate scouts.

None of these generals were first-rate, but lest they should perchance gain some military insight or develop such a quality as initiative, and so give Jackson some trouble, the telegraph was continually bearing orders and counter-orders from Washington until, individually and collectively, the Federal detachment leaders became incapable of distinguishing good from evil in a military sense.

When Jackson on November 4 left Manassas for the Valley some 5000 Federals under Rosecrans held Romney forty miles west, while the town of Bath fifteen miles north of Winchester was occupied by another Federal detachment drawing supplies from Washington by the Baltimore and Ohio railway and the Chesapeake and Ohio canal ; and Jackson on reaching Winchester at once began to operate against this line of communication. He even proposed to invade West Virginia ; but his plan was set aside, at least the force he demanded for the purpose (15,000) was not forthcoming. At the end of December Jackson's command hardly exceeded 10,000 infantry, 500 cavalry and 25 guns, but he prevented the Federals repairing the railroad and he added to their embarrassments by breaching the canal seven miles above Williamsport, where two companies headed by their captains worked waist deep in water under the enemy's fire in order to cut out the cribs and destroy No. 5 dam.



Meanwhile Edward Johnson in West Virginia had repulsed an attack on his camp at Alleghany by the Federals under Milroy, and now Jackson proposed to co-operate with him and seize Romney; but his letter of December 23 failed to move either Joseph Johnston or the War Office to send the necessary reinforcements. Rosecrans encountered a similar rebuff when he besought McClellan to allow him to attack Jackson and seize Winchester, and so menace the left flank of the Confederate army at Manassas, for which operation he could have concentrated 20,000 men including the Romney detachment.

A supreme trial of strength, a final struggle for the possession of West Virginia and the lower Valley region was ardently desired by both leaders, but the authorities on both sides intervened; and so Jackson's operations in November-December 1861 resulted in little more than breaching the canal—an important line of supply since the Baltimore and Ohio railway had been destroyed for forty miles—and this feat accomplished he returned to Winchester on December 21. Two days later he writes to Johnston and to Richmond begging that Loring's detachment, left at Huntersville by Lee on his quitting West Virginia in October, might join him for offensive operations against Romney, then held by the Federals under Kelley: and



Loring accordingly was ordered to report to Jackson before the end of the month.

Jackson's operations in January were directed against Hancock and Romney now held by the Federals under Lander, who like Jackson was more enterprising than his government and had proposed to the War Committee an expedition to seize Winchester and thence operate eastward against the Manassas Gap Railway. Jackson on New Year's Day set out for Hancock on the Maryland bank of the Potomac. He now commanded about 8000 men in four brigades, including five batteries and Ashby's cavalry, and marching by Pughtown and Unger's on January 4 he reached Bath and dispersed its small garrison.

Next day Jackson summoned the town of Hancock to surrender, but Lander was there and expecting reinforcements from both Banks and Rosecrans he resolved to give battle. Then Jackson found that he could not cross the Potomac and so countermarched on January 7 and, after destroying the railway bridge over the Great Cacapon river, retraced his steps to Unger's where he was obliged to remain until his horses were roughshod, for snow and sleet had made the roads like glass. His waggons marching on by-roads for the better concealment of his movements could not be got forward to the troops who thus ran short of

supplies. The men suffered from intense cold in their bivouacs, and Loring's brigades unused to such hardships already began to murmur.

Meanwhile General Kelley at Romney on the night of January 6 with a picked force (2000) of all arms marched 15 miles on the Winchester road as far as Hanging Rock, where Jackson had established a post to hold the pass over North Mountain; the garrison consisted of about 700 militia with two guns, and Kelley at daylight surprised the pickets, captured the guns and routed Jackson's detachment.

Jackson could not move from Unger's until January 13 and then he crossed North Mountain and proceeded to Romney, but found that Lander had withdrawn the garrison. Lander had in fact concentrated at a point on the railway, near Patterson's Creek and covering Cumberland, all the troops at his disposal; and here a battle might have been fought, for Jackson while at Bloomery Gap on January 14 had projected an expedition to Cumberland. He had begged the War Secretary at Richmond to reinforce him with 4000 infantry and 350 cavalry; but pending their arrival he was tempted by the proximity of the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, which here approaches within 15 miles of Romney, to make another march westward as far as New Creek, and from that point destroy

the railroad bridges after dispersing the forces under Lander protecting them.

The Confederate leader however had reckoned without his host : his troops had endured great suffering for a fortnight and now discontent was openly expressed by all ranks. Jackson perforce abandoned his plans and proceeded to put his command into winter quarters. Loring's detachment (3 brigades, 3 squadrons and 13 guns) was billeted about Romney ; a militia brigade was dispersed along the south branch of the Potomac as far up as Moorefield in touch with Edward Johnson's pickets in West Virginia ; a militia brigade held Bath ; Meem's brigade was at Martinsburg and Ashby's cavalry watched the Potomac : one brigade and headquarters returned to Winchester.

Jackson thus proposed to cover the entire Valley, supporting his advanced troops against Banks if the latter should cross the Potomac or against Lander who might again menace Romney, and he so reported to Richmond on January 20. But a week later Jackson received peremptory orders from Richmond to withdraw Loring and abandon Romney, in consequence, it is believed, of complaints lodged at the War Office by officers and men on furlough, who conceived that they had been ill-used by their commander in being employed in mid-winter.

Jackson's operations thus ended ; and it must be admitted that, while he controlled 10,000 infantry, 650 cavalry and 26 guns, all his marchings and counter - marchings, manœuvres, skirmishes and reconnaissances had been unproductive ; since Lander still held possession of three railroad bridges about Cumberland and being able to obtain supplies from the West he could move towards Winchester *viâ* Romney, while Banks in Maryland could co-operate by a movement south from Hancock. It is true that Jackson had recovered Romney for the moment, but since the Richmond authorities did not regard the point as worth holding it was certainly not worth winning at the cost of an incipient mutiny, for that is what was implied by his own statement on January 20 that " General Loring has not a single brigade in a condition for active operations."

Moreover the seizure of Romney from the Federals provoked them to treat the inhabitants more harshly as soon as the Confederates had withdrawn. Jackson reports that " their track from Romney to Hanging Rock a distance of fifteen miles was one of desolation ; reprobate Federal commanders have not only burned valuable mill property but also many private houses." It is difficult therefore to perceive any political, moral or strategical advantage gained by Jackson's

winter operations. He had irritated the enemy and the enemy retaliated upon the inhabitants, so that when Romney was abandoned at the end of January the last state of these wretched folk was worse than their first.

Jackson himself no doubt felt that his mission had failed, since we find him now entreating John Letcher, the Governor of Virginia, to procure him a change of scene ; and as the Virginia Military Institute had just been reopened Jackson desired to be placed in charge of the Confederate " Sandhurst " and abandon active service for good.

We may fully sympathise with Jackson in being ill-supported, not only by his military superiors but by the troops under his command, and at the same time recognise that his situation was that of many other excellent officers on both sides ; but since Jackson's " star " was in the ascendant we shall find that he was able to emerge from the clouds that had gathered round him ; and his admirers now regard this period of tribulation as conducive to the formation of his character and the development of his military gifts.

The defection of Loring's brigade and the consequent abandonment of Romney enabled the Federals to recover the ground they had lost. Lander was especially active between February 7 and the day of his death a month later : he raided

Moorefield for cattle ; he rebuilt the bridge over the Great Cacapon ; he opened the railroad from the West to Hancock ; then throwing a waggon bridge over the river at night he dispersed Jackson's militia and captured seventeen officers at Bloomery Gap by a cavalry charge ; and he reconnoitred even as far as Unger's. Jackson's cavalry under Ashby retaliated on February 16 and recovered Bloomery Gap ; but otherwise the Confederates were quiescent during February while the Federals redoubled their exertions to complete their hold on the lower Valley, stimulated no doubt by news of Grant's great victory at Fort Donelson.

General Banks himself now appeared along with his advanced guard from Frederick, crossing the Potomac by a boat bridge at Harper's Ferry, and on February 28 he reached Charlestown. The main body following occupied Bunker's Hill and Smithfield on March 6, its flanks and rear being covered by Lander's division (now commanded by Shields) and Williams' division. The reconstruction of the Baltimore and Ohio railway went on apace. Banks had no fear of Jackson in his front, but apprehended a sudden movement from the direction of Manassas against his left, remembering no doubt the sort of enterprise which had ruined General McDowell at Bull Run. Banks

was not then aware of the intention of the Confederates to withdraw their main body from Manassas and leave Jackson exposed in the Valley; so having now concentrated his three divisions under Shields, Williams and Sedgwick he occupied Winchester on March 14 and threw out a flanking detachment along the Shenandoah river about Berryville.

Jackson meanwhile had been busy reorganising his command. Loring's brigade was broken up, part going to Manassas *via* Snickers Gap and Front Royal, part by rail to Fredericksburg *via* Strasburg, General Loring himself being transferred to the department of South-West Virginia. Jackson on February 24 had proposed to bridge the Shenandoah at Castleman's Ferry in order to communicate with D. H. Hill's detachment then holding Leesburg, and to fortify Winchester on the supposition that this place was to be "adequately reinforced if attacked."

His plan was upset by the decision of the Richmond authorities to evacuate the Manassas position on hearing of McClellan's arrangements for an early advance on Richmond. Johnston on February 22 began to remove to the rear his stores and baggage, but the railway transport was not under military control and the troops could not move until March 7, on which date D. H. Hill retired from



Leesburg. Whiting now withdrew from the Lower Occoquan, destroying the guns, works and stores at Evansport; and thus the whole of Virginia north of the river Rappahannock, including the Orange and Alexandria railroad and the branch line from Manassas to Strasburg, was abandoned to the Federals. Johnston concentrated behind the Rappahannock on March 11 and prepared to defend this line against a Federal advance *via* Fredericksburg, or in the alternative move to the Yorktown peninsula for the defence of Richmond against a Federal expedition down the Potomac; and so Jackson's command became a flanking detachment flung forward on the left of the main army.

Jackson was instructed after Johnston's retirement from Manassas "to employ the invaders in the Valley, but without exposing himself to the danger of defeat, by keeping so near the enemy as to prevent him from making any considerable detachment to reinforce McClellan, but not so near that he might be compelled to fight." These instructions of course postulated that the Federals "with an army too strong to be encountered by Jackson's division" could be depended on to remain passive, surrendering the initiative to Jackson's inferior force, a ridiculous supposition in ordinary cases but in this case apparently in-



spired by a knowledge of Lincoln's idiosyncrasies : so Jackson at the end of February was left with hardly 5000 men, say two infantry brigades and two cavalry regiments. But though during the Valley operations his command alternately dwindled to 5000 and increased to 17,000 effectives, according to a variety of circumstances, Jackson retained a valuable staff—large even when the paucity of trained officers in the army is considered—namely, an Adjutant General and his Assistant ; a Chief Quartermaster ; an Inspector General ; a Chief of Artillery and his assistant ; an Engineer and a Topographical Engineer ; an Ordnance Officer and a Chief Commissary ; a Medical Director and two Aides-de-Camp.

It is interesting to notice, as showing how hazardous it is for historians to assign reasons for military movements, that while the Confederate authorities were really anxious about their right flank and the defences of Richmond McClellan indulged the belief that the true cause of their evacuating the Manassas position on March 9 was Banks' demonstration about Winchester, which he had initiated ; and he said : " I made the movement unwillingly because I anticipated precisely that effect, and did not wish them to move from Manassas until I had fairly commenced the movement to the lower Chesapeake ; but the pressure

was so strong that I could not resist it." However this may be, the advance of the Federal right wing under Banks having been accomplished that general, protected on his left by his detachment in the Luray valley, his right being covered by the forces in West Virginia, might have fortified the ground he had gained and subsisting his corps locally pushed southwards to cover the Federal foraging expeditions and so have stripped the Valley of supplies at his discretion; for Jackson was powerless against him. Banks occupied Winchester on March 12 on which date Jackson's small force retired 18 miles as far as Strasburg, where it rested two days, and then marched on to Woodstock followed up by a Federal division under Shields which entered Strasburg on March 19, when Jackson again retreated as far as Mount Jackson; so yielding to Banks all the Valley for 40 miles south of Winchester.

Jackson had delayed his retreat from the lower Valley until Banks was about to turn his right flank through Berryville, and even then the cavalry under Ashby contrived to impose upon the Federal advanced guard to such an extent that Banks believed Jackson was in considerable strength; yet in fact on March 14 while Banks had at least 20,000 Jackson had only 5000 men, and there can be no doubt whatever that Jackson

would have been driven from the Valley in March but for events now occurring at Washington and at McClellan's headquarters which resulted in Banks being suddenly required to embrace in his department or area of command the entire line of the Potomac between the Valley and Alexandria. He was now to be made solely responsible for covering Washington, and instructions were drawn up and certain details given as to the distribution of troops by which it seems that Banks was to transfer his main body and headquarters to Manassas and leave only a detachment, including two regiments of cavalry, at Winchester. Thus relief came to the Confederates in the Valley just when their mission seemed at an end; but the relief came not from Richmond—it came in the shape of fresh orders to Banks from the War Committee that ruled in Washington.

It was now ordained that Banks' corps should quit the region it had just reduced into possession and abandon the advantages it had already secured. The existence of Jackson was ignored completely. Banks was to occupy the vacated works and winter quarters at Manassas, throw out detachments to his right front as far as Warrenton and scout the Rappahannock with cavalry; he was also to repair the railway from Alexandria to the Valley *viâ* Manassas and Front

Royal and protect the bridges by constructing block-houses ; moreover a brigade of infantry and two batteries were to be stationed where the line crosses the Shenandoah river and an advanced post was to be established at Chester Gap in Blue Ridge south-east of Strasburg. These measures it was hoped would protect Washington from any hostile movement down the Shenandoah Valley beyond a point south of Strasburg, to which reinforcements could be railed from Manassas. The main body of the Confederates it will be remembered were now behind the Rappahannock, and McClellan had on March 11 personally examined Johnston's abandoned position and formed the opinion that the Confederate force at Manassas had been "very large" : their winter quarters were "well built and comfortable" ; and it seems that the Confederates had left behind "a great deal of baggage, tents, stores, ammunition, caissons, waggons, etc." implying that the Orange and Alexandria railroad would prove unequal to the strain put upon it by an army in retreat.

Meanwhile Banks had been deprived of one of his divisions by a recent order to send it to Centreville near Washington, and therefore he controlled only the divisions of Williams and Shields—the latter was at Strasburg—when the order of March 16 was to be put in operation. No record

exists of General Banks' plan for guarding the railway as instructed ; but it is evident that if Shields had been moved east from Strasburg he could have dropped a brigade and two batteries at the Shenandoah railway bridge at Front Royal and with the remainder of his division retired direct on Manassas *viâ* Warrenton ; for there was no pretence at concentrating the corps before the movement eastward : one division had gone to Centreville ; Williams' division moved its 2nd brigade on March 21 from Winchester towards Manassas *viâ* Berryville and Aldie while its 1st and 3rd brigades a day later began the move *viâ* Castleman's Ferry ; and presumably Shields' division was intended to move by the same route after its return from Strasburg : and the motives of General Banks for withdrawing his troops piecemeal in so leisurely a fashion and ignoring the instructions to protect the railway near Front Royal are nowhere disclosed. Williams' 2nd and 3rd brigades reached Aldie and Snickersville respectively on March 23, but his 1st brigade had countermarched to Berryville by order from corps headquarters. Shields meanwhile had set out from Strasburg.

The details presented here are symptomatic of the complaint from which the unhappy Federals west of Blue Ridge always suffered and which

gave the Confederates under Jackson a permanent advantage in that region. There was no real leader and there was no real policy. The Valley and the Mountain Department constituted a dumping ground for the amateur soldiers whom politics had foisted upon the Lincoln Administration, and the troops here stationed were styled corps or armies more in accordance with the political status of their leaders than with reference to their numbers and organisation.

Robert Patterson, J. D. Cox, N. P. Banks, Louis Blenker, Robert H. Milroy, James Shields, Robert C. Schenck and B. F. Kelley were all men of this type—men whose ideas of war, of tactics, discipline and of organisation, were elementary. After Rosecrans had quitted this scene of operations there was hardly anyone to put Jackson on his mettle. The brilliant Lander was dead, and Frémont called “the Pathfinder of the Rocky Mountains” was in temporary eclipse: and so it happened that Mr Banks, ex-governor of Massachusetts and sometime Speaker to Congress who had assumed “volunteer” general’s rank in virtue of his State’s contribution of 150,000 recruits for the army, was given nominal command of a “corps” which on March 29 at Strasburg consisted of 5 brigades of infantry (15,000), 6 batteries and about 800 cavalry.

Meanwhile events were occurring which led to an encounter a few miles south of Winchester, events which are recorded by James Shields in reports to McClellan and the Secretary of War direct, as though no "corps" organisation had existed. He describes his forward march from Winchester to Strasburg on March 18-19 as a reconnaissance, and declares that he fell back on March 20 "giving the movement all the appearance of a retreat" in order to draw Jackson northwards away from some imaginary supports. There is no suggestion that the movement was made in pursuance of the President's general plan.

Shields reached Winchester on March 22 and his outposts were attacked about 5 P.M. by Jackson's advanced cavalry. Shields reinforced his outposts with a small force "to keep him deceived as to our strength," and during the night he sent a brigade three miles south on the Strasburg road and made such dispositions of the remainder of his division that Winchester was covered from attack in all directions. He says that at 8 A.M. on March 23 General Banks and himself both became convinced from personal reconnaissance that only the enemy's cavalry was in front of them, and that "Jackson could not be tempted to hazard himself so far away from his main support"; whereupon Banks himself proceeded to Washington

leaving his staff to aid Shields in case of necessity.

Shields subsequently reported that Jackson on arrival disposed his forces within half-a-mile of the Federal line in an order of battle which threatened the three main approaches to Winchester, that is to say from the Cedar Creek road on the west to the Front Royal road on the east, while covering his own line of retreat to Strasburg. Shields credited Jackson with a force of 11,000 men, reporting his own strength as 6000 infantry, 750 cavalry and 24 guns; but actually Jackson engaged 3000 infantry, 18 guns and 300 cavalry in the belief that Shields had 8000 infantry, 18 guns and 500 cavalry present. Each commander supposed on March 23 that he was attacking a superior force of the enemy, but though Shields received official congratulations on his "splendid achievement" Jackson barely escaped reprimand. Yet there was more justification for Jackson than for Shields in engaging a superior force of the enemy, since the mission of the former was to detain the Federals in the Valley, while that of Banks (*vide* Orders, March 16) was to get his command to Manassas speedily and intact.

In ordinary circumstances Jackson ran too great a risk in view of his instructions and considering his numerical weakness and the physical condition



of his troops. But the circumstances were by no means ordinary as it soon appeared ; for although Shields on March 27 writes that " our victory at Winchester has been more fatal to the rebels than at first supposed : it has struck the Shenandoah Valley with terror " the astounding fact remains that Jackson's defeat at Kernstown caused President Lincoln to be importuned by citizens demanding further protection for Washington and ample security against Jackson in future ; and the result was that for the third time General Banks receives counter-orders and the 5th corps is again assigned to the Valley.

The chance encounter known as the battle of Kernstown (Winchester) has been aptly described by a Confederate historian as " bread cast upon strategic waters " ; for the combat which Jackson initiated on Sunday, March 23 and which ended in a tactical defeat actually blossomed into a strategic victory : but it was President Lincoln and his entourage who repaired the error of Jackson and robbed Shields of the fruits of his victory. Lincoln not Jackson detained the Federals in the Valley.

Jackson had been specially warned against keeping too close to the enemy : he was to " keep near " but " not so near as to be compelled to fight." He had, however, set these instructions at naught and imperilled his command by attacking with

a skeleton division (his three brigades mustered only 3000 bayonets) which had marched fourteen miles on Sunday, before going into action, and had on Saturday marched twenty-two miles down the Valley. It appears that when his cavalry commander Turner Ashby warned him on Friday evening (March 21) of Shields' departure from Strasburg Jackson was "apprehensive that the Federals would leave this military district," and so determined to follow them. At dawn on Saturday Ashby in the van was supported by Fulkerson's brigade (2 regiments and 1 battery) which started from Woodstock, ten miles south of Strasburg. Garnett's brigade was ten miles and Burk's brigade fifteen miles in rear of the leading brigade. All marched continuously and all were concentrated within a couple of miles of Kernstown by 2 P.M. on Sunday, March 23, where they went into bivouac with a view to an action on Monday. Why did Jackson then attack within two hours? "Ascertaining," he says, "that the Federals had a position from which our forces could be seen I concluded it would be dangerous to wait as reinforcements might be brought up during the night." He was quite mistaken, as it happens, for Shields had decided that "Jackson was nowhere in the vicinity" and did not even apply for reinforcements until after the battle.

It therefore appears that a day's delay on the part of Jackson would have put another day's march between Shields and his supports, whereas Jackson's premature attack brought about what as a tactician he least desired, namely, the immediate recall of Williams' division to the Valley ; and though Jackson ends his Report to the effect that " the more important object for the present, that of calling back troops that were leaving the Valley and thus preventing a junction of Banks' command with other forces, was accomplished " it is allowable to point out that this result would have been more completely effected by the defeat of Shields which his rashness prevented.

One point remains unsettled. Did Jackson credit the report " from a source which had been remarkable for its reliability " that the Federal infantry at Winchester did not exceed four regiments ? If he believed that he had only four regiments in front of him on March 23 he was correct in attacking them before they could be reinforced : but in that case he cannot as a general avoid blame for having acted on wrong information. To succeed by destroying a small force of the enemy in inducing him to detach a large force would be in the circumstances a brilliant achievement ; but to suffer your own force to be destroyed and thereby enable the enemy to avoid detaching

any troops at all would be in the circumstances disastrous ; and it must be admitted that Jackson came perilously near exemplifying the latter case at Kernstown.

He was in truth saved only by the action he took in consequence of a second error in his deductions as to the enemy. He attacked at 4 P.M., he says, because he feared the enemy might be reinforced before morning : his fears were groundless as events proved ; but nevertheless in attacking so late in the day he gained one advantage, namely, his defeat was minimised by his being able to withdraw his troops in a few hours under cover of darkness.

The behaviour of General Banks seems incapable of explanation. He was lingering in the Valley a week after receipt of orders to march to Manassas. He neglected the only defensive measure prescribed in those orders. And when on March 23 the enemy appeared he departed for Washington leaving to James Shields all responsibility for action. If Banks believed that Jackson was likely to be reinforced by 15,000 men it was hardly an act of wisdom to expose Shields' division to be attacked ; and if on the other hand " Jackson was nowhere in the vicinity " at 9 A.M. why was the inglorious rôle of passive defence adopted in presence of Ashby's cavalry ? This is

a matter which neither Banks nor Shields has thought fit to explain.

Shields apparently never found out that Jackson himself was not present on the morning of March 23, for he attributes to Jackson's skill in concealing his force his own ignorance of the situation at 8 A.M. "The main body of the enemy was posted in order of battle about half a mile beyond Kernstown. . . . This ground had been so skillfully selected that while it afforded facilities for manœuvring it was completely masked by high and wooded ground in front. These woods he filled with skirmishers supported by a battery on each flank," etc. His report was erroneous: the skirmishers and guns were those of Ashby's cavalry; and eight hours were to elapse before "the initiative was taken by the enemy." The delay of course was in consequence of the absence of Jackson with the main body.

The Confederate general's plan was a simple one: his cavalry retained its position on the Valley turnpike to demonstrate against the front and left of the enemy, supported by the reserve brigade, while the remainder of his little force was moved on the Cedar Creek road to attack the Federal right. His attack failed; but Shields having made no arrangement to take the offensive Jackson was able after a three hours' contest to

retreat six miles up the Valley covered by his cavalry; but he was compelled to leave in the enemy's hands 263 men, who were sent to Baltimore and so fell among sympathetic Marylanders. The bodies of eighty Confederates were interred by the people of Winchester. Jackson's total loss was 718 of whom 375 were wounded.

In the operations above described however nothing appears to warrant the extraordinary commotion among the Federals which began at Winchester on March 23, when Shields called on Williams for assistance and swept the communications of their garrisons; which spread to Harper's Ferry where Banks on his way to Washington turned back to take command of the remains of the 5th corps; and which finally caused the War Department at Washington to modify its plans for the operations against Richmond.

Cancelling all previous orders to Banks the government proposed that a large division (10,000) under Blenker intended for the reinforcement of Frémont in West Virginia should be temporarily attached to Banks for the further protection of the Valley, and that McDowell's corps should be permanently stationed at Fredericksburg for the supposed protection of Washington.

Jackson's retreat up the Valley had been covered by his mounted troops and horse artillery under

Ashby, a fine cavalry leader, who for two days took up a succession of rearguard positions which always brought the Federal advanced guard to a halt until artillery were available to reply to Ashby's guns, when the leisurely retreat was resumed. The Federals halting at Strasburg gave time to Jackson to disappear entirely with his main body; but when on April 1 the Federals resumed their march up the Valley they found Ashby at Edenburg where, after burning the bridge, he had taken up a position to command the crossing of an affluent of the Shenandoah river.

On this date fresh orders from McClellan assigned Banks with 35,000 men to the Valley. The Yorktown campaign was about to commence and McClellan supposed he would satisfy Lincoln by placing Banks west of Blue Ridge, Abercrombie with 20,000 men at Warrenton and Manassas, while 1300 men guarded the Lower Potomac and 18,000 remained to garrison Washington. The Manassas railroad would enable Banks and Abercrombie to render each other any necessary assistance, and so directly and indirectly the capital would be covered by about 75,000 men.

At Edenburg Banks allowed himself to be delayed for a week, affording the Federal artillery an opportunity to discover that the gunnery of

the Confederates was better than their ammunition, for few of their percussion shells burst. Banks then again advanced as far as the railway terminus at Mount Jackson, and here the Vermont cavalry surprised Jackson's rearguard which was employed in burning the bridge over another branch of the Shenandoah. Their cavalry having secured the bridge, the Federal advanced guard crossed and moved on to Newmarket, where a final skirmish and more artillery practice took place.

At this point of the Winchester-Staunton turnpike a well-constructed road from Newmarket runs due east, crossing the Massanutton Range by easy gradients, to the Shenandoah river, over which the road is carried by White House Bridge to Luray and through Fisher's Gap to Manassas, while a branch road returns northwards to Front Royal. By either route, Strasburg to Newmarket or Front Royal to Luray, the Massanutton Range as a parallel obstacle served the purpose which the Monte Junto ridge north of Torres Vedras served in Portugal: the Massanutton Range divided longitudinally the space between the turnpike road and the Shenandoah river.

General Banks made no attempt to advance beyond Woodstock until April 17 and when at last his force was put in motion Jackson again retired south. He marched 25 miles to Harrisonburg



and then turning left-handed (eastward) towards Blue Ridge he took the Gordonsville road, crossed the south fork of the Shenandoah river at Conrad's Store and went into camp at Elk Run Valley (Swift Run Gap), thence communicating with another Confederate force under Ewell who was holding the line of the Rapidan about Gordonsville covered by Stuart's cavalry. Banks accordingly reported to Washington on April 19 that Jackson had quitted the Valley.

Once more we may ask ourselves whether President Lincoln was quite sincere in his declaration that a large force was necessary for the protection of the upper Potomac and the B. and O. railroad against Jackson, who in April had been driven 70 miles south of Winchester; that while McClellan was threatening Richmond the danger really existed of a Confederate force being detached from the main army to "sack Washington": or whether political reasons alone "constrained" him to reduce McClellan's forces by 73,500 men and 109 field guns (in addition to McDowell's corps) for the occupation of Warrenton, Manassas, the Shenandoah Valley, the lower Potomac and the forts round Washington. With a smaller force Grant had just gained a great victory at Shiloh.

It was claimed by the Confederates that these

prodigious detachments were in fact being "contained" by Jackson's defeated brigade, a detachment under Ewell, Stuart's cavalry and another detachment under Anderson about Fredericksburg—each of them a skeleton division incapable of resistance if attacked in force. To cap the absurdity a "Mountain Department" force under Frémont was being freshly organised in the Alleghanies to oppose Edward Johnson with about 4000 Confederates.

General Lee's estimate of the comparative fighting value of the opposing forces may be gathered from the fact that on April 29 he considered Banks' force alone too strong to be attacked otherwise than by a junction of the three detachments under Jackson, Ewell and Johnson, a disposition which would leave nothing whatever in front of Frémont in West Virginia and only Anderson's detachment in front of McDowell's force and the Washington garrison (70,000): so the "sacking" of Washington was not a very probable contingency in the circumstances, and the phantom which President Lincoln had conjured up really served the Confederates well at a critical period.

We find Jackson writing to Lee on April 23 to say that Banks is still in the vicinity of Newmarket, his force strung out along the roads for

some miles, and that he hopes to attack him in flank and rear in the event of his moving south on Staunton: a week later Jackson proposes either to leave to Ewell, who had joined him on April 29, the task of attacking Banks in flank while he (Jackson) joins Edward Johnson 40 miles away at Buffalo Gap west of Staunton; or unite with Ewell in an attack on Banks; or move on Winchester by a detour east of Blue Ridge *via* Sperryville and Front Royal and so prevent Banks returning north. Lee offers him the choice of either plan of operation, placing Ewell and Johnson at his disposal in any event; and so Jackson's command is at last increased to 17,000 men and he is free to manoeuvre against Banks (19,000) or Frémont (15,000).

Banks was near at hand but concentrated, Frémont was sixty miles distant but dispersed at this date. But the problem before Jackson was again solved for him by President Lincoln who, having stripped McClellan of McDowell's corps and Blenker's division for the alleged protection of the capital, now instructs Banks to reinforce McDowell to the extent of one—his strongest—division; and moreover Banks himself with Williams' division is to abandon his position at Newmarket, return to the lower Valley and fortify a position near Strasburg; thus reverting to the

plans of March 16 with the difference that Banks himself is to command the detachment instead of the main body.

McDowell is now at Fredericksburg and, in consequence it is supposed of information reaching Washington that Jackson had proceeded to Richmond, Banks is ordered to detach Shields; but why Banks should be left with 5000 men to guard the Valley at a time when according to Washington advices it was no longer threatened is by no means apparent.

It afterwards transpired of course that on May 8 Jackson was engaged with Frémont's brigades (under Milroy and Shenck) near McDowell village between Staunton and Monterey; but the theory at Washington was that Jackson was at Richmond, that the Valley was secure, and that Frémont had only to look after Edward Johnson: it was in this belief that Shields' division on May 6 was ordered to send back its sick to the Federal dépôt at Winchester, store its tents and surplus baggage, and get ready to march to Fredericksburg.

On May 12 accordingly Shields moved over the Massanutton gap, crossed the river Shenandoah, moved northwards to Front Royal down the Luray Valley and over Blue Ridge at Chester Gap, and so within a week reached Warrenton: halting one day his division then marched to Catlett's Station

on the Orange railroad which was garrisoned by a Federal brigade under Duryea, and here Shields halted two days to experiment with some new shells. But at last, after marching eleven days, the division reaches Fredericksburg, where McDowell had been impatiently awaiting the arrival of this reinforcement before moving south to co-operate with McClellan. Yet even now fresh delay occurred owing to some flats which were bringing artillery ammunition from Washington getting aground in the Potomac, and also to a visit from President Lincoln who desired to review the troops.

General Banks meanwhile had reported the enemy at Swift Run Gap on May 6, but in obedience to orders he moved from Newmarket to Strasburg on May 9; and a week later he is busy entrenching at railhead where he is in communication with Geary's detachment then covering the Manassas Gap railway. Geary's headquarters were at Rectortown and the Federals thus held a line running north-west from Fredericksburg to Strasburg, having McDowell on the left, Geary in the centre and Banks on the right. The Confederate cavalry was watching the line of the Rappahannock and Johnston's army was retreating from Williamsburg to Richmond followed by the Army of the Potomac under McClellan.

Jackson's information early in May led him to

believe that Banks had pushed his force as far south as Harrisonburg, and that another force—Frémont's detachment under Milroy—was moving from Monterey on Staunton *via* Buffalo Gap, where Edward Johnson was posted; and he now feared a junction of Banks and Milroy about Staunton and subsequent operations by the combined forces against Edward Johnson. Jackson accordingly determined to go to Johnson's assistance with his own division and immediately operate against Milroy, while Ewell remained in Elk Run Valley to hold Banks in check.

Jackson's information was so far erroneous that there was no danger from Banks who was then at Newmarket; from which place President Lincoln was about to withdraw him—as we have seen—at the moment when he was preparing to advance on Harrisonburg in pursuance of the strategic purposes of the Federals; for Jackson's retreat had, of course, given them the control of the Valley with results which are described in a complaint on the part of the inhabitants to the Richmond authorities on April 29. Crops had been planted in the belief that Jackson would cover the Valley and these crops would mature at the end of June—the four counties of Jefferson, Berkeley, Clarke and Loudoun would alone produce a million bushels of wheat. The Federals

were removing into Maryland all the supplies which the farmers had garnered last season for the use of the Confederate armies. The loyalists of West Virginia had been induced to drive their cattle into the Valley for safety. The stoppage of all the distilleries had of course increased the store of corn, while the want of transport compelled the farmers to hoard it. In short, the Valley was at this time an immense granary and Secretary Randolph's correspondent pointed out that a definite policy should now be pursued: either the Valley should be abandoned, in which case the farmers would cease to grow crops "as they are determined not to contribute to the support of the enemy," or the Federals should be driven from the Valley and the supplies thus be secured for the use of the Confederate army.

This common-sense view of the situation does not appear to have appealed to the Richmond authorities, who would neither waste the Valley nor reinforce Jackson; and so the retention of the Valley by the Confederates depended less on Jackson's operations than upon the vagaries of the Lincoln cabinet which had already caused the withdrawal of Shields' division (10,000 men) from the Valley to Warrenton, and since Banks could not remain south after Shields' departure it fell out that when Frémont on May 13 had

reached Franklin, and was ready to unite with Banks at Harrisonburg, Banks was on his way to Strasburg, a combination of circumstances which enabled Jackson to administer another shock to the Union government.

He joined Edward Johnson who had six regiments and marched against Milroy on May 7 with his own brigades commanded by Taliaferro, Campbell and Winder. Milroy retired and Jackson followed, placing Johnson who knew the country in the van. The first day's march ended at the foot of the range (called the Shenandoah Mountains) which forms the western wall of the Upper Valley about Staunton. On May 8 the advance is resumed and the range crossed, so that the village of McDowell in the Pasture River Vale was fully exposed to view. The enemy was located here and Jackson sent out a reconnaissance under Edward Johnson.

In the meantime Milroy had been joined by Frémont's advanced guard under Schenck and together they resolved to attack. Jackson was therefore called upon to defend his position on Setlington's Hill about 4.30 P.M. but at nightfall the Federals retired. Jackson did not bring up his artillery "there being no road to the rear by which our guns could be withdrawn in case of disaster, and the prospect of using them success-



fully did not compensate for the risk." He had of course anticipated the possibility of Banks' intervention and so had obstructed the roads in the direction of Harrisonburg. He had proposed to attack Milroy and Schenck the next day, but on this occasion the enemy took the initiative; and in the combat at Setlington's (McDowell) the defenders suffered greater loss than the attackers, for the casualties were 256 Federals (26 killed) and 498 Confederates (75 killed). The fight lasted four hours. Jackson engaged thirteen regiments (6000) to repulse Milroy and Schenck with portions of six regiments (2500) and to the Confederates the affair proved a sort of Majuba in a tactical sense.

In following up the enemy next day Jackson encountered banks of thick smoke, obstacles which the Federals had improvised by burning the forest as they retired, and the pursuit was further checked by ambuscades. Upon the whole the Federals seem to have had rather the best of the encounter. Jackson was back again at McDowell on May 14, his force somewhat the worse for wear, and Frémont's command was now concentrated at Franklin; where no doubt Jackson supposed it would remain to operate against Loring, who now was responsible for the protection of the region west of Lynchburg but was routed by J. D. Cox at Lewisburg a week later.

Jackson after a few days' rest returned to Harrisonburg, screening his movement from Frémont with Ashby's cavalry, and thence moved down the Valley to Newmarket where a junction with Ewell was effected. He now learnt that Banks was at Strasburg, and finding himself for the first time in command of a considerable force—that is, Ashby's cavalry and Flournoy's cavalry, his own three brigades, Edward Johnson's brigade, Ewell's three brigades and a force of Marylanders (1 regiment, 1 battery) under G. H. Stuart—he conceived that the moment was propitious for a strategical and tactical *coup*.

On May 22 the Confederates moved down the Luray Valley along the eastern flank of the Massanutton Range and bivouacked within ten miles of Front Royal: next day they attacked the post at Front Royal driving out the Federal garrison who retreated on Winchester. Jackson then disposed his forces to prevent the escape of Banks whom he intended to attack at Strasburg. But on May 24 he is informed of Banks' preparations to quit Strasburg and accordingly marches his main body toward Middletown with a view to severing Banks' communications northward; but it will be remembered that Banks was now in communication with Geary and McDowell *via* Chester Gap, and of course he could also by a

movement westward unite with Frémont in case of emergency.

General Jackson was too late. Banks had already marched to Winchester, and that portion of the Federal column which Jackson cut off at Middletown countermarched to Strasburg and made its escape *viâ* Chester Gap to Manassas; moreover Jackson's further advance towards Winchester was checked by artillery, which shows that a strong rearguard had been formed: "we were retarded," he says, "until near dark when the Federals retreated and the pursuit was renewed."

Jackson complains that his mounted troops abandoned the pursuit in order to pillage, and it will be remembered that the escape of Joseph's army after Vittoria was attributed by Wellington to a similar cause. Jackson continued his exertions during the night of May 24, but the Federals were equally active in delaying his march by means of ambuscades; and at dawn Banks was found occupying the heights overlooking Winchester from the north, a position which Jackson had hoped to secure for his own force. His flanking detachment under Ewell had meanwhile reached a point some three miles from Winchester.

The fighting at Front Royal and Jackson's delay in crossing the Shenandoah had enabled

Banks on the main road to gain a start which was fatal to Jackson's plans for cutting off the Federals from Winchester.

On May 25 Jackson's main attack on the Federals in front was successful, Ewell co-operating on his right and the reserve under Elzey being brought forward to take up the tactical pursuit. Winchester town was occupied and the enemy was followed, the Confederate artillery leading in order by its fire to prevent him reforming and the infantry supporting the artillery. But where was the cavalry? With regard to this arm General Jackson must have been inclined, after the experiences of the last few days, to use strong language: yet his report is free from bitterness: "never have I seen an opportunity when it was in the power of cavalry to reap a richer harvest of the fruits of victory . . . had the cavalry played its part in this pursuit as well as the four companies had done under Colonel Flournoy two days before in the pursuit from Front Royal, but a small portion of Banks' army would have made its escape to the Potomac." One is reminded of Ziethen's troopers after the battle of Prague who covered their great commander with shame. "Your Majesty, I cannot rank a hundred of them sober," he replied to Frederick's demand that the cavalry should pursue.

Three days later a Confederate brigade reconnoitring encountered the enemy at Charlestown and drove him thence to Bolivar Heights; and on May 29 Jackson moved his main body through Charlestown to Halltown and sent a regiment forward to Loudoun Heights.

In regard to the operations of May 23-25 General Banks has perhaps been awarded less than his meed of praise.

His "corps" had been whittled away by the Washington authorities until on May 21 at Strasburg he finds himself alone with 4500 infantry (2 brigades), 1600 cavalry, 10 Parrott guns and 6 smoothbores; and "the larger part of this force is at work in fortifications and constructing lines of defence." He is however in telegraphic communication with Frémont who warned him that Jackson was still active in the Valley. He believed Jackson to be at Harrisonburg and Ewell at Swift Run Gap and that their forces comprised about 16,000 men; for his cavalry had encountered some of Ashby's scouts ten miles up the Valley at Woodstock. Geary had been guarding the railroad between Strasburg and Front Royal, but on May 17 the President had ordered Banks to relieve Geary by detaching two regiments to the latter point. It will be seen therefore that Jackson had been given by President Lincoln every

opportunity to destroy Banks; who on May 22 had apologetically asked Washington for reinforcements to withstand Jackson, saying "from all the information I can gather—and I do not wish to excite alarm unnecessarily—I am compelled to believe that he meditates attack here."

The situation was in fact more serious than he believed it to be; and next day he telegraphs to Washington, to Frémont and to McDowell news of the attack at Front Royal and the retreat of its garrison *via* Middletown. At midnight a fugitive officer reports from Winchester "regiment cut all to pieces and prisoners," and Banks instantly makes up his mind to "anticipate the enemy in the occupation of Winchester." The evacuation of Strasburg was at once commenced and his advanced guard enters Winchester at 5 P.M. on May 24. The retreat was not unmolested, for "a strong attack was made upon our trains at Middletown by rebel cavalry, artillery and infantry, but it was repulsed by our troops and the few waggons abandoned by teamsters nearly all recovered." If this be true General Jackson had very little cause for exultation; but the statement is flatly contradicted by Jackson's reports; and of course in considering this species of evidence the legal maxim holds good that "confessions if voluntary

are deemed to be relevant facts as against the persons who make them only."

The telegraph was operated very vigorously on May 24 in Washington; all manner of aids and reinforcements were promised Banks, who was exhorted not to "give up the ship before succour can arrive"; and much reliance seems to have been placed on Frémont, who on this day is at Franklin making preparations to move eastwards on Harrisonburg.

On May 25 Banks had reached Martinsburg, twenty-two miles from the battlefield at Winchester where 4000 Federals had withstood for some hours the attacks of Jackson's corps; and at 5.30 P.M. he reports "we all pass the Potomac to-night safe—men, trains and all, I think—making a march of 35 miles"; and next day Banks is able to announce from Williamsport that out of a train of 500 waggons on a forced march of 53 miles (35 miles in one day) under constant attack he had lost not more than 50 waggons, including those abandoned by panic-stricken teamsters and others lost in crossing a river 300 yards wide with a defective ford and ferry. This was perhaps a roseate view to take of a deficiency of 103 waggons and 486 horses afterwards reported by the quartermaster's department; but still the wonder is that the loss was so small in the circumstances; and the most ardent admirers



of Confederate generalship must admit that the honours of war on this occasion remained with General N. P. Banks, whose retreat was conducted in such good order that he even established signal stations along the route from Strasburg to Winchester so as to keep communication from the rear to the front, and the signallers only quitted their stations as the rearguard (Hatch's cavalry) passed.

It is time perhaps to introduce a new actor on the Valley stage in the person of General J. C. Frémont, who wrote in 1865 an elaborate memoir of his operations in the "Mountain Department" during the second quarter of the year 1862; but as most Federal generals have followed his example we are compelled in a survey of the War of Secession to reduce the substance of such documents to the dimensions of a few paragraphs.

Frémont had been superseded by Halleck in the West and came to relieve Rosecrans, who was ordered to Missouri, a few days after the Kernstown battle. He assumed the control of the forces under Schenck, Milroy, Kelley, J. D. Cox, Garfield and Carter, which were estimated at 34,000 men though probably Frémont never actually disposed of more than fifty per cent. of that number. He was made officially responsible for a frontier of 350 miles, as well as for communications embracing



some 300 miles of railroad and 200 miles of waterway. His area of command was infested by "guerilla bands," as the Federals persisted in calling the corps of Partisan Rangers commissioned by the Governor of Virginia. The unparalleled severity of the weather which afflicted even the forces on the peninsula was acutely felt in the mountains, and marching had reduced the division of Blenker, whose loss McClellan was continually mourning, to a collection of 7000 shoeless, exhausted and badly-armed foreigners, according to Frémont, who received this reinforcement at Petersburg 60 miles west of Front Royal on the day after Milroy and Schenck had been driven from McDowell. Frémont's main depôt for supply was at New Creek on the B. and O. railroad 100 miles west of Harper's Ferry, the point which Jackson had proposed to seize in January.

Frémont had on March 29 reached his new theatre of operations; and his plans included a junction with Banks, the capture of Monterey and Staunton, an advance southwards to unite with his detachment under Cox in the Kanawha valley; thence to move towards the railway east of Knoxville and finally to operate in the direction of Richmond with a force of 20,000 men, after making the necessary detachments to guard the communications with the Ohio valley *viâ* Gauley. It must

be admitted that many of the Federal commanders were not lacking in imagination.

Frémont in April supposed he would be operating on parallel lines with Banks ; that each would protect the other's inner flank, their outer flanks being covered by mountain ranges ; and so in May Frémont's advanced guard at McDowell, a village in the hills west of Staunton, held the belief that it was covered by Banks near Staunton. But Banks on May 9 is at Newmarket 50 miles distant from McDowell, and moreover under orders from Washington to retire to Strasburg when Shields' division (10,000) marched to join McDowell ; and that is how Jackson had been able to frustrate the intentions of Frémont with regard to Edward Johnson. The President had kept Banks and Frémont apart and Jackson was to profit by the system of waging war by telegraph. Frémont has hardly reached Franklin when President Lincoln inquires (May 16) whether he, Frémont, cannot move to the Virginia and Tennessee railroad, west of Lynchburg between Newberne and Salem, and thence advance on Richmond, a distance of some 300 miles. But a week later the President is urging Frémont to march on Harrisonburg and intercept Jackson who was then at Winchester.

Frémont fills pages of his " *Memoir* " with complaints of his lack of supplies and transport when

ordered to move against Jackson. He also made much of the difficulty of removing the obstructions placed on the roads towards Harrisonburg by the enemy. He also feared lest Jackson striking west from Strasburg should seize his communications with New Creek. He need not have worried about the proposed march south, for the very next day (May 25) fresh instructions reach him to "fall upon the enemy wherever he could find him with all speed." How Frémont found Jackson a fortnight later we must now ascertain.

At the end of May it was Jackson's turn to retreat, pursued by various forces which his recent operations had drawn from all quarters.

McDowell on May 25, two days after being joined by Shields' division so that he might move with 40,000 men to co-operate with McClellan at the decisive point, was ordered by the Washington committee to march to the aid of Banks' five thousand. McDowell protested in vain and McClellan, who came to hear of the plan, pointed out to Lincoln the obvious truth that the effect of this movement would be to play into the hands of the Confederates: and in fact Joseph Johnston seized this opportunity to attack McClellan at Fair Oaks. The fatal telegraph however controlled all the forces from Washington, where senseless panic again reigned, and from this

moment the peninsular campaign was ruined for the Federals. McDowell in obedience to orders moved on May 25 to Manassas Junction—the policy of quieting Washington again dominating strategy, which would have prescribed a march on Harrisonburg to intercept Jackson—a two days' march; thence to Thoroughfare Gap the scene of Geary's disgraceful stampede; and his advanced guard (Shields' division) reached Front Royal on May 30, overcoming the garrison which Jackson had left there.

On this date Jackson was collecting his detachments at Winchester and his capture seemed certain; for he was loaded with booty, which included cattle, medical and hospital stores, subsistence, quartermasters' stores and 9354 small arms, in addition to 2000 prisoners. But McDowell's main body unused to marching on bad roads did not reach Front Royal until next day; and then Shields was ordered to push southwards up the Luray Valley and intercept Jackson at Newmarket, instead of proceeding west to Strasburg: while Frémont who on this date was at Cedar Creek was apparently expected to encounter the enemy alone: certainly no provision was made for co-operation between McDowell and Frémont either at Strasburg or elsewhere.

In the result Frémont's advanced guard hustled

Jackson's column considerably; and indeed Jackson only escaped a pitched battle by sacrificing much of the spoils he had gathered in the course of his expedition: he had camped near Strasburg on the night of May 31, but Winder's brigade in spite of a forced march of 36 miles could not rejoin till the evening of June 1.

Frémont had reached Petersburg on May 26 and Fabius on May 28, where he rested two days and received fresh orders from Washington. On May 31 he reached Cedar Creek where the road forks, one branch leading to Strasburg and the other north-east to Winchester. Frémont sent out a reconnaissance on both roads but learnt nothing save that two of his scouts had been captured at Strasburg; and next day he came in contact with Ewell on the Strasburg road. Some skirmishing took place and he camped at noon "hearing nothing of a supporting force coming from Front Royal"; but he sent forward cavalry and a brigade to Strasburg which at night missed the way to the town and so fell in with Jackson's cavalry acting as rearguard. Some fighting took place in the dark but Frémont's mounted troops behaved badly: "disobeying the order to charge after a scattering fire our cavalry broke in a shameful panic to the rear, passing over and carrying with them the artillery."

On June 2 Frémont's advanced guard followed Ashby's cavalry which covered Jackson's retreat. McDowell's cavalry (800) under Bayard now made its appearance and, aided to this extent only by all the forces which Lincoln had set in motion a week ago, Frémont marched south along the turnpike road in pursuit of Jackson, whose rearguard soon discovered that "the enemy had become very bold and annoying." Frémont occupied Woodstock at 5 P.M. with a brigade, and he reported the collection of 500 prisoners and stacks of arms abandoned by Jackson's troops; moreover, "of gray-coated stragglers at least a thousand were in the woods along the road and country adjoining."

Next day (June 3) the march is resumed with more skirmishing and a struggle for the bridges over creeks at Edenburg and at Mount Jackson which Jackson's rearguard endeavoured to destroy. The bridge over the Shenandoah south of Mount Jackson was in flames before Frémont reached the village, but he had carried a pontoon train with him and set about constructing a floating bridge: part of his command had crossed when the bridge was swept away by the drift brought down by a flood which caused the stream to rise twelve feet in four hours: until the flood subsided the remainder of the troops could not cross the stream; and Frémont was obliged to leave his

pontoons here under pain of losing his communication with Strasburg.

On June 5 Frémont received replies to his various despatches seeking co-operation to the effect that neither McDowell nor Banks could or would assist him. McDowell even demanded the return of Bayard's cavalry, which so far had marched with Frémont, and suggested that Bayard should report to Shields at Luray. Banks had been reinforced by 10,000 men under Sigel, a volunteer colonel from Missouri, and reoccupied Winchester on this date; but the sanguine expectations of President Lincoln as to the ability of Banks to utilise this large force were not realised. The President's demand on June 1 that Banks shall "assume actively the offensive against the retreating enemy without the loss of an hour" is met, twelve days later, by a report from Banks that he is "greatly distressed at the unaccountable delay in getting clothing and equipments and at the state of the river which has made crossing impossible." McDowell himself instead of heading the pursuit of Jackson paid a visit to Washington, leaving his chief of staff at Front Royal until he, too, grew tired and announced his intention of returning to Manassas.

Shields meanwhile had set out for Newmarket through the Luray Valley, but on reaching the



Shenandoah beyond Luray found his march impeded by a swollen river and no means of crossing, for he had no pontoons and Jackson had burnt the bridge. But it does not appear that he made any effort to communicate with Frémont who was marching with a pontoon train on a parallel road to Newmarket, where the two commands might have been united. The combined forces of Frémont and Shields were ample to drive Jackson back to the point where Banks had left him a month before; or a concentric advance might have been planned with the object of closing the passes in Blue Ridge and cutting Jackson off from Richmond; for Shields was free to operate by the right bank of the Shenandoah river while Frémont took the Valley road, and a junction by means of the bridge at Port Republic would have placed Jackson in difficulties and secured for the Federals the whole of the region between Blue Ridge and the Ohio. The stake was worth playing for; and if ever the War Committee at Washington was to justify its existence here was an opportunity; since Gordonsville is only 60 miles by rail from Manassas Junction.

To return to Frémont. Jackson had gained a start of 30 hours by destroying the bridge, but Frémont reached Newmarket on June 5 and next day caught up the enemy's rearguard at Harrison-



burg. Frémont camped here but pushed out cavalry to find his enemy and a skirmish resulted in the capture by the Confederates of Sir Percy Wyndham and many others: *en revanche* Jackson lost his cavalry leader, Turner Ashby, the incomparable partisan officer who was killed in this affair. Frémont on June 7 reconnoitred again and locating Jackson astride the Harrisonburg-Port Republic road prepared to attack him next day and so moved out on the road through the woods to Cross Keys by Union Church. Frémont's command now consisted of six brigades, under Cluseret, Stahel, Bohlen, Milroy, Schenck, Steinwehr, ten batteries and a regiment of cavalry. Bayard's cavalry which he had retained furnished an escort to the baggage at Harrisonburg and picketed the line of retreat when on June 8 Cluseret's brigade drove in Jackson's outposts near Union Church about 9 A.M. Frémont disposed his troops (10,500) for attack in four bodies: Milroy (right wing), Cluseret (centre), Stahel (left wing); Bohlen, Steinwehr and Schenck in reserve. His flanks and rear were guarded by cavalry.

Frémont carried on a very spirited contest all day against what he judged to be a superior force; he attacked but he could not drive the enemy, but neither could the enemy drive him. Ewell who

commanded the Confederates had the great advantage of knowing the country and of fighting on the defensive ; but he alleges that his force, though afterwards increased to 8000 men, did not exceed 5000 in the morning. Frémont had neither maps nor guides and feared the enemy would escape if he spent time in reconnaissance. His main efforts were directed against the enemy's left which he judged to be his most sensitive flank, but Ewell refused this flank and in turn developed a movement against Frémont's left. Frémont manœuvred to check this attempt to outflank him, and when the Federals had lost 650 and the Confederates 300 men the arrival of a despatch from James Shields, the first intimation he had received of any attempt being made to co-operate with him, determined Frémont to break off the combat and commence a fresh battle next day.

Shields was still at Luray and had sent his note by one of Frémont's scouts who had discovered him that morning at 9.30 A.M. He wrote: "I hope to have two brigades at Port Republic to-day. I follow myself with two other brigades from this place," and it was natural to assume that he would move south from Luray along the foot of Blue Ridge, seize the bridges over the Shenandoah behind Jackson and thus prevent his escape to Gordonsville, while securing a junction

of the Federal forces. Shields had even, he said, advanced a force as far south as Waynesboro to burn the bridge which carried the road from Staunton to Charlottesville. The arrangements so far though belated were satisfactory. But the distance from Luray to the bridge at Port Republic is over 30 miles, and therefore Shields' arrival could hardly be counted on for two days.

Here was a dilemma for Frémont. Co-operation was quite impossible until June 10. If he resumed his attack next morning he must do so single-handed, unless Shields' advanced guard was sufficiently enterprising to cross the river and come to his assistance. But it was unlikely that the officer commanding an advanced guard would assume this responsibility, even if he happened to be fully acquainted with the plans of both generals. On the other hand Frémont by retiring would set Jackson free to operate against Shields' advanced guard. Evidently he must renew the attack and if harm resulted the blame would rest with Shields who had allowed six days to elapse without communicating his whereabouts and intentions; and had then thought fit to detach various parts of his force and depend on Frémont to aid these detachments in case of need. His words are: "If the enemy changes direction you will please keep me advised; if he attempts to force a passage, as my

force is not large there yet, I hope you will thunder down on his rear." He adds with singular fatuity "I think Jackson is caught this time," but while he is writing these words at Luray, which he did not quit for another twelve hours, one of his detachments is attempting single-handed to engage Jackson's corps at Port Republic.

Frémont at dawn found that Ewell had retired from his front. Astonished no doubt Frémont advanced towards the river until a black column of smoke apprised him that the bridge at Port Republic was on fire. Then the sound of battle reached him, and on coming to the river bank he witnessed the defeat of another of Shields' detachments. Frémont could offer no assistance, for the river was unfordable. A member of his staff crossed the river lower down "in rebel disguise" and succeeded in reaching Shields' staff, from whom was gathered the amazing intelligence that the main body of Shields' division was *en route* for Fredericksburg in obedience to an urgent order from Washington. But President Lincoln need hardly have troubled to step in once more to the assistance of the enemy, for Jackson by this time had done his work pretty thoroughly.

Frémont later on received two despatches which had been written by Shields on the evening of June 8 at Columbia Bridge, from which it ap-

peared that Jackson himself had been holding the bridge at Port Republic when Shields' detachment advanced against it, that Ewell had fought at Cross Keys with Frémont, and that the Confederates had carried on two battles simultaneously on June 8. Shields in his note dated 8.15 P.M. anticipated that Jackson, if not attacked in force during the night, would cross the bridge and burn it so that Frémont could render no assistance on the morrow (June 9). And that is just what occurred.

Knowing the imbroglio we may wonder that Jackson with the large force then at his disposal did not encourage Frémont to cross and then drive him into the river; for as matters stood he had not much injured Frémont and had even failed to capture Shields' detachment, and having put the Shenandoah river between his corps and the Valley turnpike his action left the unfortunate inhabitants entirely in the hands of Frémont.

Our interest to-day centres in the conduct of the operations by the Federals between May 25 and June 9, the sins of omission and the blunders committed by the President, by McDowell and by Shields. The behaviour of Shields had been quite inexcusable. He had reached Front Royal on May 30 and yet on June 9 was too far distant from Port Republic to render assistance to his

own detachment: the distance is only 60 miles and Jackson could march, as from Newmarket to Elk Run, 50 miles in three days while Frémont had accomplished 70 miles in five days. For a week Shields had failed to communicate with Frémont, who was operating in a strange country and badly needed the advice of one to whom the *terrain* was familiar. The more his own movements were likely to be impeded by bad roads the more necessary it became to keep touch with Frémont on his right. His message to Frémont dated 9.30 A.M. (June 8) disclosed no definite plan of action, invited no co-operation and in fact proved an embarrassment to its recipient; and finally he excused his inaction on June 9 by alleging that "orders from Washington" prevented tactical co-operation at a time when his own advanced guard was engaged.

Shields at first sight appears to be sagacious in sending on a strong detachment to seize the bridge at Port Republic, the only bridge by which he could unite with Frémont after moving south of Columbia. But what are we to think of his admission that he had ordered Brigadier Carroll to burn it? His advanced guard commander was prompt to seize the bridge, but could not hold it against Jackson's counter-attack, and Shields had not foreseen this contingency. His

instructions to Carroll to burn the bridge are only explicable (since he was thereby leaving Frémont exposed to Jackson) on the assumption that he proposed to move his main body *viâ* Newmarket to join Frémont; but there is no record of such an intention. Shields in a later message dated 8.15 P.M. (June 8) after Carroll's misadventure had become known to him suggests that Frémont might "come around by way of Newmarket and cross the ferry at Columbia Bridge."

It does not seem to have occurred to Shields that he might himself have used this route to join Frémont; nor does it appear to have struck him that his march from Luray commenced after 9.30 A.M. in the month of June need not have terminated at a point less than ten miles distant. Shields, however, seems to have been satisfied to halt at Columbia Bridge in the afternoon and point out to Frémont how Jackson—unless attacked by him (Frémont) during the night—could destroy Tyler's brigade on the morrow: he does not appear to have taken any steps to withdraw this detachment from the danger to which he had exposed it in placing it two days' march from the main body.

Carroll on reaching Port Republic on June 8 with two squadrons and two guns found the bridge guarded by Confederate cavalry, which he dispersed and followed into the village; but

Jackson brought up Winder's division and Carroll was glad to make his escape, with a loss of forty men and two guns, across the river: here the infantry had remained, which at 2 P.M. is joined by Tyler's brigade: Tyler then as Carroll's senior assumed command of both brigades.

Winder's division continued to hold the bridge at Port Republic securing the communication with Richmond by Brown's Gap and Charlottesville of the remainder of the Confederates now engaged with Frémont at Cross Keys. In this situation, what was Tyler to do? He could not communicate with Frémont. Ought he to have retired? He had no definite knowledge of Jackson's strength or intentions, but was naturally disposed to exaggerate the former. To destroy the bridge would spoil Jackson's plans which were evident from the force he had detached to guard it; but then he would frustrate the assumed object of Shields' march, which surely was to join Frémont. If Frémont won at Cross Keys the use of the bridge was required by the Federals, but if Jackson drove Frémont westward it might be important to place the river between Jackson and the Federal detachment. The only solution in such a case is "attack or retire," but Tyler did neither. In such a situation no doubt Jackson would have attacked, but it would have been no



discredit to Tyler to march back towards Shields and leave the decision to him. Tyler however took up a position near the bridge and awaited attack, which Jackson was prompt to deliver on the morrow; and though Tyler on June 9 disposed of his 3000 bayonets and 3 batteries with some skill his left flank was exposed, and Jackson soon discovered the fact. Tyler's infantry fought valiantly before they gave way, and then a retreat by the road they had come by brought them to Conrad's Store, which point Shields had by this time just reached with his main body.

Shields had lost by a day's delay the opportunity of delivering with his fresh troops a counter-attack before Jackson could bring across the river the brigades he had left in front of Frémont; for greatly daring, and prone always to underestimate the strength of defensive tactics, Jackson had proposed to himself to defeat Shields' detachment before 10 A.M. with the brigades of Taylor, Winder, Steuart and Elzey, and afterwards recross the river to support Trimble and Taliaferro in an attack on Frémont. But he was eventually obliged to call up Trimble and Taliaferro to aid him in the struggle with Tyler, and burn the bridge to keep Frémont from the battlefield. Jackson's attack with 13,000 was resisted by Tyler's 3000: the day's fighting cost over 1700

casualties and the Confederates lay almost as thick as the Federals on the battlefield between wood and river: and so ended the last of Jackson's indecisive battles in the Valley

It must remain one of the many curious facts of military history that the Confederate army covering Richmond, which was to cost the Union government millions of dollars and a loss of eight thousand men, attracted comparatively little notice during the spring of 1862; while attention was focussed during this period on a Confederate detachment of 5000 to 15,000 men which marched up and down the Shenandoah Valley for three months; though its operations could probably have been checked at the outset by fortifying a position at Mount Jackson behind the river with outposts on the line Newmarket-Luray. A small force of Federals with a strong commander having plenary powers would have doubtless proved sufficient for the purpose.

Is it possible that President Lincoln wished to figure in history as another Washington and, finding a willing instrument in General Banks who did not object to being controlled by telegraphy, baited traps for Jackson by exposing weak Federal detachments, always hoping to be able to reinforce them in time to smash a leader with whom mobility was a passion? Lincoln's conduct

of operations in the Valley—which to some extent compensated the Confederates for disasters at Fort Donelson, Pea Ridge and Shiloh—was certainly not inconsistent with such a theory; but on the other hand his behaviour may be regarded as a manifestation of pure foolishness.

The Confederate detachment in the Valley throve on the whole at the expense of President Lincoln, though the margin between safety and disaster was often very narrow; and we may opine that Kernstown and Winchester, McDowell and Port Republic left much to be desired as military enterprises. The Valley operations exhibit no such feat of arms as that of which Almaraz was the scene fifty years before, when 3 British and 1 Portuguese regiments without artillery attacked a *tête du pont* and two strong forts on the Tagus mounting 18 guns and garrisoned by 1000 of Napoleon's soldiers: the allies descending to the river by a footpath in file bearing their scaling ladders in ten minutes carried the works at a cost of 177 killed and wounded. The operation was of essential service, too; for Hill totally destroyed an important line of communication between the north and south of Spain, and so enabled Wellington to take the offensive without anxiety for his right flank.


But all things are judged by comparison and in

1862 the feeble operations of McClellan and Johnston threw into strong relief Jackson's vigorous initiative, even though it resulted in a repulse or a partial success. Moreover in 1862 as at a much later period any events in the East overshadowed any events in the West of America, so that the masterly combinations of Grant went unheeded while Virginia and Maryland rang with the exploits of Jackson.

The Valley operations however came abruptly to a close in early June; for Robert Lee had superseded Joseph Johnston as commander of the main army of the Confederates in the East, and his first care was concentration of forces. General Lee is under no illusion as to the military economy of employing 15,000 men in the Valley; and his letter of June 11 to Jackson directs him to leave his "enfeebled" troops to watch the country and guard the passes, covered by some cavalry and guns, and march the remainder to Ashland with a view to forming the left wing of the main army: for Lee meant to put an end to the long period of inactivity on the peninsula and he had been led to hope much from Jackson's assistance. But it took Jackson a fortnight to reach Ashland on the Richmond-Fredericksburg railroad, and two days more to unite with D. H. Hill's division on Beaver Dam; and this unaccountable delay had much to answer

for ; since Lee anticipating greater activity on the part of his subordinate had assigned to his command the fine brigades of Lawton and Whiting, and so Jackson's delay deprived Lee of these troops also.


Even President Lincoln seems to have learnt something at last from the events of the past three months, for he writes to Frémont on June 13: "we cannot afford to keep your force and Banks' and McDowell's engaged in keeping Jackson south of Strasburg or Front Royal . . . he can have no substantial reinforcements so long as a battle is pending at Richmond," a remark which would have shown real military insight if uttered in March, but which falls somewhat flat at a date when Jackson is about to quit the Valley. The President was however not yet quite emancipated : and though McDowell's visit to Washington enabled him to write on June 10 "for the third time I am ordered to join you [McClellan], and this time I hope to get through" the President fell from grace again, and McDowell was fated to remain in front of Washington—to be presently further mortified by a War Office order assigning him, together with Banks and Frémont, to a new organisation called the Army of Virginia under General John Pope.



## CHAPTER XI

### CAMPAIGN ON THE YORKTOWN PENINSULA

THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC AT FORT MONROE—MCCLELLAN'S PLANS — EVACUATION OF YORKTOWN BY THE CONFEDERATES—THE BATTLE OF WILLIAMSBURG—MCCLELLAN ON THE DEFENSIVE—FAIR OAKS AND SEVEN PINES—GENERAL LEE ASSUMES COMMAND—THE SEVEN DAYS' BATTLES—EFFECTS OF LEE'S COUNTER-STROKE—GENERAL MCCLELLAN'S CHARACTERISTICS — DIARY OF ENGAGEMENTS—CAUSES OF LEE'S FAILURE—CAVALRY OPERATIONS ON THE PENINSULA.





## CHAPTER XI

### CAMPAIGN ON THE YORKTOWN PENINSULA

IN war as in politics it often happens that a man of strong character achieves more than a man of great ability, and so it was in the case of the Federal generals, McClellan and Grant. That McClellan was a man of great constructive powers nobody will deny. He was the organiser of the Army of the Potomac; he founded its staff, he equipped the troops and he conceived the plan of utilising the short line of supply which the proximity of Richmond to the sea afforded to an army which should land on the Yorktown peninsula: and McClellan laboured under all the difficulties experienced by a pioneer. He fashioned armies out of odds and ends of territorial militias and 15,000 regulars, and he schemed to gain for the North that command of the sea which enabled landings to take place on the Atlantic seaboard. But the fourfold task of combating the Washington policy, forming strategical plans, organising the armies and con-

trolling the tactical operations in the East was beyond his strength ; and indeed such a task in 1861-62 would have taxed the powers of a Napoleon.

McClellan failed and Grant, two years later, reaped where he had not sown. But Grant had in 1864 been given extraordinary authority as lieutenant-general, a rank created to place him in absolute command of all the Union armies, and he at once grasped the reins. He had the sagacity to perceive that the issue depended less upon the field operations than upon his power to control " the political and personal influences of various sorts and of various individuals which centred at Washington," and which we shall find dominated McClellan after he had laboured for eight months to shape the instrument of strategy which we call an army.

McClellan's career as general-in-chief, begun in November 1861, had practically terminated in March 1862 when the President's War Order (No. 3) appeared, assigning McClellan to the Department of the Potomac, giving Halleck control of the Mississippi Department (with Buell and Hunter under his command) and appointing Frémont to the Mountain Department in Western Virginia : and from this date we have to regard McClellan as the subordinate of the

War Committee at Washington. The instructions he had issued to Burnside in North Carolina, to Halleck in Missouri, to Buell in Kentucky, to Sherman in South Carolina and to Butler at New Orleans were set aside or varied by the new authority. The comprehensive plans elaborated in his letter of February 3, 1862 to the Secretary of War, in which he sought to neutralise the advantages possessed by the Confederates in holding a central position, with roads diverging in every direction and with other facilities for operating on interior lines, were now absolutely ignored.

McClellan had intended, while continuing the diversions against Wilmington, Charleston and New Orleans as well as in the Mississippi, Tennessee and Cumberland Valleys, and against the Knoxville and Lynchburg railroad *via* Cumberland Gap, to have moved 150,000 men to the James river; for he held a belief, in opposition to the views of his predecessor General Winfield Scott who regarded the Western theatre as the more important one, that the Eastern was "the true theatre of decisive operations." He had proposed moreover to operate by land from Urbana on the Lower Rappahannock to West Point at the head of York river and so turn the Confederate defences at Yorktown, afterwards crossing the Pamunkey to move against Richmond either on

the north or the south bank of the James according to circumstances. But the Lincoln Committee now prohibited a movement *viâ* Urbana and offered McClellan the choice of operating overland *viâ* Manassas or by water from Fort Monroe. Tamely accepting this rebuff McClellan chose the latter route and assented also, though not without protest, to the reduction of his force to 85,000 men.

The most direct route from Washington to Richmond was by water down the Potomac to Chesapeake Reach, thence up York river to West Point, whence a short line of railway ran due west to the Confederate capital. But the Federal army did not concentrate at Washington: the troops were brought south to Hampton Roads where, at the mouth of James river on a spit of land, Fort Monroe commanded the channel and afforded a sea base where troops could be landed and finally organised for the forward movement. There was of course no pretence at secrecy. The Confederates' signal stations had duly reported the sailing of vessels down the Potomac at the end of March, and their signal line extended from rail-head at West Point down the York river and thence across the peninsula to Williamsburg. McClellan spent a week in reconnaissances between Mulberry Island and Yorktown (April 5-10) and

did not complete his strategical concentration until April 16.

Meanwhile the Confederates had not been idle. Robert Lee was hardly inferior to McClellan as an organiser and moreover possessed great influence with President Davis. But it was Joseph Johnston who commanded in the field when McClellan after a month's preparation was ready to march on Richmond.

The Confederates had fortified a line which extended across the peninsula from north to south ; the left of this line rested on Yorktown, its right on Mulberry Island—a sort of swamp formed by Warwick river and Skiff Creek, tributaries of the James. About Yorktown the troops with the aid of a thousand negroes had thrown up parapets 15 feet thick and 20 feet high : on the right bank of York river guns in pits crossed their fire with the guns of Gloucester Point on the opposite bank and so closed this waterway to the Federal fleet. A field fort dominated Mulberry Island and the Confederate fleet still controlled the lower James. From Yorktown to Mulberry Island flowed Warwick river, a tidal stream dammed at five points which formed a wet ditch along the front of the Confederate works ; but about one mile and a half from Yorktown the inundation ceased, and this interval was closed by two redoubts and many complex

lines of trenches commanding difficult ravines. The works mounted 80 heavy guns besides field batteries, and yet D. H. Hill declared that "the defences were of the weakest character" and that these heavy guns of the old navy pattern taken at Norfolk "were of little more use than so much cast iron." It must be remembered however that D. H. Hill was always something of a pessimist, though a staunch fighter.

Magruder had hitherto held the peninsula with 11,000 men of whom 6000 were allotted as garrisons to Gloucester Point, Yorktown and Mulberry Island; so that he had only 5000 bayonets available for 12 miles of open trenches. He was not reinforced until April 16 when Joseph Johnston assumed command; and on this day as it chanced the Federals made an attack on the centre of the line, its weakest part at Lee's Mill (Dam No. 1), with W. F. Smith's division which succeeded in crossing the inundation and even gained the Confederate rifle pits before being repulsed. Johnston's divisions now stood thus from right to left—Magruder, Longstreet, Hill; and G. W. Smith's command was held in reserve.

McClellan meanwhile had proceeded as though regular siege operations would become necessary. Misled by his Secret Service Department he believed he had at least 100,000 Confederates in front

of him at Yorktown. Landing 72 siege guns he established 14 batteries in 23 days, an effort comparable to that of the Allies before Sebastopol; indeed some of his guns were heavier than any yet used in the field, for his armament included 13-inch mortars and 200 pounders. By partial attacks, secret reconnaissances and observations from a balloon the Federals had located the defenders' works, had taken their ranges and compass bearings, had laid down miles of corduroy road for the transport of ammunition, etc., and even had manufactured rope mantlets for the embrasures. Close study of the reports of the chief of artillery and the chief engineer and of their admirable plans and sketches form a practical lesson in the art of fortification. On April 30 the Federals opened fire from the 100 pr. and 200 pr. guns of No. 1 battery expecting in a few days to complete No. 14 battery and then to begin a general bombardment. McClellan perhaps hoped to emulate the exploit of General Washington who caused the surrender of Lord Cornwallis at Yorktown in 1781.

Johnston however did not wait to be shelled out of his works. He started his retreat after dark on Saturday, May 3; though his guns were kept in action till midnight to mislead the enemy. His troops had been half-starved for a month, deprived of fires in cold and wet weather, living

knee-deep in water on flour and salt meat. It was stated that want of transport caused the Confederates to be so ill-nourished in their own country and also compelled them to leave guns and wounded behind when retreating. There seems to have been no firm intention to hold the lines of Yorktown and yet no adequate preparations for retreat had been made. The hasty evacuation involved the loss of all the heavy guns, besides a month's sick and casualties. The gain by such defensive measures is not apparent : it is true that a month's toil was imposed on the Federals, and delay and disappointment, besides friction at Washington and some loss of prestige to McClellan ; but on the other hand the Federal troops acquired some schooling, McClellan was made cautious, and profound discouragement overcame the Confederates who ended by believing that they had 158,000 Federals in pursuit.

Johnston had assembled his retreating forces about Williamsburg by noon of Sunday, May 4. Magruder's division continued the march towards Richmond the same afternoon and Smith's division followed at daybreak on May 5, but the slow progress made by the leading troops caused Hill's division to delay its intended movement in rear of Smith. Longstreet's division with Stuart's cavalry formed the rearguard of the army.



The Federal pursuit on May 4 was a travesty of war. The chief of cavalry (Stoneman) acting as advanced guard commander is assisted by the G.O.C. cavalry division (Cooke) with 2 regiments and 1 squadron, and by the G.O.C. 1st brigade cavalry reserve (Emory) with 2 regiments, and by O.C. brigade of horse artillery (Hays) : thus 4 regiments and a squadron of cavalry, together with 4 batteries taken from the artillery reserve, are divided and grouped to form "commands" for three brigadier-generals : and the mission of this detachment was " to pursue and harass the rear of the retreating enemy and if possible to cut off his rearguard or that portion of it which had taken the Lee's Mill and Yorktown road."

Stoneman was told to expect support from Hooker's division in harassing the enemy along the Yorktown-Williamsburg road ; but he was to co-operate with Smith's division along the Lee's Mill-Williamsburg road in cutting off the Confederate rearguard. These divisions however had not been detached from the III. and IV. corps, and therefore remained subject to the orders of Heintzelman and Keyes respectively : and presently Sumner, too, arrived who as the senior general claimed to be in sole command of the operation, a position to which Heintzelman supposed he had been specially appointed. We now have three

infantry generals directing affairs more or less in opposition, while Stoneman with the cavalry was apparently assisted by Governor Sprague and hampered by royal volunteers in the persons of the Comte de Paris and the Duc de Chartres. This host of leaders and functionaries were incapable of controlling a couple of divisions and the mounted force ; for we read that Hooker and his staff were two miles ahead of his division while the road in front was blocked by Smith's division, and that ultimately " Hooker's and Smith's divisions changed places," while the cavalry were taking up a defensive position " which we had determined to try and hold at all hazards "—a strange ending to the first day's " pursuit."

On May 5 occurred an engagement which is known as the battle of Williamsburg, where the Federals lost 2228 and the Confederates 1000 men. This was the second encounter between the main armies in the East, and though Williamsburg was not a pitched battle its story has been told in seventy-eight separate reports (59 Federal, 19 Confederate) filling two hundred pages of print. The Federals had 21 infantry regiments engaged : Hooker's division on the left suffered severely and was reinforced at 3 P.M. by a part of Kearny's division, while Hancock's brigade (W. F. Smith's division) achieved a notable success on the right :

but after all the affair was merely a rearguard action carried on by Longstreet until darkness should screen the intended retreat.

The works covering Williamsburg had been constructed previously by Magruder as a second line of defence and were formidable parapets 7 feet high and 12 feet thick, behind a ditch 8 feet deep and 10 feet wide : wood and water as usual interfered with the attackers' manœuvring : the Federal cavalry seems to have been freely requisitioned by the infantry commanders for local purposes, so that Stoneman complained that he "remained an idle spectator" of the fight : part of the cavalry was employed in observation on the left flank and in support of Hooker. Sumner was afterwards blamed for not reinforcing Hooker : he retorted that his centre being hard pressed no troops could be spared for his left : perhaps a Frederick would have let both left and centre go in order to confirm Hancock's success on the right, for *there* was the decisive point.

The Confederate brigades engaged were those of Anderson, Early, A. P. Hill, Jenkins, Pickett, Pryor and Wilcox. Stuart's cavalry was also present. Longstreet reported his total loss as 1560 (288 killed) and McClellan assured the Secretary of War that he held on May 6 some 1300 Confederate prisoners, but though Johnston ad-

mitted leaving 400 wounded in hospital at Williamsburg it is hardly credible that the whole of the Confederate "missing" fell into the enemy's hands. Johnston's congratulatory order to his troops refers to the affair as "the repulse of the enemy's attacks upon the position of our rearguard near Williamsburg," and he claims to have driven the Federals into the woods. On the other hand McClellan telegraphs to Washington that "every hour proves our victory more complete: enemy's loss great, especially in officers; have just heard of five more of their guns captured: prisoners constantly arriving": but he omitted mention of his losses—456 killed, 1400 wounded and 372 missing.

Longstreet states that his outposts were driven in and a strong attack had developed by 10 A.M.; that the main body and the supply trains meanwhile were moving on so slowly that D. H. Hill's division was still within his reach, a circumstance which determined him to launch a counter-attack, for "we could not afford to rest longer under the enemy's long-range guns and superior artillery and we were wasting much ammunition"; that at 3.30 P.M. his ammunition was running short and being without his waggons, which continued the retreat during the battle, he could not replenish the men's pouches and therefore had to put in fresh troops; that the success of his counter-attack was

such as to cause Stuart's cavalry to advance ready to take up the pursuit ; but that the Federal attack on his left about 5 P.M. was successful. " Every piece but one of the enemy's artillery was captured by the repeated and brilliant charges of our troops " : but want of transport compelled him to leave these trophies on the field. Longstreet had engaged about 9000 and estimated the forces opposed to him at 12,000 men. He asserts that the Federals continued to throw in fresh troops until quite dark, whereas he only relieved those of his troops who had expended their ammunition. Longstreet released those prisoners who were wounded, paroling the officers. He lost three good colonels, and General Early was severely wounded while leading his brigade in an assault. Stuart occupied himself, he says, as " a medium of communication between the different commanders and with General Longstreet, and gave orders to other commands than my own whenever necessary." Stuart claims that the presence of his cavalry prevented the enemy venturing upon the only open ground where troops and guns could manœuvre ; his horse artillery fired 360 rounds of spherical case, canister, percussion shell and solid shot. Pickett's brigade went into action with 1529 muskets, remained on the field till 11 P.M., camped at 12.30 A.M., and at 2 A.M. resumed

the march towards Richmond. Such particulars indicate the character of the battle of Williamsburg, and next day D. H. Hill's division formed the rearguard: his vivid picture of the retreat shows what might have been accomplished on May 6 by an effective force of Federal cavalry. Hill writes:

"Thousands of soldiers had sought shelter from the storm of the night before in barns and out-houses, and it was with the utmost difficulty they could be driven out. Cold, tired, hungry and jaded, many seemed indifferent alike to life or capture. The roads were in a truly horrible condition. Horses could with difficulty wade through the mud and slush, and to footmen the task seemed almost impossible. The straggling was enormous, but more especially on this, the first day after leaving Williamsburg. The Yankee cavalry followed slowly in our rear picking up stragglers."

The retreat continued to a point six miles beyond Williamsburg where a swamp had caused the abandonment by the main body of waggons and ambulances which the rearguard had to destroy. But roads that were bad for Johnston's army were equally obstructive to McClellan's advanced guard, and so the direct pursuit came to an end—happily for the retreating Confederates who certainly at this juncture owed more to the lethargy

of the enemy than to the forethought of their own commander, since no depôts of supplies had been established on the line of retreat—for three days (says Hill) there had been no regular issues of rations—and men were forced to subsist on parched corn and the proceeds of plunder ; indeed “ several thousand had thrown away their arms and straggled off to Richmond ” : and Hill asserts that this demoralisation partly proceeded from a reorganisation of the army at Yorktown “ under the elective system ” which had “ thrown out of service many of our best officers.”

Meanwhile McClellan had dislocated the Federal commands by launching an indirect pursuit with Sumner's II. corps (minus its commander), part of III. corps (Porter's division) and an independent division under Franklin, despatching them all from Yorktown by water as soon as the river was opened and landing them on the right bank of the Pamunkey in the vicinity of West Point. Franklin disembarked on May 7 and was at once attacked by a Confederate division under Whiting which Johnston had detailed to guard his flank, and the engagement at Barhamsville or Eltham's Landing resulted in a Federal loss of 200 men. Whiting's command formed part of G.W. Smith's corps, the march of which had been protected by a cavalry rearguard detailed by brigades

from Stuart's command, and Whiting's brigadiers were J. B. Hood and Wade Hampton, both of whom attained celebrity later in the war. Johnston's army was not afterwards molested and so a week later reached a position four miles east of Richmond where it camped on May 17.

The defences round Richmond, unlike those that protected the Federal capital, were extremely weak in May 1862; only a few redoubts armed with smoothbore guns connected the open entrenchments: and Richmond from this time practically ceased to be a seaport, for on May 15 the Confederate ironclad, the *Merrimac*, drawing too much water to ascend the James, had got aground and was blown up; so that the Federal fleet could now approach within seven miles of the city: but at a bend of the river the Confederates had constructed at Drury's Bluff and Chaffin's Bluff batteries which mastered ships' guns, and they obstructed the waterway here by a row of piles and sunken schooners.

McClellan's operations on the Yorktown peninsula had however produced important strategic results; such as the abandonment by the Confederates of the coast defences along the Atlantic seaboard from Yorktown to Norfolk, and of the navy yard at Gosport which on May 10 Huger evacuated after doing what damage he could.



Then on May 18 the Federal gunboats came up the James as far as City Point and communicated with McClellan, and the opening of the York and James rivers to the Federal gunboats gave him possession of the peninsula ; for McClellan with an undefeated army could of course turn the flank of any Confederate force which should place itself within the angle.

The next phase of this campaign of invasion, however, demanded qualities very different in kind from any which McClellan had displayed hitherto. No further progress could be made by manœuvring, and the limitations of sea power were now to be experienced. The enemy's main army was still intact, and although the Federal gains were great in a strategic sense the decisive battle had yet to be fought ; and for that ordeal the Confederates were now better prepared than before, since the enemy had compelled that concentration of forces which Johnston had begged for in vain ; and although Charleston and Savannah still absorbed garrisons that might have been added to the field army, the numbers now assembled to fight in defence of Richmond were sufficient, if well handled, to make McClellan's further advance a hazardous enterprise.

McClellan had quitted Yorktown on May 4 ; a

fortnight later his headquarters were established at White House and on May 22 he moved to Cold Harbour, by which date the army was astride the Chickahominy river. Cavalry reconnaissances were being pushed north-west towards Hanover Court-house on May 23-24. An expedition up the Pamunkey river had caused the Confederates to burn a fleet of schooners which now were cut off from blue water ; and on May 27 a detachment of Porter's corps drove back a brigade of Confederates from the Virginia Central railroad to the Fredericksburg railroad about Ashland. Porter seized Hanover Court-house on the Pamunkey with a view to keeping open communication with McDowell, who was at Fredericksburg, though Joseph R. Anderson's Confederates were holding the Fredericksburg-Richmond road. But three divisions at Cumberland were two days moving five miles over roads of such a nature that the trains of one division took thirty-six hours to accomplish this short journey ; and in other respects General McClellan was beginning to experience some of the drawbacks of offensive operations : it was fortunate for the Army of the Potomac that the enemy had elected to remain so close to the Federal fleet.

General McClellan had begun on May 10 when three miles beyond Williamsburg to write letters to

the President, and the burden of every one of them is the same: believing the enemy would fight, believing the enemy would take up a position and entrench, believing that the Confederates would be in superior strength "perhaps double my numbers" yet McClellan promises to attack and says: "I firmly believe that we shall beat them." He takes the opportunity of asking for reinforcements. "I ask for every man that the War Department can send me." But he does not say that he will not fight without reinforcements. Quite the contrary. "I shall fight the rebel army with whatever force I may have, but duty requires me to urge that every effort be made to reinforce me." No more than that. On May 21 he writes: "I shall advance steadily and carefully and attack them. . . . I fear there is little hope that he [McDowell] can join me overland in time for the coming battle. Delays on my part will be dangerous."

This sort of correspondence was continued for a fortnight: while deprecating delay McClellan was always procrastinating; nor does he ever give any reason for his inaction: he seems to expect that the will should be taken for the deed; and even when President Lincoln on May 25 sharply reminded him of his mission McClellan replied "the time is very near when I shall attack

Richmond": yet nothing was done except to restore the bridges of the Chickahominy and plant the Army of the Potomac the more firmly astride that stream.

A strong post had been established up at Beaver Dam on the left bank commanding the point where the Chickahominy was crossed by the Richmond-Mechanicsville road, a post which in fact formed the right of an echelon of which the left flank, refused, rested on another entrenched post on the right bank down at White Oak Swamp, whence several roads led westward to Richmond. Connecting these two posts, which we may regard as the extremities of McClellan's tactical front, was a position astride the York river railway and the Williamsburg road, between Fair Oaks station and Seven Pines: and this central position the Federals strongly entrenched (parapets, epaulments and abattis) and garrisoned by over 25,000 men. Apparently secure from attack, and seemingly in readiness to take the offensive against the flank of any force moving north on Beaver Dam or east on White Oak Swamp, McClellan placidly awaited events.

As early as April 7 McClellan had realised that he might have to contend against 100,000 Confederates though his own forces would possibly be reduced to 85,000 men: and if he doubted

that his own skill as a general and the assumed superiority of his army as regards moral were not equal to the task proposed, as a soldier he should have declined the command. There is no gainsaying the fact that the acceptance of responsibility by McClellan was regarded by the army and the country as a guarantee that the means were sufficient to the end in view.

President Lincoln had been sufficiently explicit in his letter of April 9 as to the mission of McClellan on the peninsula: "Once more let me tell you it is indispensable to you that you strike a blow. I am powerless to help this. . . . I always insisted that going down the bay in search of a field instead of fighting at or near Manassas was only shifting and not surmounting a difficulty; that we would find the same enemy and the same or equal entrenchments at either place." In short, McClellan's army had not been sent south for manœuvres, but in order to subjugate the Confederates by routing their main army.

A month later, as we have seen, McClellan is daily promising to attack: but he still hankers after McDowell's corps. Lincoln had sensibly pointed out that "by delay the enemy will relatively gain upon you—that is, he will gain faster by fortifications and reinforcements than you can by reinforcements alone." McClellan ignored this

truism though it must have been evident that the approach towards Richmond of McDowell would be the signal for Johnston to call in Anderson from Fredericksburg, Huger from Norfolk, and possibly part of Ewell's division from Gordonsville; and these troops on the defensive would equal thrice their numbers attacking: moreover McDowell's aid was conditional, and to obtain it McClellan must operate against Richmond from the north in order to cover Washington; that is to say, he must deploy for attack in prolongation of his line of communication with York river, whence McDowell's supplies would be drawn as well as his own; and finally McDowell would remain a quasi-independent commander, an ally rather than a subordinate, adding certainly to McClellan's responsibilities without necessarily increasing his fighting power. On all these grounds it appears that a general desirous of closing with his enemy and achieving a decisive victory would have seized the earliest opportunity to attack, in his own way, at his own time and with the troops under his sole control. Perhaps these matters had influenced McClellan in his final decision—if any written promise of McClellan could be called a decision—to attack without McDowell's assistance.

As late as May 21 McClellan wrote: "All our

divisions are moving towards the foe. I shall advance steadily and carefully and attack them." He does not expect McDowell to join "in time for the coming battle." Three days later McClellan repeats that he will "make his calculations" on the assumption that he can receive no immediate aid from McDowell. What were his calculations? What was to prevent him from establishing a field magazine south of the Chickahominy, destroying the bridges over that river to protect his right flank, and fighting his great battle when fully concentrated, looking to the James for further supplies until the resources of Richmond were at his disposal? He might even have retained his communications with White House; for a vigorous offensive by McClellan at the end of May would have occupied the Confederates too completely to leave them free for a turning movement; and the fact that Johnston had flung his left so far north as Hanover Court-house would appear to be a sound reason for attacking his right, instead of making corresponding detachments and engaging in raids upon the Virginia Central railroad with the vague purpose of interfering with one of the enemy's lines of supply or preventing his sending reinforcements to Anderson and Jackson: indeed if McClellan's object were to beat Johnston surely the more

troops Johnston detached the better ? But it was McClellan's characteristic, his failing, to "see too many things at once." Meanwhile Lincoln is writing (May 25) : "I think the time is near when you must either attack Richmond or give up the job and come to the defence of Washington," and McClellan in replying to the effect that "we are quietly closing in upon the enemy preparatory to the last struggle" stated the reverse of the truth ; for in fact he was extending his line northwards, weakening his centre and left by detachments and losing hundreds of men in petty combats such as Porter's "glorious victory" of May 27.

Would the Confederates seize the opportunity for a counterstroke ? McClellan's manœuvres had resulted in giving his opponent a choice of two plans of attack. Johnston could assail either wing of McClellan's army by operating on either bank of the Chickahominy. Would he choose the easier task of destroying McClellan's left wing by a concentration covering Richmond south of the Chickahominy, or would he disperse his divisions by an attempt against the Federal communications ?

There was indeed little danger of the Federal army being starved even if Johnston had seized the White House depôt, since the York river



railroad had enabled the chief commissary to establish a supply depôt at Savage Station 3 miles beyond the Chickahominy on May 27 : and moreover vessels with 800,000 rations aboard lay in the York river only waiting orders to proceed round the bay and up the James to City Point under protection of the gunboats, while herds of beef cattle followed the troops and were replenished from the corral which had been established at White House on May 16. McClellan had nothing to fear. Would Wellington situated so favourably as regards supplies have hesitated to attack the enemy in his front? Did Soult refrain from attacking Wellington by the Pass of Roncesvalles although he knew that he could not retrace his steps if defeated? The answer to such questions is the measure of McClellan's faint-heartedness.

Johnston anticipating the arrival of McDowell to reinforce McClellan had summoned Anderson from Fredericksburg ; for an advance by McDowell in support of McClellan's right combined with a forward movement by McClellan along the railway to Richmond would be difficult to withstand ; but the Confederate general believed that he could extricate himself from this supposed predicament by an immediate attack on McClellan's right wing (Porter's V. corps, Franklin's VI. corps,

Sumner's II. corps) which he hoped to destroy before the arrival of McDowell, and before it could be reinforced by III. and IV. corps which were posted on the south bank of the river under Heintzelman and Keyes.

But on the day when this scheme was to be carried into effect Johnston received news that McDowell has been ordered to march from Fredericksburg to the Valley and extricate Banks from the difficulty in which Jackson's operations of May 23-24 had placed him.

The situation at Richmond is now entirely changed and Johnston, who was by no means venturesome and who was professedly conducting a defensive campaign, found the temptation to attack quite irresistible: and his new plan was not unlike that which enabled Wellington to drive Soult from the Nivelle to the Adour after breaking his too extended front; for Johnston decided to attack McClellan's weaker force on the south (right) bank of the Chickahominy before reinforcement could reach it from Beaver Dam; and his immediate objective was the Federal centre—the Fair Oaks or Seven Pines position.

Johnston issued no written orders but held repeated and lengthy conferences with his principal subordinates, and out of the chaos of explanation to which the events of May 31-

June 1 have given rise, it may be gathered that his dispositions to attack McClellan south of the Chickahominy were somewhat as follows :

Magruder was holding a defensive position between the Chickahominy and the railway. D. H. Hill was astride the Williamsburg road fronting Seven Pines with a brigade on his right covering the Charles City road. Some distance in rear of Hill stood Huger, and far in rear of Magruder was Longstreet. Behind Huger was Whiting in reserve. Johnston's instructions involved movements by all except Magruder. HUGER was to relieve Hill's brigade on the Charles City road. D. H. HILL was to move along the Williamsburg road, and attack Casey's divisions at Seven Pines with his 4 brigades. LONGSTREET with his 5 brigades was to pass Magruder's right and proceed (north of the railway) along the Nine Mile Road to Fair Oaks and attack on Hill's left. WHITING was to prolong Magruder's right by a movement on the Nine Mile Road and if necessary reinforce Longstreet.

"The whole history of this battle," says Alexander, "remains a monument of caution against verbal understandings."

Longstreet got on the Williamsburg road (south of the railway) instead of Nine Mile Road at an early hour, and blocked the way to Huger who was

to relieve Hill's brigade. Whiting's march also was impeded by Longstreet's blunder, but Johnston hearing of Whiting's check assumed that it was the necessary result of his following Longstreet on the Nine Mile Road, and paid little heed to the matter. Johnston at 9 A.M. sent a staff officer along the Nine Mile Road to find Longstreet, but the staff officer lost his way and rode into the enemy's lines at Fair Oaks, and so warned Keyes (IV. corps) at 10 A.M. of the impending attack. Longstreet further delayed Huger's relieving brigade by claiming precedence for his command on the march and so Hill's brigade could not start to rejoin him till 1 P.M. Hill's attack eventually commenced on a front of 2 brigades with a second line of 2 brigades while " nine other brigades encumbered the one good road leading to the battle."

Hill's division (8500) was sent against Seven Pines, an entrenched position defended by Casey's division (IV. corps) with 3 other divisions in support holding two lines partly entrenched. Little wonder that Hill's command suffered a loss of 44 per cent. in three brigades—casualties comparable with those of our cavalry at Balaklava which lost 49 per cent. of its strength : his 4th brigade meanwhile was engaged in a local turning movement and so dropped out of the fight after sustaining a loss of one-seventh of its personnel : but Hill had

had assistance also from R. H. Anderson's brigade which probably suffered to the same extent, for Anderson says " we were under fire from 3 P.M. to 7.40 P.M. . . . in my two colour companies out of 80 men who entered 40 were killed or wounded, and out of 11 in the colour guard 10 were shot down " : the 6th Alabama regiment lost nearly 60 per cent. of its strength.

This punishment, we may notice, was gamely endured by troops who had never been held in such bonds of discipline as are forged in the training of " regular " soldiers, and it is well to ponder the fact in days when many believe that manœuvring alone will win battles : for the tactical methods of 1862 are by no means obsolete ; heavy losses in battle do not invariably imply that " someone had blundered " : the practical question is whether losses in action are productive. Now Hill was opposed by 25,500 Federals on the defensive : he inflicted a loss of 3615 upon the Casey, Couch and Kearney divisions, captured 10 guns and 5000 muskets and took 400 prisoners ; and he carried both lines of defence before nightfall put an end to the fighting : his tactics are therefore justified.

Part of Couch's division which Hill had driven out of the Federal works retreated towards the Chickahominy and joined Sumner's corps ; for General Sumner at 2.30 P.M. had received orders to

cross to the right bank of the Chickahominy by two bridges which had been laid down, and he contrived to effect a passage just before the bridges were carried away by a flood.

The Confederate commander, having realised before noon that the attack he had planned had gone to pieces, attempted to improvise a fresh battle with Whiting's 5 brigades, which he ordered to take the original route down the Nine Mile Road and join the left of Hill's attack, the direction of which he supposed would be indicated by the sound of the firing; but unluckily the phenomena called acoustic shadows sent the sound of the firing in every direction but one, and that chanced to be the position of Whiting's brigades waiting for the signal to advance. Not until 4 P.M. did Whiting move, and then only in consequence of the arrival of an officer sent to investigate the cause of his absence from the battle. Whiting marched immediately and had reached Fair Oaks Station when he was fired upon by Sumner's troops who had just crossed the Chickahominy: but as this river had been deemed impassable the Confederates supposed that the enemy now seen in their front was one of the routed detachments and could be driven away by a charge; and so Whiting advanced again for 800 yards, when he came under heavy fire from Sumner and was repulsed: out of 10,592

men Whiting lost 1283, the Federals under Sumner only 416 out of an equal number engaged.

This chapter of accidents must close with the observation that Johnston, present at this engagement, apparently took no steps to bring his artillery into action although two Federal batteries were shelling his infantry; and that he who had been fretting at the increase of McClellan's army had essentially himself given McClellan the aid of 40,000 men, since this number of Confederates stood idle on May 31. According to his own account Johnston had expected to be able to defeat Keyes' IV. corps completely before it could be reinforced, and "heavy and protracted rain during the afternoon and night [May 30] by swelling the stream of the Chickahominy increased the probability of our having to deal with no other troops than these of Keyes." Reliance on weather as an obstacle was the extent of General Johnston's tactical precautions. At the end of the day he was severely wounded and handed over the command to General G. W. Smith.

Meanwhile the flood subsided, Sumner's bridges were restored, and the Federals had covered this line of communication by fresh dispositions when Longstreet on the morrow (June 1) was ordered to attack northward from the Williamsburg road with the object of enabling Whiting to co-operate

from the point where he had been brought to a standstill the day before : and when Longstreet had by 11 A.M. lost 1336 men without making any progress the operation was abandoned : the offensive movement commenced under most favourable conditions thus came to an end. As Alexander points out, on three separate occasions within two days hardly 14,000 men had been got to the front to do the work for which 63,000 men were available and so the Confederates lost over 6000 men in an abortive counterstroke.

Johnston was afterwards placed in command of the Confederate forces in the West, and he was commanding 30,000 men at the surrender in 1865 ; but he had signally failed as a fighting general in the East : for at Bull Run the moving spirit was Beauregard, at Fair Oaks and Seven Pines it was D. H. Hill.

Among other defects that had become glaringly apparent in the Confederate army during the past two days was the want of a trained staff to draft Orders and interpret when necessary the wishes of the Army Commander ; the need was also felt of a higher organisation than the division in order to facilitate inter-communication and relieve General Headquarters from the personal care of many small units ; the formation of artillery brigades (which they called " regiments ") under officers possessing



tactical as well as technical knowledge was seen to be desirable, since in offensive operations the fire must be concentrated, which in those days involved the massing of guns: above all it was imperative to appoint to the chief command in the field an officer whose personality would ensure obedience to a central authority, whose energy was equal to continual superintendence—one who moreover possessed the tact to compose all the differences now beginning to arise among subordinates holding ranks and appointments in the Confederate service in striking contrast with those held so very recently in the United States army: the time was ripe for Robert E. Lee.

Lee  
June 1862

General Lee had the moral courage to resist the proposals of his subordinates to abandon Johnston's line of defence and withdraw nearer Richmond. On the contrary he set the army to work with pick and shovel and constructed earthworks in an almost continuous line from the James river at Chaffin's Bluff to the Chickahominy at New Bridge, and threw back his left flank along the latter river as far up as Meadow Bridge. He thus covered all the routes into Richmond from the north and the east and held a tactical front of twelve miles. He garrisoned his works with six divisions in the

following order from the left (north)—A. P. Hill, Whiting, Magruder, D. H. Hill, Huger, Longstreet.

The cavalry under Stuart was placed in observation along the Rappahannock as far up as Fredericksburg, which town McDowell had garrisoned before his departure for the Valley.

Lee daily rode along the lines encouraging his troops to labour, and humorously chiding those brigadiers who for lack of experience preferred log breastworks to parapets of earth as a protection against cannon balls.

McClellan endeavoured to reconnoitre Lee's works by means of balloons. General Lee returned the compliment by crossing the Chickahominy on a personal reconnaissance. Lee discovered 25,000 Federals under Porter between Cold Harbour and Mechanicsville, and he at once conceived the idea of attacking this force which constituted McClellan's right wing : indeed Lee's real motive in entrenching (according to A. L. Long, his military secretary) was to employ the troops profitably and restore their moral, which the retreat from Yorktown and Johnston's disasters had much shaken, while he matured his plans. Lee's methods recall the methods of Wellington. Dignified and gentle in manner Robert Lee was essentially aggressive, and an incident related

by Alexander gives the key to his character as a soldier. It seems that *The Richmond Examiner* had denounced the appointment of Lee to command the main army, on the ground that his operations in West Virginia had exhibited a lack of vigour. To the troops also Lee was certainly at this period an unknown quantity, and Alexander inquired of a member of the President's staff, a West Point graduate and a Northerner who had married and settled in the South, "Has General Lee the *audacity* that is going to be required for our inferior force to meet the enemy's superior force,—to take the aggressive and to run risks and stand chances?" Colonel Ives replied "Alexander, if there is one man in either army, Confederate or Federal, head and shoulders above every other in *audacity*, it is General Lee! His name might be Audacity. He will take more desperate chances and take them quicker than any other general in this country, North or South; and you will live to see it, too." Such was the impression Robert Lee had produced on President Davis and his entourage before he ever won a battle.

McClellan's left wing still remained south of the Chickahominy within four miles of Richmond and forest land lay between the fronts of the opposing armies. The pickets on both sides exchanged newspapers, coffee and tobacco. The

Federal general resumed his correspondence with Washington, promising on June 10 to attack "whenever the weather permits," and ten days later offering the President his views "as to the present state of military affairs throughout the country." After the Fair Oaks and Seven Pines battles he had demanded reinforcements; but when he had got them (McDowell had sent him McCall's division) he still lingered and seemed to be waiting like Micawber for "something to turn up." He had not long to wait. Lee was resolved to use the occasion of McDowell's absence to better purpose than his predecessor had done, though adopting the manœuvre which had first occurred to Johnston, viz. an attack on McClellan's exposed flank north of the Chickahominy.

Stuart's raid was the first intimation received by McClellan that a new hand was at work: and on the day when Stuart collected his troops for the march to Hanover, preparatory to wheeling to his right to descend upon the rear of the Federal army, a letter was on its way to Jackson recalling him to the main army for operations which were intended to be decisive. Lee had also brought up troops from Georgia and the Carolinas, but sent them to meet Jackson as though the Valley army were to be reinforced, movements which bewildered the Federal spies

and confirmed McClellan in his belief that the Confederates were in great strength. Jackson was expected to reach Hanover Junction by June 25 but he was a day late and, the preparatory movements for attack having already been made, Lee's design was thus exposed to the Federals. Porter still remained near New Bridge by Cold Harbour having an advanced post (6000) at Mechanicsville and McClellan on June 25 heard that Jackson was intended to attack his right and rear.

Lee proposed to hold his defensive lines south of the Chickahominy with three divisions (30,000) and attack Porter's corps (25,000) with four divisions and Stuart's cavalry (50,000): A. P. Hill's division was to lead when Jackson arrived within supporting distance, and Jackson's delay of course postponed the movement for twenty-four hours. Then Hill's attack drove back the Mechanicsville detachment on its main body between Gaines' Mill and Cold Harbour on June 26. Hill crossed the Chickahominy by Meadow Bridge near the railroad and Longstreet by the Mechanicsville Bridge. General Order No. 75 given in our Appendix exhibits the first day's operations, as planned by the Confederate commander.

The battle of Friday, June 27, was a move-

ment by three columns of Confederates against an entrenched position covering the bridges at Gaines' Mill (Cold Harbour) held by 40,000 Federals, for Porter had been reinforced by 2 brigades while Lee's attack was delayed. The Confederate dispositions were: right attack, Longstreet; centre attack, A. P. Hill; left attack, D. H. Hill and Stuart. Jackson on June 27 like Longstreet on May 31 mistook the route and blocked the road of the column next on his right: even after the battle had developed Lee had to send staff officers to bring up Jackson's troops, which on arriving were led by "Stonewall" in person against the Federal right.

At the close of the day after the Confederates had been repulsed and failure appeared irretrievable Lee ordered an assault. His audacity was rewarded, for the Federals were routed immediately and fled across the river by bridges which they afterwards destroyed to prevent pursuit.

Lee's three divisions in charge of the defences south of the Chickahominy meanwhile had acquitted themselves well under Magruder, who demonstrated against McClellan's left wing so vigorously that the Federal commander dared not send further aid to his right wing where the real battle raged.

Next morning (June 28) Stuart's cavalry sup-

ported by a division seized Dispatch Station on the York river railway and so cut off McClellan from his line of supply, but of course the possession of the waterways enabled him to open up a new line of supply from the James river. Unfortunately, Lee himself remained north of the Chickahominy during June 28, doubtful whether his enemy was escaping southwards to the James river or was making for the lower bridges to recross the Chickahominy and regain Yorktown. Lee repeated this mistake to his cost in June 1864. On June 29 McClellan again writes: "We have fought a terrible battle against overwhelming numbers. We held our own," etc. At noon on this day Lee began to follow McClellan leaving on the north of the Chickahominy Stuart's cavalry and two divisions to watch the lower bridges. Sumner and Franklin were found and attacked at Peach Orchard and Savage Station, but they resisted until dark, and meanwhile McClellan made good his retreat to his works at White Oak Swamp. Late in the day Lee succeeded in getting Jackson's corps to the south of the Chickahominy with a view to take up the direct pursuit of the enemy and hold him fast while the Confederate right wing should by an indirect pursuit strike him in flank. Next day accordingly the divisions of Longstreet and A. P.



Hill fell upon the flank of the Federal columns at Frazier's Farm, where McClellan's five corps and McCall's division were all engaged ; but Jackson was not up on June 30 and so the enemy escaped and continued his march to Malvern Hill.

It has been seriously put forward as a reason for Jackson's failing to co-operate that he was asleep and his staff forbore to wake him : perhaps the halo that surrounded Jackson by reason of his adventures in the Valley had caused more to be expected of him than human nature would concede ; on the other hand it is fair to assume that the General was not more fatigued than his staff and the troops who waited for his *levée*. Other causes for inertness have been assigned, as for instance that Jackson " did not intend that *his* men should do all the fighting." On this vexed question Alexander, always judicial, writes : " His failure is not so much a military as a psychological phenomenon. He did not try and fail. He simply made no effort. The story embraces two days. He spent the 29th in camp in disregard of Lee's instructions and he spent the 30th in equal idleness at White Oak Swamp. His 25,000 infantry practically did not fire a shot in the two days." On the other hand there is the testimony of Lee the Younger, who had left college that spring to enlist in the Rockbridge artillery and



serve under Jackson, to the effect that "the tremendous work Stonewall's men had performed including the rapid march from the Valley of Virginia, the short rations, the bad water and the great heat had begun to tell upon us, and I was pretty well worn out." It was the day after the battle of Cold Harbour and "most of the men were lying down, many sleeping," when General Lee and his staff appeared in Jackson's camp and a "dirty, ragged, unkempt youth" was discovered under a caisson "busy making up many lost hours of rest": this was the General's youngest son, and they were to meet again in similar circumstances at the battle of Sharpsburg before Gunner Lee received promotion from the ranks.

On July 1 McClellan's five corps were discovered in position at Malvern Hill, their guns commanding every approach by land, and gunboats prepared to contribute a flanking fire from the James river. Lee reconnoitred and determined to attack the enemy's left. Magruder, D. H. Hill and Jackson were to form the First Line and attack in that order from left to right. The attack was not commenced until sundown and at 10 P.M. the assailants lay down under arms, ready to renew the fight at daylight. But the Federals availed themselves of the darkness and a fall of rain with ensuing fog to execute a night march and retire to ground

directly commanded by their gunboats. Lee's army rested all day (July 2) while McClellan continued his march to Harrison's Landing on the James where he formed an entrenched camp.

The strategic value of Lee's counterstroke was slight, since the recovery of territory for 15 miles east of Richmond was evidently temporary; for McClellan with reinforcements from Washington could retake the offensive at his pleasure, or by detaining Lee down at Harrison's afford Banks, Frémont and McDowell an opportunity to seize Richmond behind him. But in war moral considerations must be given due weight, and the political effect of the repulse of McClellan was extraordinary throughout the South: it even had the effect of restoring to the Confederate army many who had deserted their standards under the depression produced by Johnston's retreat: and the Lee-Davis combination having resulted in the withdrawal of McClellan's forces from before Richmond the civilians in the army and out of it hailed Lee as a conqueror. Probably Lee was the only man who recognised that in a military sense nothing had been gained, and that when his loss of 17,500 men was compared with the Federal casualties (15,250) the balance

went down in favour of McClellan who on July 4 having recovered his buoyancy writes: "I am ready for an attack now; give me twenty-four hours even and I will defy all Secession"; and four days later we find him resuming his interminable epistolary correspondence: "I have written a strong frank letter to the President . . . if he acts upon it the country will be saved." Meanwhile the Harrison Mansion was made a signal station and the Federal troops lay in the open grounds around "weary with the ceaseless marching and fighting of the past week and confused and depressed by movements they did not understand."

General McClellan as a soldier had many excellent traits. He was a good organiser, of a sanguine temperament, high principled, popular with his troops and a chivalrous foe. In administrative matters he was energetic and capable, his ready pen and flow of language transmuted his ideas into clear and comprehensive instructions. He knew much of the theory of war and his active brain could plan a campaign and frame a policy better than most men. Twelve

years of army service as a military engineer had been followed by four years of civil employment as railroad president, and in strategic movements, in organising a base and lines of supply none could excel him. When the war broke out and McClellan volunteered for service he was only thirty-five, the age at which Napoleon was at the zenith of his mental and physical powers, and McClellan at a single bound gained a position hardly second in importance to that of the President himself. The ball was at his feet in the spring of 1862 and yet within six months he was relegated to civil life with the stigma of failure upon him. But even to the end his sublime self-confidence remained and enabled him to write to his wife after Sharpsburg : " We are in the full tide of success ; so far as it is or can be successful to advance without a battle."

There's the rub. No commander-in-chief can be successful without a battle ; for as long as the enemy's main army is undefeated his mission is unfulfilled : and McClellan's continued inactivity in November 1862 sealed his fate so far as the Lincoln cabinet could control it.

In this we judge Lincoln's decision to be perfectly sound. He had a year previously accepted McClellan at his own valuation, had turned out Winfield Scott to afford his *protégé* a golden opportunity, had placed at his disposal 100,000 men to

be organised and trained after his own fashion, and had caused the navy to co-operate to the extent of gaining complete control of the York and James rivers. It was then for McClellan to take a hand in the game and give assurances of his ability, and without quibbling about the temporary absence of a division or two afford the Federal president a taste of his quality, if only as a means of overcoming cabinet scruples as to increasing his forces and enlarging his authority. The demands of a successful general are never refused, the complaints of one who fails are rarely listened to.

McClellan must have known this, and yet his operations for a hundred days on the peninsula are unrelieved by a single success. He opened an offensive campaign, he drifted into a series of demonstrations and he ended by retreat. And though it may be urged that Grant two years later attacked in vain the Confederate entrenchments before Richmond the reply is obvious that the assaults at Cold Harbour in 1864, costly as they were, at least preserved the Federal communications with the York river and pinned Lee to his ground for ten days while the turning movement to Petersburg was in progress. But McClellan in no single instance delivered an attack in force and even in following Johnston he allowed the enemy's rearguard to take the initiative.

He met all Lincoln's suggestions to attack with a *non possumus*. Possessing a short line of supply by water and a railway he yet is wanting provisions, until it is time to retreat, when it is found that he has more than he can carry away. When urged to advance he begins to build bridges, when the bridges are built he fears the enemy may use them to attack him. He complains of the roads and the weather, as if the roads and the weather of Eastern Virginia were not essential factors in the plan of campaign he had framed before leaving Washington. His health suffers from broken rest and low diet, but he writes letters of portentous length to all and sundry when he should have been abed or at dinner. Probably no general in the field ever suffered to so great an extent as McClellan from *cacoethes scribendi* and his excursive mind darts from the dictation of reports of his failures to letters on domestic matters, from applications for civil employment in New York to diatribes against Stanton or Halleck, or an "Order of the Day" in which he informs the army that "we are fighting in a holy cause, and should endeavour to deserve the benign favour of the Creator." When the President visited the camp at Harrison's Bar the general took the astounding liberty of handing him an epistle denouncing the policy of the government. The commander of a hundred thousand

men while the enemy is in his front "with the purpose of overwhelming us by attacking our positions or reducing us by blocking our river communications"—so McClellan described his situation on July 7—exhorts the President in the language of a platform orator to mend his ways.

To peruse the enormous correspondence of McClellan in the field has of course a tendency to win one over to his views until a tonic is administered by recalling the operations of Frederick in his last campaign, of Napoleon in Italy, and of Wellington on the Nivelles and the Nive, by which we learn how war has been waged even with inferior numbers. Not weather, not roads, nor lack of supplies stopped the masters of war when once their plans were made and the campaign had opened for offensive operations; and only when successes had caused them for a moment to despise the enemy did they suffer a check: they even transmitted some of their own energy to their lieutenants. Seidlitz and Hulsén won at Liegnitz after Frederick had quitted the field, as he believed a beaten man; Desaix snatched the victory of Marengo from the Austrians; and Hill's battle at St Pierre gave Soult his *quietus* in December 1814. McClellan's sluggishness similarly infected his troops, stamped out the offensive spirit from the Army of the Potomac, and deprived his subordinates of legiti-



mate opportunity to show their mettle; so that Porter and Hancock, Franklin and Stoneman languished, while Jackson and Stuart, Longstreet and Hill won imperishable renown.

McClellan's desire was to convert the entire peninsula into a permanent camp for the accommodation of the whole of the Federal armies and to command them himself, and doubtless other generals at other times and places have had similar aspirations; but the heroes of military history all seem to have had the sense to perceive that generals are esteemed in proportion to their ability to make up for lack of means by personal prowess and skill, thus proving their capacity to utilise profitably the resources of the state. And so with every disposition to reverse the judgment of the Lincoln cabinet we must leave General McClellan to stand self-condemned out of the pages of "McClellan's Own Story" published by him twenty years after the war.

The so-called Seven Days' Battles, operations which for the Federals constituted a Seven Days' Retreat would exemplify the principles laid down in our Field Service Regulations for the "delaying action" on the assumption that McClellan had on June 25 determined to concentrate at Malvern Hill for a great defensive battle: for defence his manœuvres on the Chickahominy were correct.



"When a force is occupying a strong position which cannot be turned, or can only be turned by a wide turning movement through difficult country, its delaying power is very great : and where a series of such positions exists a comparatively small force, acting on the general principles described for the action of a rearguard, can exhaust the offensive energy of one which is much larger." And that is what proved to be the case at the end of June 1862. The wide turning movement planned by Lee was checked even more by forest, stream and swamp than by the enemy.

Then the Confederate army got out of hand. Magruder was embarrassed by instructions which, even on the critical day of pursuit after the Gaines' Mill battle, took the form of orders to "hold your lines at all hazard, defending the approaches to Richmond," but "moving against enemy whenever you can do so to advantage." It is true that next day (June 29) a different tone was adopted by Lee, who says to General Magruder : "regret much you have made so little progress to-day in the pursuit of the enemy : the pursuit should be most vigorous : press on his rear rapidly and steadily : we must lose no more time or he will escape us entirely : Jackson has been ordered to support you and push pursuit vigorously." These injunctions it must be remembered came

to one whose functions had been hitherto defensive, who commanded only 13,000 men and who often came under the control of other senior officers. Magruder's mission was certainly the most difficult of all, and he needed the active support of General Headquarters to fulfil his most delicate functions : he was to defend and attack, to hold and to pursue, to avoid being overwhelmed and yet prevent the enemy's escape ; and he was to accomplish this task with constantly diminishing forces before an enemy who was being concentrated in his front by the action of the left wing of the army.

Impossible as it is to follow in detail all the operations as described by the actors on the spot, whose reports are often contradictory, we can approximately determine the nature of the actions by the process of locating the divisions day by day.

*June 25.*—Huger and D. H. Hill's Confederates were opposed to Hooker and Kearney's Federals on the Williamsburg road about Oak Grove, King's School House, French's Field or The Orchard. Huger lost 441 men. Hill did not engage. Some skirmishing took place near Ashland.

*June 26.*—D. H. Hill, A. P. Hill and Longstreet (Con.) were opposed to Morell and Seymour (Fed.) at Mechanicsville, Ellison's Mill or Beaver Dam Creek. The two Hills did the fighting here and lost nearly 2000 men between them. Longstreet

did not engage. Skirmishing took place at Atlee's Station on the Virginia Central railroad, at Meadow Bridge on the Chickahominy and at Hanover Court-house ; and also at Hundley's Corner which Ewell's division was approaching from the west. On this day Stoneman commenced his operations preliminary to the evacuation of stores at White House.

*June 27.*—Six Confederate divisions under Whiting, Jackson, Ewell, D. H. Hill, Longstreet and A. P. Hill were concentrated about Gaines' Mill, Cold Harbour and thereabouts on the Chickahominy, and attacked the three Federal divisions under Morell, Sykes and Seymour assisted by Cooke's reserve cavalry. The Confederates lost about 7000 men in this action. Some skirmishing took place at Garnett's and Golding's Farms and at Fair Oaks.

*June 28.*—Jones (Con.) opposed W. F. Smith (Fed.) at Golding's and Garnett's Farms. Jones lost 400 men. Ewell (Con.) skirmished at Dispatch Station on the Richmond and York river railroad. Magruder is instructed by Lee to "hold his lines at all hazards."

*June 29.*—Jones and McLaws (Con.) oppose Richardson, Sedgwick and Kearney (Fed.) at Peach Orchard or Allen's Farm and about Fair Oaks Station, and later on the same forces

(Kearney being relieved by W. F. Smith) engage in the "battle" of Savage Station. Jones at Peach Orchard lost 28, McLaws at Savage Station lost 357 men. Couch's division (Fed.) skirmished near Willis Church on the James river road and Kearneyskirmished at Jordan's Ford. On this day Lee reproves Magruder for slackness in "pursuit."

*June 30.*—At White Oak Swamp Bridge the Federal rearguard (Richardson and W. F. Smith's divisions) faced the Confederates under Whiting and D. H. Hill, but the latter reported no loss. Three Confederate batteries lost 15 men. Huger's Confederates engaged some Federal artillery at "Brackett's" and lost 76 in Mahone's brigade. About Glendale, Nelson's Farm, Frazier's Farm or Willis Church, and on the New Market road and at Charles City crossroads, the Federals made a stand with the divisions of Richardson, Sedgwick, Hooker, Kearney and Seymour, which the Confederate divisions of A. P. Hill and Longstreet valiantly attacked until they had suffered a loss of about 3300 men. Farther south at Turkey Bridge and Malvern Cliff the Confederates under Holmes skirmished with the Federals under Sykes and Morell. Skirmishes took place at Jones' Bridge and at New Kent Court-house.

*July 1.*—At last ten Confederate divisions are concentrated for decisive action under Whiting and

Jackson, Ewell and D. H. Hill, Jones and McLaws, Longstreet and Huger, A. P. Hill and Magruder and Holmes ; but the Federals had discovered a battleground about Crews or Poindexter's Farm and Malvern Hill where eight divisions under Richardson and Sedgwick, Hooker and Kearney, Couch and Morell, Sykes and Seymour offered a successful resistance which lasted some hours. Longstreet alone did not engage: the other Confederate divisions between them lost 6000 men.

During the period of seven days it appears that the divisions of Whiting, Jackson and Ewell were only twice engaged, namely at Gaines' Mill (June 27) and at Malvern Hill (July 1) ; they comprised ten brigades of which three escaped with a total loss of 40, and since these brigades belonged to the " Stonewall " division there was unfavourable comment on the Valley corps commander. Jackson never divulged his reasons for conserving certain brigades at the expense of others during this campaign.

Longstreet was engaged on only two occasions, namely at Gaines' Mill (June 27) and Glendale (June 30), on both occasions putting in his entire command of 6 brigades and losing heavily. A. P. Hill who called his command the Light Division was ubiquitous, fighting at Mechanicsville (June 26), at Gaines' Mill (June 27), at Glendale (June 30)

and at Malvern Hill (July 1). Holmes fought at Oak Grove (June 25), Malvern Cliff (June 30) and Malvern Hill (July 1). It is apparent from the summary given in our Appendix that the Seven Days' Battles resolve themselves into two general actions, namely at Gaines' Mill (Cold Harbour) on June 27 and at Malvern Hill on July 1, and two partial attacks, namely at Mechanicsville on June 26 and at Glendale on June 30. The other affairs were engagements by single divisions, as Huger's at Oak Grove on June 25, as Jones' at Garnett's and Golding's on June 28 and McLaws' at Savage Station on June 29.

General McClellan avoided Bazaine's error at Colombey, for he succeeded in making good his retreat. General Lee could not with Jackson's corps gain the rear of the enemy and arrest his march as the Germans did that of the French at Vionville with their cavalry and horse artillery. When McClellan made a stand on July 1 he was able to rest his left on the James river, from which his gunboats could co-operate by their fire: and McClellan's final position at Harrison's Landing was that of Wellington at Torres Vedras, rather than that of Bazaine at Metz. Lee like Massena was compelled to withdraw his army from the front of an entrenched camp and consider the campaign at an end.

Complete interception is in fact an ideal seldom attained in war ; since he who turns is himself turned unless his numbers are sufficient to guard against a counterstroke : and when the enemy appears to lack enterprise and fails to retaliate it is generally because he is adopting deliberately a system of evasion : the attacker's blow is then delivered in the air ; and a stern chase is a long chase. Wellington never succeeded in intercepting a French army subsequent to the Convention of Cintra ; the Japanese vainly endeavoured to surround the Russian field army in Manchuria : even Moltke failed in 1866 to stay the retreat of the Austrians after Sadowa, and his triumph at Sedan was directly attributable to the malign influence of French politics upon French strategy.

Yet there is, the books tell us, a way to destroy one's enemy in war. The theory is perfect, the practical results are sure, if certain conditions are fulfilled. We have only to engage the enemy in our front so closely that he cannot extricate his infantry from our grasp, to pin him to his ground and wear down his powers of resistance while our intercepting force is secretly making its way to his flank and rear. The enemy will discover too late the deceit of which he is the victim ; he will then endeavour to form a new front, to improvise a new

system of defence ; but our attacks are incessant along his original front and so we prevent his thinning this line. Such is the theory. But to accomplish this we have not only to surprise the enemy ; we must even take care lest our own troops suspect that the part they are playing in front is really for the benefit of the flank attack—*Sic vos non vobis*.

And hitherto it has been our custom to regard the frontal engagement or Holding Attack as a species of skirmish or sham fight that may be entrusted to inferior troops under a second-rate commander, while we allot the flower of the army and our best general to the flank movement which is intended to culminate in the Decisive Attack : that is what General Lee did in 1862 : and that was his capital error.

He strengthened the hands of Jackson at the expense of Magruder and Jackson's corps was expected to win glory by a great victory. But Lee had reckoned without his host, for the 15 brigades on his left flank came only once into action before the seventh day ; and meanwhile he had reduced Magruder on his right to a cipher by weakening his command and bidding him act defensively against the enemy in his front. In the result McClellan was enabled to withdraw his right and constantly reinforce his left ; he evaded Jackson's army corps and scarce heeded Magruder's two divisions : and



it is permissible to hazard the opinion to-day, with the facts and figures now available, that if Jackson had commanded on the right and Magruder on the left, if Longstreet's six brigades in a central position had been used as a General Reserve, the Federals would have had to fear a double envelopment and must have fought to a finish in some position from which both the York and the James were equally inconvenient as supply depôts, as an alternative to headlong flight or capitulation.

The task which Lee had set himself may be contrasted with that which confronted Wellington in November 1813, when Soult barred the roads into France by occupying a position astride the Nivelle and holding a tactical front of 15 miles with 60,000 men. Wellington demonstrated on his left and attacked the centre down the Nivelle valley. Lee acted defensively on his right and attempted an enveloping movement on his left, at the risk of course of counter-attack. McClellan and Soult both evaded the more serious consequences of defeat by early retirement. Lee like Wellington had taken the measure of his opponent, but Lee did not possess a Hope or a Hill to carry out his plans. Moreover he lacked even the excess numbers in which Wellington for once in a way had rejoiced: and it is the surplus of 20,000 or 30,000 men in hand that converts the defeat into the destruction of an

enemy ; and the story of the Seven Days' Retreat on the Yorktown peninsula is the story of efforts always falling short of their just reward for want of a General Reserve. Lee's campaign failed for want of vigorous action on his right, which would have cut off McClellan from the James river after the York river line of retreat had been seized. Magruder, Huger and Holmes between them controlled 9 brigades and their united losses (4770) show that they were constantly in contact with the enemy ; but apparently their action was disjointed, Magruder's command being restricted to 6 brigades (13,000) while Huger and Holmes, each with 3 brigades, were virtually independent.

Magruder believed that his mission was defensive, since he had been instructed not to make any attack on the enemy in his front " unless absolutely certain of success " ; and these instructions were perfectly justified by the events of June 28, when McClellan had withdrawn from the left of the Chickahominy and was concentrated in front of Lee's right and centre, for the bridges being destroyed Lee's left wing was temporarily isolated.

At this supreme moment a Napoleon would have repeated the manœuvre of Austerlitz, but McClellan had no stomach for decisive victory and his chance was gone as soon as the bridges over the Chickahominy were restored. But McClellan's want of

enterprise should have emboldened Magruder and his allies, Huger and Holmes, to follow closely and delay his retreat, to hold him fast until Jackson and Longstreet attacked in flank ; but it is permissible to suggest that General Lee's proper place at this juncture was with his right not his left wing. It is easy to attack but difficult to delay. A straightforward advance to the "decisive" attack can be carried through by even second-rate leaders without supervision ; but the nice adjustment of strength which is indispensable for the "holding" attack demands the highest skill, and only Lee himself could have held close to the enemy the scattered commands of Magruder, Huger and Holmes.

Holmes had remained south of the James until June 29, and Lee's frequent messages to Magruder crossed other messages to Magruder from Longstreet and Jackson and the result was confusion and misfortune. There was the usual recriminatory correspondence later on, Magruder even getting sworn testimony from his guides on the question whether the road shown on the map as Quaker road was not known locally as Willis road, and so on. But all is summed up in saying that the decisive point after June 27 was the line of the James and the commanding general was not there.

The cavalry operations in Lee's first campaign are deserving of special notice. It is not a little remarkable that General Lee, himself like McClellan an engineer officer, should have so quickly perceived what had been hidden from every general — Wellington not excepted — for half-a-century; namely that the functions of cavalry are to operate at a distance from the main army, to be a perpetual thorn in the side of the enemy, and to be particularly active when the main armies are recuperating after a great battle and a feeling of apathy pervades the enemy's camps: and Lee's quality as a general may be gauged from the circumstance that on assuming command he first laid plans to mystify the enemy, and then let Stuart and the cavalry loose in order to gain information while he called in Jackson's detachment to strengthen his arm for a decisive blow which should initiate a strategic counter-stroke.

Stuart as is well known in the middle of June, a fortnight after the battle of Seven Pines, proceeded on a reconnaissance between the Chickahominy and Pamunkey rivers. Improving the occasion he

succeeded in passing round the rear of the Federal army, dispersing stray squadrons and companies on picket duty, collecting a number of prisoners and destroying communications and stores. Stuart took only 1200 men and a section of horse artillery organised in three commands under Martin and the two Lees (son and nephew of the general) who were materially aided no doubt by the knowledge of the country possessed by many of their men, natives of Virginia.

Porter was at New Bridge on the Chickahominy, his right flank covered by Cooke's small command of regular cavalry, which Stuart dispersed or evaded and then cut up the Federal communications. Stuart's three regiments and two guns were magnified by the Federal outposts into a force of all arms 3000 to 5000 strong; and the manner in which Stuart dealt with the Federal cavalry caused General Porter to remark of the G.O.C. cavalry division, "Cooke seems to have regarded his force as a reserve for the day of battle . . . no picket duty has been performed by it until ordered, and then Cooke seems to have confined his protection of our flank to scouting with one squadron . . . and when General Cooke did pursue he tied his legs with the infantry command."

Cooke's report is naturally in a different strain from that of his corps commander. He complains

of the great number of despatches and orders he received "every few moments" and it is evident from their several reports that Generals Porter, Sykes, Emory and Cooke had very little confidence in one another.

Cooke may or may not have been a good cavalry leader, but he was certainly never given a chance to prove his capacity; for the Federal practice was, whenever Stuart's incursions called for a little activity on the part of the Federal horsemen, to strip the cavalry leaders of their squadrons and send them in return some infantry and guns, with instructions for defence if the enemy was present or pursuit if he had been gone for a day or two: and it seems to have given these Federal generals some solid satisfaction afterwards to pen lengthy reports in which Stuart's mobile force is referred to as "Lee's guerillas."

We find Stuart marching about at will in rear of the enemy, sometimes sabring his cavalry, sometimes dismounting to skirmish with his infantry, burning camps on land and transports on water; chasing escorts away from supply waggons, cutting telegraph wires, obstructing the railroad and opening fire on "a train of cars" and burning the railroad bridge. His engineer officer is with the advanced guard, obtaining information of the enemy's strength, movements

and position, locating water and making rapid but accurate sketches. His signalling officer transmits orders on the battlefield, his gunnery expert, Captain Pelham, getting marvellous results out of his section of 12 pr. howitzers. He marches by day and by night, now and then halting 3 or 4 hours to let the column close up : he repairs with the rafters and joists of an old house a bridge over the Chickahominy 15 miles east of the railway and so gains the James river by Wilcox Landing, and thence completing his circular tour returns to Richmond.

Stuart never hints at being pursued or even disturbed by Porter's corps after the first brush with Cooke's regular cavalry (when Fitz Lee had the pleasure of routing the regiment in which he had formerly served) and yet the Federal narratives would lead one to suppose that a vigorous pursuit had taken place and that Stuart's men had barely escaped with their lives. Cooke, the G.O.C. cavalry division with singular fatuity remarks " the enemy was supported by infantry no doubt " which rather confirms Porter's opinion as to his unfitness ; for of course it was the absence of infantry that enabled Stuart to sweep like a tornado round the enemy on a radius of 25 miles. The cavalry leader who needed the " support " of infantry was already obsolete, though General Cooke had not the wit to

see it, and so it was left for an infantry soldier, Philip Sheridan, ultimately to impart to the Army of the Potomac a few notions as to the functions of cavalry in war.

Stuart's operations during the seven days' battles with nine regiments and Pelham's horse artillery exhibit also the tactical functions of cavalry. Colonel Rosser was detached with four regiments to observe the enemy's left and, by demonstrations in his front and vigorous attacks on his flank, harass and delay him if he attempted to move from White Oak Swamp towards the James. Stuart thus concluded his instructions to Rosser: "it is our first duty to whip the enemy and to effect that no necessary sacrifice is too great, no hardship too severe."

The right of the Confederates being thus guarded, Stuart with the remainder of the cavalry marched on June 25 and stationed himself on Jackson's left flank near Ashland on the Fredericksburg railroad. He of course gave Jackson the information obtained in the course of his reconnaissance (June 13-15) as to the topography of the country and the enemy's dispositions about the Totopotomy Creek, and on June 26 the cavalry preceded Jackson and bridged the Totopotomy near Pole Green church: at night Stuart furnished outposts for



Jackson's command on the line Cold Harbour-Old Church.

On June 27 Jackson united his command at Beaver Dam with the divisions of Longstreet and the two Hills, which had crossed the Chickahominy about Mechanicsville, and Stuart lay off on the left in reserve, patrolling towards the enemy, engaging his cavalry patrols, and doing some damage with the horse artillery. After dark the cavalry reconnoitred towards the Chickahominy at Grapevine Bridge and bivouacked at Cold Harbour.

Stuart was already collecting many prisoners "mostly of the regular army," while Jackson's headquarters were a couple of miles south-west at "New" Cold Harbour, when on June 28 he is ordered by Jackson to make for the York river railroad and intercept the enemy's retreat in that direction; and Stuart fell in with Ewell's division near Dispatch Station bent on the same errand. A squadron of Federal cavalry fled before him and Stuart tore up the track: leaving Ewell at the station he pushed on for White House. Here he found and reported to General Lee evidence of McClellan's resolve to abandon the York river line of supply and to seek a new base on the James. White House was in flames. Barges loaded with stores, tents, waggons, supply trains, locomotives and field forges—millions of dollars' worth of

property—were being burnt to avoid capture. Stuart later on sarcastically remarks “if the Federal people can be convinced that this was a part of McClellan’s plan, that it was his original design for Jackson to turn his right flank and our generals to force him from his strongholds, they certainly can never forgive him for the millions of public treasure that his superb strategy cost the nation.”

A gunboat on York river landed a party of Federal sharpshooters but Stuart’s men dismounting “deployed in pairs with intervals of 40 paces” and opened fire with their rifled carbines; and then a howitzer brought fire to bear upon the deck of the vessel: and when its commander recalled his landing party and made off down the river “the howitzer gave chase at a gallop” and the gunboat never returned. Stuart now regaled his command with “delicacies of every description” even “the fruits of the tropics” which had been provided by the Federal commissariat and now were abandoned by the Army of the Potomac. On June 30 General Stuart moved south to the Chickahominy: he had disabled both his Blakely and Napoleon guns and now relied on his 12 pr. howitzers, with which Pelham engaged the enemy on the opposite bank of the river until dark,

On this day the Confederate cavalry on the right of the army in the vicinity of Willis Church was ordered to locate the enemy, and its commander not being able to obtain any reliable information by espionage determined to drive back the Federal cavalry which covered the enemy's movements. He charged and overthrew the hostile cavalry, but venturing too far came under heavy fire and lost 4 officers and 50 men. This force was ordered to rejoin General Stuart two days afterwards.

On July 1 General Lee instructed Stuart to cross the Chickahominy and co-operate with the other arms: accordingly Stuart moved westward 11 miles to Bottom's Bridge, but ascertaining that the army had marched south-east he retraced his steps and crossed at Forge Bridge, where he met some divisional cavalry who informed him of Jackson's whereabouts: at dark Stuart had reached Rock's House, a point north-east of Malvern Hill, after a march of 42 miles in one day. Stuart believed that it was his appearance in this direction (divulged by the sound of his waggon wheels) that alarmed the Federals for their line of retreat and caused them to stampede in the night from Malvern Hill. Meanwhile General Lee had sent him orders to march on the point he had so happily selected.

Next morning (July 2) Stuart and Jackson meet: then discovering the abandoned camps of the enemy Stuart hastens to Haxall's Landing, too late however to intercept McClellan's march with his five corps. The day was spent in collecting Federal prisoners and gathering up the arms of the fugitives, in reconnoitring right and left to Shirley on the James and to Charles City Court-house (which at 10 A.M. was still unoccupied by the Federals) and finally in sending the horse artillery and a squadron to Westover, where Pelham located the enemy and reported during the night. Stuart forwards the report to Jackson and hastens with his main body to Evelington Heights, a plateau commanding the Federal position. From this point of vantage Stuart opened fire with his howitzers on the Army of the Potomac now on the river bank protected by creeks on both flanks and by high ground in front. General Lee had meanwhile ordered Jackson and Longstreet to the support of Stuart.

Stuart held this position on July 3 from 9 A.M. till 2 P.M. when his howitzer ammunition was expended and his sharpshooters had fired their last cartridge: and now a Federal battery opened fire upon him and Federal infantry was seen approaching his right. He had waited five hours for Longstreet's division to arrive and now was com-

pelled to save his command by flight. Longstreet having been misled by his guide could not reach Stuart till nightfall and not until next day (July 4) did Jackson arrive.

Meanwhile the Federals had themselves occupied the plateau from which Stuart had shelled their camps, and this disposition of the Army of the Potomac proved effective against any further attacks on the part of Lee's forces.

On July 5-7 Stuart's cavalry moved farther down the James and reinforced by artillery harassed the Federal transports as they moved up and down the river, but on July 8 at sundown Lee withdrew his army to Richmond covered by Stuart's cavalry who established a chain of posts from the James to the Chickahominy.

In striking contrast to Stuart's operations the report of General Cooke of the U.S. army tells of the abortive attempts of his 1st brigade (5½ squadrons) and of his 2nd brigade (2 "skeleton squadrons" and the provost guard) to charge an enemy "who had not yet emerged from the woods," with the result that the horses "regardless of the efforts of the riders" wheeled about and dashing through the Federal batteries convinced the gunners that they were charged by the enemy. The casualties on this occasion further reduced this "division" by 154 horses. The remainder

of the Federal cavalry had been distributed among the corps commanders, but in no instance did it effect anything on the peninsula that justified the issue of rations to 10 regiments and 22 companies, if history is to be trusted: even local protection was apparently little cared for, since the Federal commissaries afterwards declared that during the retreat "five hundred mounted resolute men might have captured a thousand prisoners and half the transportation of the army."

## CHAPTER XII

### OPERATIONS IN THE WEST

THE GREAT WATERWAYS—PADUCAH—BELMONT AND COLUMBUS  
—FORT HENRY AND FORT DONELSON—CAPITULATION OF  
15,000 CONFEDERATES—THE BATTLE OF SHILOH OR  
PITTSBURG LANDING—BEAUREGARD'S RETREAT TO  
CORINTH—GRANT THE APOSTLE OF THE OFFENSIVE.





## CHAPTER XII

### OPERATIONS IN THE WEST

A THOUSAND miles from the sea, at Cairo in the State of Illinois, the waters of the Ohio flow into the longest river in the world : and hereabouts the Cumberland and the Tennessee rivers discharge into the Ohio ; so that the region south of the Ohio and east of the Mississippi divided up by these waterways is constituted of three or four peninsulas. In these circumstances the control of the waterways is evidently of great military importance and in 1861 the Federals secured possession of all the vessels and pilots which navigated the four rivers. The Confederates on the other hand held the forts which commanded the waterways, and so the reduction of these forts became the immediate object of Federal operations in the West.

Paducah in Kentucky commanding the navigation of both the Ohio and the Tennessee was the scene of Ulysses S. Grant's earliest exploit on September 6, 1861. Grant had embarked in two gunboats overnight and arrived at Paducah at

8.30 A.M. when only a company of recruits held the place, who retreated by rail and thus gave Grant this strategic point without firing a shot; and its possession practically decided the question then pending as to whether the State of Kentucky, with a population of a million and a quarter of whom one-fifth were slaves, should adhere to the Union cause.

For the next two months Grant was occupied in organising his forces which by the end of October amounted to 20,000 men, his subordinate C. F. Smith having meanwhile secured Smithland at the mouth of the Cumberland river.

Grant's next objective was Belmont on the Mississippi, a post on the right bank connected by a ferry with the fortress and depôt of Columbus on the left bank, held for the Confederates by Bishop Polk. The ferry between Belmont and Columbus was in fact a line of communication between Kentucky and Missouri, and Grant's instructions were to demonstrate against Belmont so as to prevent any reinforcements reaching the Confederate general Price; who was being pressed by Frémont, Grant's immediate superior.

Grant on November 6 voyaged eighteen miles down the Mississippi from Cairo with 3000 men under convoy of two gunboats. He landed on the right bank and marched on the enemy's camp, dispersing

the Confederates north of Belmont after a fight of four hours. He captured their guns and took many prisoners, but his raw troops were demoralised by their first victory, and Grant seeing reinforcements coming across the river from Columbus set fire to the camps which his troops were looting and retired in the direction of his transports.

The enemy emboldened by Grant's retreat and the arrival of succour pursued by a shorter route and intercepted the Federals. The moment was a critical one for an inexperienced commander ; but when Grant's staff reported : "We are surrounded" the future President of the Republic replied : "If that is so, we must cut our way out as we cut our way in," a remark which stamped him at once as a fighting general and gave his men the cue for their behaviour at this crisis. They did in fact cut their way out, and Grant even collected his wounded before re-embarking under cover of his gunboats, which opened fire on the enemy at 60 yards' range with grape, canister and five-second shells.

Bishop Polk lost over 600 men in this action and Grant nearly as many ; but strange to say Grant was reprimanded for gaining the first of a series of victories which built up his great reputation and created the high moral of the western armies.

Halleck now relieved Frémont in command of this Department and stopped all further movements until the end of the year, but on February 16, 1862 he was electrified by a report from Grant that Fort Donelson had been captured with its garrison of 12,000 Confederates and 40 guns, besides stores, horses and other public property.

It was a famous victory. Grant had commenced operations by proceeding up the Tennessee river to Fort Henry with 17,000 men under convoy of seven gunboats, landing his troops just out of range of the heavy guns (17) of the fort. He detached C. F. Smith to seize high ground on the opposite bank of the river; the gunboats were to shell the water batteries (guns sunk in pits along the river bank), while the remainder of the troops was to invest Fort Henry on the land side and so prevent aid reaching the garrison.

The gunboats silenced the artillery of the fort, and Tilghman with his staff who had escaped Grant at Paducah now surrendered Fort Henry with guns and gunners; but the field troops had meanwhile escaped to Fort Donelson. The Confederates had it seems regarded Fort Henry as untenable from the outset and had fought the guns only to gain time for the withdrawal of the troops, who now marched eastward across the peninsula

to unite with the garrison of Fort Donelson on the Cumberland river. Grant abstained from tactical pursuit over swamps (heavy rains and swollen rivers had flooded the country) which had to be bridged, and called up reinforcements from Buell and from Hunter in Kansas. Halleck supported his subordinate with all available troops from Cairo, but Halleck's ideas were always of defence and he forwarded picks and shovels and wanted slaves impressed to labour at earth-works at Fort Henry. "Destroy the bridges at Clarksville" were his final instructions.

Grant however was an apostle of offensive warfare, and only waited for his gunboats, which had gone up the Tennessee as far as Florence in Alabama, to return to Fort Henry before sending them down the Tennessee and up the Cumberland to land below Fort Donelson and establish a "maritime base" for a new operation of a strictly aggressive character.

On February 12 Grant quitted Fort Henry with 15,000 men and 8 light batteries (having sent on his advanced guard the day before) taking only such rations as could be carried in haversacks and forty rounds in the cartridge boxes. Without tents or baggage the column marched 12 miles across the peninsula to Dover and Fort Donelson.

Here the Confederates had concentrated a

large force, drawn partly from Bowling Green and Cumberland City, but with no more competent leaders than Buckner, Pillow and Floyd ; and the latter having been so recently Secretary for War at Washington was in no small dread of the consequences of being captured.

Grant had invested Fort Donelson before night and on February 13 he attempted to close on the enemy's works, but was repulsed in an attempt to capture a battery with 3 regiments. He now waited for reinforcements and as the Confederates remained passive Grant extended his line until about 3 miles of works were held. The Federal troops bivouacked in extreme cold within point-blank range of the defenders, and being without rations or fire many were frozen to death : the wounded could not be removed nor even tended.

The next day gunboats with reinforcements arrived and at 3 P.M. the gunboats attacked the fort, but were disabled by the land batteries. Grant held on to his lines in spite of a storm of sleet and snow, and by the morning of February 15 he had collected 22,000 men. At last the Confederates decided to attack, and desperate fighting on the Federal right continued for hours, the garrison too late attempting to cut their way out and reach Nashville.

Grant with true military insight resolved to let his weak flank go, and attack in turn on the reverse flank with C. F. Smith's troops, who after a severe struggle got within the enemy's works before darkness put an end to the conflict. The Confederates fearing the renewal of the attack at dawn sent away by water some thousands of men (with whom were Pillow and Floyd) and Buckner was left to arrange terms of capitulation. Grant demanded unconditional and immediate surrender, and so the white flag was hoisted and Buckner handed over 65 guns, 17,600 muskets and 15,000 prisoners of war. Grant now had 27,000 men at his disposal although he had lost 2000 men.

After the victory a telegram arrived from his very cautious superior, Halleck: "Don't let gunboats go higher up than Clarksville; even then they must limit their operations to the destruction of the bridge and railroad," and we see that ineptitude in high places was prevalent in the West as in the East, but it was Grant's good fortune ultimately to overcome all obstacles put in his way.

In one matter Halleck, Sherman, Buell and Hunter deserve high praise: they all forwarded promptly to Grant the troops he needed to confirm success. The strategic results were as re-

markable as the tactical results, for the Confederate front had been broken—it was a case of strategic penetration—and Columbus in the west and Bowling Green in the east were now evacuated; Nashville fell; the whole of Kentucky and Tennessee was open to the Federals; and the Mississippi was free from St Louis to Arkansas.

Grant was now assigned to West Tennessee with the rank of major-general while W. T. Sherman took his place at Cairo. Smith who had loyally served under Grant, his former pupil at West Point and twenty years his junior, now was placed in command of an expedition up the Tennessee as far as Eastport east of Corinth.

Elated by the great victory at Fort Donelson on February 16 the Federals made preparations to resume the offensive, and a month later Grant's headquarters were fixed at Savannah on the right bank of the Tennessee. Meanwhile the expedition under C. F. Smith had pushed up the river as far as Eastport and then returning had established itself on the left bank at Pittsburg Landing. Grant now (March 17) assumed command of Smith's force, and of another force under Buell coming from Nashville on the left bank of the Cumberland river.

Pittsburg Landing is 19 miles from Corinth, where the two great railroads meet that traverse



the South and connect the Mississippi region with the Eastern theatre of operations, and where the Confederates were known to be concentrating. Halleck as usual prescribed caution. Buell was to bring 5 divisions (40,000) to reinforce Grant, but his movements were deliberate. He took 17 days to march 90 miles, building bridges and mending bad roads. Meanwhile Grant had concentrated 5 divisions (McClelland, C. F. Smith, Wallace, Sherman, Hurlbut) at Pittsburg Landing, himself remaining at Savannah in order to organise fresh troops coming up from Missouri and be in a position to communicate early with Buell, since Halleck had forbidden him to attack until Buell arrived. Grant's own view was that "the enemy are gathering strength at Corinth quite as rapidly as we are here, and the sooner we attack the easier will be the task of taking the place." Now the Confederates gained contact and after April 2 there was skirmishing daily; a reconnaissance in force on April 4 on the part of the Confederates was followed up the next day by a bold advance of their cavalry in Sherman's front. Buell's advanced guard was now approaching, but it halted on the right bank of the Tennessee river.

On Sunday, April 6 the blow fell, when the Confederates who had advanced from Corinth under Sidney Johnston on April 3 attacked the

right of the Federals near Shiloh church, where Sherman's division was in position, his right flank resting on a creek. The Federals were not entrenched, because the Western armies were still confident that in tactics as in strategy a vigorous offensive was possible and judicious on all occasions. But on Sunday it was the Confederates who seized the initiative, and Grant himself is at Savannah nine miles distant when heavy firing at Shiloh is reported. Calling up Buell's advanced guard (Nelson's division) to a point opposite Pittsburg where it could cross the river, Grant hastened to Shiloh and saw that the rebel onset extended along his entire front, since both his flanks were protected by creeks. The divisions of Sherman and Prentiss gave way and the Federal line (33,000 men) drifted back a mile towards the river, indeed many thousands fled to the Landing three miles away. Grant occupied himself with the supply of ammunition (brought from the river to the front by a single narrow road) and in reorganising the stragglers with the aid of his cavalry, while hammer-and-tongs fighting went on for hours round Shiloh and the Confederates continued to gain ground.

Grant's reserve divisions having failed to arrive by 5 P.M. the Federal left was forced back to within half-a-mile of the river, for the Confederates

had crossed a creek on their left which the Federals had regarded as an impassable obstacle : a ravine however afforded the Federal left a fresh point of support, and here with their backs to the river and aided by the gunboats they at last checked the assaults of the enemy. Sidney Johnston had fallen and Beauregard assumed command of the Confederates just as Buell's advanced guard arrived to succour Grant's left. But the fight now died away owing to exhaustion on both sides.

Grant magnificently rose to the occasion, and at this supreme crisis on Sunday night gave orders to attack in the morning. " To Sherman he told the story of the Donelson battle ; how at a certain period he saw that either side was ready to give way if the other showed a bold front ; and he determined in consequence to do that very thing—to advance at once on the enemy ; when as he had foreseen the enemy surrendered." Grant at Shiloh on the evening of April 6 believed the Donelson situation would repeat itself notwithstanding the Federal camps and the Federal wounded were already in the hands of the enemy. The Confederates had attacked in force but yet had been prevented from gaining a decisive victory. During the battle on both sides all organisation had been lost, each unit or group fighting wherever it found

a leader until night overtook them and the combatants bivouacked where they stood.

Grant not unmindful of the part Providence is said to play in regard to "big battalions" ferried over the river on that dark and stormy night all the troops of Buell that had come up during the day. With the divisions of Nelson, McCook and Crittenden (20,000) he strengthened his left and relieved the broken regiments that had fought all Sunday. In violent rain the troops on both sides slept on their arms, while the commanders exerted themselves to distribute the reinforcements and Federal gunboats dropped shells into the Confederate lines. Grant's final instructions to every divisional general were to "attack with a heavy skirmish line as soon as it was light enough to see, and then to follow up with his entire command leaving no reserves." Each divisional leader loyally carried out his orders: the Army of the Tennessee (as Grant's command was now called) commenced its counter-attack at 6 A.M. on Monday, and by 2 P.M. the Confederates had had enough of fighting.

Bragg and Beauregard had no doubt learnt of Buell's lethargic movements, and their attack on Sunday had been launched with the object of destroying Grant's force before assistance could reach it: it was an attempt to emulate Napoleon

in Italy ; but the energy of Napoleon was lacking or the fighting power of the Sardinians was not equal to that of the Federals ; for as we have seen the stubborn defence of Sunday was succeeded by a vigorous offensive on Monday ; and it was the Southerners who then gave way. " Our troops," says Beauregard, " exhausted by days of incessant fatigue and want of rest, and ranks thinned by killed, wounded and stragglers amounting on the whole to nearly half our force, fought bravely but with the want of that animation and spirit which characterised them the preceding day."

It was the old, old story of the big battalions. Beauregard on Monday could put in only 20,000 men but Grant had behind him the means to repair his losses, since Halleck controlled 120,000 bayonets in the West. The fighting on Monday was light compared with that of Sunday, for the Confederates soon drifted five miles to the rear and the Shiloh camp was again in Grant's possession on Monday night. The Confederate rearguard under Breckenridge covered the retreat of the beaten forces towards Corinth ; but immediate pursuit was pronounced impossible by Buell's division commanders who alone were in a condition to undertake it ; and history tells how rare it is for a general to find himself with sufficient remaining energy to dominate the situation at

the moment when the enemy is *in extremis*. Grant had lost over 12,000 men: Beauregard reported 11,000 casualties. No subsequent battle in the West was so fiercely fought, and Grant in after years compared Shiloh only with the Wilderness.

Two days later the Federal general-in-chief arrived and quickly infected Grant's army with the ideas of a scientific soldier turned lawyer. Halleck indeed was the antithesis of Grant who already perceived that the supposed rebels were in fact a nation in arms, and that the conquest of the Mississippi Plain would tax the energies and resources of the North to their utmost. Grant held the belief which is now the commonplace of our text-books, namely that "armies and men must become the points of attack; that these should be pursued whenever they moved, regardless comparatively of positions and forts; that the armies must not only be defeated but destroyed, and that therefore the policy of merely outwitting or outmanœuvring the enemy, or forcing the evacuation of strongholds and the abandonment of territory and allowing him thus to concentrate his real force, was unwise; that every effort should be made to find and fight the rebel armies again and again, and that only when these armies were either subdued or annihilated, would the rebellion end."

Badeau, writing in 1867, after serving on Grant's personal staff during the last and the greatest campaign in 1864-65, attributes these views to Grant in 1862; and even allowing for the colouring and shaping they underwent subsequent to the events of 1862 they are sufficiently interesting to place on record as showing that the Napoleonic tradition was alive in America in the sixties, and that the modern gospel of The Offensive had its apostles prior to the Metz and Sedan campaigns, which for so many of us seem the Alpha and Omega of the military art.

Unfortunately for Grant such advanced views were obnoxious to his military superiors in 1862, and when Halleck arrived on the scene two days after the battle of Shiloh he proceeded to enforce his opinion that the pick and shovel were of more importance than the musket and bayonet. Grant was elbowed out of his command; there was a recurrence of the complaints we have already noticed; and then a virulent attack on Grant commenced on the part of newspapers, congressmen and other politicians, who even urged President Lincoln to remove Grant from the army.

In the result the Western army was reorganised and divided into three corps and a reserve under Thomas, Pope, Buell and McClelland; and then Halleck slowly moved these masses towards



Corinth: entrenching at every step he took six weeks to march fifteen miles, and meanwhile the Confederates were busily engaged in converting a railway junction into a field fortress.

Grant in vain pointed out when he visited Halleck's headquarters in May 1862 that the enemy intended to hold Corinth with a detachment while concentrating to the rear; and when he advised an immediate advance on the right, turning the Confederate position and sweeping them from the field, Halleck scouted Grant's idea and carried out his own plans; and these plans ended a month later (May 30) in his drawing out his forces—the largest number ever assembled in the West—to await attack instead of delivering it. As a matter of history we find that the Confederates had fought for Corinth on April 6-7 at Shiloh, and having as they fully recognised lost the entire stake it is not surprising that when Halleck's "strategic pursuit" ended at Corinth he found there only a collection of "quaker" guns and dummy trenches. Beauregard had evacuated the town ten days before.


Pope and Buell were now sent on a wild-goose chase after the enemy; that is to say 70,000 men were advanced about 30 miles in a line which stretched from Booneville to Blackland; and then having waited two days as if expecting



attack from Beauregard's corps of hardly 20,000 men the Federals marched back to Corinth.

Fresh dispositions were made on June 10 when Buell went towards Chattanooga, the great strategic point in East Tennessee, and Grant was sent to Memphis on the Mississippi which the Federal navy had seized a few days previously. Later on Grant resumed control of the Army of the Tennessee and fixed his headquarters at Corinth ; but his forces were gradually diminished by Buell's demands, so that the victor of Fort Donelson and Shiloh, the apostle of the offensive, was compelled to remain in an attitude of passive defence until the spring of 1863 when the Vicksburg campaign opened.

Meanwhile General Pope went east to command the Army of Virginia, and in August 1862 was hunted across the Potomac by General Lee and driven into Washington with a loss of 17,000 men, after leaving 12,000 men at Harper's Ferry who surrendered to "Stonewall" Jackson in September. A week later the Confederates were expelled from Maryland by General McClellan, whose failure to pursue resulted in his dismissal from the Union army.



## APPENDIX A

[*Confidential*]

SPECIAL ORDER }  
No. 28.

HEADQUARTERS VALLEY MOUNTAIN,  
Sept. 8, 1861.

I. General H. R. Jackson, commanding Monterey division, will detach a column of not more than two thousand men under Colonel Rust, to turn the enemy's position at CHEAT MOUNTAIN PASS at daylight on the 12th inst. (Thursday). During the night preceding the morning of the 12th instant, General Jackson having left a suitable guard for his own position with the rest of his available forces will take post on the eastern ridge of CHEAT MOUNTAIN, occupy the enemy in front, and coöperate in the assault of his attacking column should circumstances favour. The march of Colonel Rust will be so regulated as to attain his position during the same night, and at the dawn of the appointed day (Thursday, 12th) he will, if possible, surprise the enemy in his trenches and carry them.

II. The "Pass" having been carried, General Jackson, with his whole fighting force, will immediately move forward toward HUTTONSVILLE prepared against an attack from the enemy, taking every precaution against firing upon the portion of the army operating west of CHEAT MOUNTAIN, and ready to coöperate with it against the enemy in TYGART'S VALLEY. The supply-waggons of the advancing columns will follow, and the reserve will occupy CHEAT MOUNTAIN.

III. General Anderson's brigade will move

down TYGART'S VALLEY, following the west slope of the CHEAT MOUNTAIN RANGE, concealing his movements from the enemy. On reaching WYMAN'S (or the vicinity) he will refresh his force unobserved, send forward intelligent officers to make sure of his further course, and during the night of the 11th (Wednesday) proceed to the STAUNTON TURNPIKE where it intersects the west top of CHEAT MOUNTAIN, so as to arrive there as soon after daylight on the 12th (Thursday) as possible. He will make dispositions to hold the turnpike, prevent reinforcements reaching CHEAT MOUNTAIN PASS, cut the telegraph wire, and be prepared, if necessary, to aid in the assault of the enemy's position on the middle top of CHEAT MOUNTAIN by General Jackson's division, the result of which he must await. He must particularly keep in mind that the movement of General Jackson is to surprise the enemy in their defences. He must, therefore, not discover his movement, nor advance—before Wednesday night—beyond a point where he can conceal his force. CHEAT MOUNTAIN PASS being carried, he will turn down the mountain and press upon the left and rear of the enemy in TYGART'S VALLEY, either by the old or new turnpike, or the BECKY RUN ROAD, according to circumstances.

IV. General Donelson's brigade will advance on the right of TYGART'S VALLEY RIVER, seizing the paths and avenues leading from that side to the river, and driving back the enemy that may endeavour to retard the advance of the centre along the turnpike, or turn his right.

V. Such of the artillery as may not be used on the flanks will proceed along the HUTTONSVILLE TURNPIKE, supported by Major Munford's

battalion, followed by the rest of Colonel Gilham's brigade in reserve.

VI. Colonel Burk's brigade will advance on the left of TYGART'S VALLEY RIVER, in supporting distance of the centre, and clear that side of the valley of the forces of the enemy that might obstruct the advance of the artillery.

VII. The cavalry under Major Lee will follow, according to the nature of the ground, in rear of the left, Colonel Burk's brigade. It will watch the movements of the enemy in that quarter; give notice of, and prevent, if possible, any attempt to turn the left of the line and be prepared to strike when opportunity offers.

VIII. The waggons of each brigade, properly packed and guarded under the charge of their respective quartermasters—who will personally superintend their movements—will pursue the main turnpike, under the general direction of the Chief Quartermaster, in rear of the army and out of cannon range of the enemy.

IX. Commanders on both lines of operations will particularly see that their corps wear the distinguishing badge, and that both officers and men take every precaution not to fire on our own troops. This is essentially necessary as the forces on both sides of CHEAT MOUNTAIN may unite. They will also use every exertion to prevent noise and straggling from the ranks, correct quietly any confusion that may occur, and cause their commands to rapidly execute their movements when in presence of the enemy.

By order of General W. W. LORING :

CHARLES L. STEVESON,  
*Assistant-Adjutant and Inspector-General.*

## APPENDIX B

MOUNTAIN DEPARTMENT, HEADQUARTERS IN THE FIELD,  
HARRISONBURG, VA., *June 8, 1862.*

### *Order of March*

#### ADVANCE GUARD

1. Colonel Cluseret's brigade.
2. The pioneers of all brigades, as also the axemen of every regiment, to start at 5 A.M.
3. Fourth New York Cavalry.
4. General Stahel's brigade, with Bucktail Rifles as flankers, at 5.30 A.M.

#### MAIN COLUMN

5. Cavalry, under command of Colonel Zagonyi, at 5.45 A.M.
6. General Milroy's brigade, at 6 A.M.
7. General Schenck's brigade, at 6.15 A.M.
8. General Steinwehr's brigade, at 6.30 A.M.
9. General brigade train, at 6.45 A.M.

#### REARGUARD

10. General Bayard's brigade.

Each regiment to be accompanied by its ambulances and a sufficient number of waggons to carry their cooking utensils.

The train will move in the order of brigades.

All horses unable to perform service to be left at this place until further orders.

By order of Major-General FRÉMONT :

ALBERT TRACY.

*Colonel and Assistant Adjutant-General.*

## APPENDIX C

### GENERAL LEE'S OPERATION ORDERS

GENERAL ORDERS, }  
No. 75. }

HDQRS. ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA  
*June 24, 1862.*

I. General Jackson's command will proceed to-morrow from ASHLAND toward the SLASH CHURCH and encamp at some convenient point west of the CENTRAL RAILROAD. Branch's brigade, of A. P. Hill's division, will also to-morrow evening take position on the CHICKAHOMINY near HALF-SINK. At 3 o'clock Thursday morning, 26th instant, General Jackson will advance on the road leading to POLE GREEN CHURCH, communicating his march to General Branch, who will immediately cross the CHICKAHOMINY and take the road leading to MECHANICSVILLE. As soon as the movements of these columns are discovered, General A. P. Hill, with the rest of his division, will cross the CHICKAHOMINY near MEADOW BRIDGE and move direct upon MECHANICSVILLE. To aid his advance, the heavy batteries on the CHICKAHOMINY will at the proper time open upon the batteries at MECHANICSVILLE. The enemy being driven from MECHANICSVILLE and the passage across the bridge opened, General Longstreet, with his division and that of General D. H. Hill, will cross the CHICKAHOMINY at or near that point, General D. H. Hill moving to the support of

General Jackson and General Longstreet supporting General A. P. Hill. The four divisions, keeping in communication with each other and moving *en echelon* on separate roads, if practicable, the left division in advance, with skirmishers and sharpshooters extending their front, will sweep down the CHICKAHOMINY and endeavour to drive the enemy from his position above NEW BRIDGE, General Jackson bearing well to his left, turning BEAVER DAM CREEK and taking the direction toward COLD HARBOUR. They will then press forward toward the YORK RIVER RAILROAD, closing upon the enemy's rear and forcing him down the CHICKAHOMINY. Any advance of the enemy toward RICHMOND will be prevented by vigorously following his rear and crippling and arresting his progress.

II. The divisions under Generals Huger and Magruder will hold their positions in front of the enemy against attack, and make such demonstrations Thursday as to discover his operations. Should opportunity offer, the feint will be converted into a real attack, and should an abandonment of his entrenchments by the enemy be discovered, he will be closely pursued.

III. The 3rd Virginia Cavalry will observe the CHARLES CITY ROAD. The 5th Virginia, the 1st North Carolina, and the Hampton Legion (cavalry) will observe the DARBYTOWN, VARINA, and OSBORNE ROADS. Should a movement of the enemy down the CHICKAHOMINY be discovered they will close upon his flank and endeavour to arrest his march.

IV. General Stuart, with the 1st, 4th, and 9th



Virginia Cavalry, the cavalry of Cobb's Legion and the Jeff. Davis Legion, will cross the CHICKAHOMINY to-morrow and take position to the left of General Jackson's line of march. The main body will be held in reserve, with scouts well extended to the front and left. General Stuart will keep General Jackson informed of the movements of the enemy on his left and will co-operate with him in his advance. The 10th Virginia Cavalry (Colonel Davis) will remain on the NINE-MILE ROAD.

V. General Ranson's brigade, of General Holmes' commands, will be placed in reserve on the WILLIAMSBURG ROAD by General Huger, to whom he will report for orders.

VI. Commanders of divisions will cause their commands to be provided with three days' cooked rations. The necessary ambulances and ordnance trains will be ready to accompany the divisions and receive orders from their respective commanders. Officers in charge of all trains will invariably remain with them. Batteries and wagons will keep on the right of the road. The chief engineer, Major Stevens, will assign engineer officers to each division, whose duty it will be to make provision for overcoming all difficulties to the progress of the troops. The staff departments will give the necessary instructions to facilitate the movements herein directed.

By command of General LEE :

R. H. CHILTON,  
*Assistant Adjutant General.*

## APPENDIX D

### SUMMARY OF THE FORCES ENGAGED DURING THE SEVEN DAYS' BATTLES

#### FEDERALS

SUMNER's corps of 2 divisions (6 brigades with 8 batteries and 4 companies cavalry) fought at Peach Orchard and Savage Station on June 29, at Glendale on June 30 and at Malvern Hill on July 1 (lost 2420).

HEINTZELMAN's corps of 2 divisions (6 brigades with 8 batteries and 1 regiment cavalry) fought at Oak Grove on June 25, at Savage Station on June 29, at White Oak Swamp and Glendale on June 30 and at Malvern Hill on July 1 (lost 1973).

KEYES' corps of 2 divisions (5 brigades with 8 batteries and 1 regiment cavalry) partly engaged on June 30 at White Oak Swamp and Turkey Bridge (lost 800).

PORTER's corps of 3 divisions (9 brigades with 35 batteries and 2 regiments cavalry) fought at Mechanicsville on June 26, Gaines' Mill on June 27, Glendale and Turkey Bridge on June 30 and at Malvern Hill on July 1 (lost 7601).

FRANKLIN's corps of 2 divisions (6 brigades with 7 batteries and 1 regiment and 2 companies cavalry) fought at Golding's and Garnett's on June 28, at White Oak Swamp on June 29 and Malvern Hill on July 1 (lost 2878.)

COOKE's Cavalry Reserve (2 regiments and 9

companies) fought at Gaines' Mill or Cold Harbour on June 27 (lost 154). Engineers lost 23.

HEADQUARTERS including garrison at White House (1 battery; 12 companies infantry; 1 regiment and 7 companies cavalry; dragoons, rifles and volunteer cavalry) reported no casualties.

General McClellan had at his disposal 32 brigades and 67 batteries and a force of cavalry amounting to 10 regiments and 22 companies and his total losses may be estimated at 16,000 or an average of 500 per brigade.

#### CONFEDERATES

JACKSON'S corps of 4 divisions (15 brigades with 16 batteries) fought at Gaines' Mill or Cold Harbour on June 27 and at Malvern Hill on July 1; and 2 brigades of D. H. Hill's division were engaged also on June 26, at Mechanicsville. Jackson lost 6685, of whom nearly two-thirds belonged to D. H. Hill's division.

MAGRUDER'S corps of 3 divisions (6 brigades with 13 batteries) fought at Garnett's and Golding's Farms on June 28, at Savage Station and Peach Orchard on June 29 and at Malvern Hill on July 1. Magruder lost 2491.

LONGSTREET'S division (6 brigades with 5 batteries) fought at Gaines' Mill or Cold Harbour on June 27 and at Glendale on June 30. Longstreet lost 4438.

HUGER'S division (5 brigades with 6 batteries) fought at Oak Grove on June 25, at Bracketts on June 30 and at Malvern Hill on July 1. Huger lost 2167.

9  
A. P. HILL's division (6 brigades with 9 batteries) fought at Mechanicsville on June 26, at Gaines' Mill or Cold Harbour on June 27. A. P. Hill lost 4145.

HOLMES' division (1 brigade with 6 batteries) fought at Oak Grove on June 25, at Turkey Bridge on June 30 and at Malvern Hill on July 1. Holmes lost 724, of whom 624 were in Ransom's brigade.

WISE's brigade (2 battalions with 4 batteries and heavy artillery).

Reserve artillery consisted of 23 batteries.

Stuart's cavalry consisted of 12 regiments.

General Lee's force thus consisted of 40 brigades, 82 batteries and Stuart's cavalry, say 80,000 effectives, viz. 73,000 infantry, 3000 cavalry and 4000 artillery and his total losses may be estimated at 20,000, an average of 500 per brigade or 25 per cent. of his effective strength.



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